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- Soutenir l'émergence et le partage d'un savoir socialement pertinent ainsi que son appropriation par les décideurs, intervenants scolaires et organismes communautaires.

- Accentuer la visibilité de l'expertise canadienne au plan international et favoriser le développement des partenariats avec divers pays d'immigration ou pays multiculturels en émergence.

- Soutenir la formation et l'échange interprovincial et international des futurs et nouveaux chercheurs.

Son programme, qui privilégie une perspective comparative et internationale, a pour thème général le rôle de l'éducation formelle dans le maintien et la transformation des rapports ethniques. Il comporte trois grands axes:

Axe1: Culture, socialisation, curriculum

Axe2: Égalité des chances et équité

Axe3: Politiques et pratiques dans une perspective comparative

La Chaire organise régulièrement des conférences-midi et des séminaires réunissant chercheurs et praticiens ainsi qu'un évènement majeur annuel. Elle mène également des collaborations avec des universités indiennes dont *Jawaharlal Nehru University* (JNU) et la *National University of Educational Planning and Administration* (NUEPA) sur divers enjeux liés à l'éducation et au pluralisme.

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The Chair has the following mandates:

- To develop and strengthen research activities in the field of ethnic relations, particularly by exploring new research problems and approaches and defining programs with a comparative and international perspective;

- To contribute to the dissemination and exchange of knowledge in the field of ethnic relations, particularly by forging ties with other researchers and various players within the community;

- To play a role in establishing new faculty and inter-faculty teaching programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

The main focus of this program, through its comparative and international perspective, is the role of formal education in the maintenance and transformation of ethnic relations. It has three main components:

Component 1: Culture, Socialization, Curriculum

Component 2: Equal Opportunities and Equity

Component 3: Policies and Practices from a Comparative Perspective

The Chair regularly organizes lunchtime conferences and seminars, as well as a major annual event, which enable researchers and practitioners to come together and discuss related topics. She is also pursuing collaborations with Indian universities, such as *Jawaharlal Nehru University* (JNU) and the *National University of Educational Planning and Administration* (NUEPA), on a variety of issues related to education and pluralism.

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PART 1 – RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY: GOVERNMENTS' AND NON-STATE ACTORS' POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND ACTIONS

PART 2 – SECULARISM, RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

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COURRIER

LETTERS

PART 3 – THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND OF THE MEDIA IN BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY

PART 4 – COMBATING INEQUALITY AND INSURING EQUITY

INTRODUCTION – REPENSER L'ÉQUITÉ EN INDE ET AU QUÉBEC: VERS DES SOCIÉTÉS INCLUSIVES

Marie Mc Andrew, Priti Singh et Émilie Parent

En ce 21ᵉ siècle, la question des relations entre groupes ethniques définis par des marqueurs variés tels que la langue, la culture ou la religion, s'impose plus que jamais. Plusieurs sociétés, qu'elles aient étés ou non marquées par une diversité historique profonde, ont été transformées par l'intensification et la diversification des flux migratoires au niveau international ou national. De plus, alors que plusieurs analystes avaient prédit que l'ethnicité jouerait un rôle moins important pour les individus et pour les groupes à la suite de la mondialisation et de l'émergence de nouvelles solidarités, elle constitue encore un facteur majeur dans l'explication de la persistance des inégalités. Son rôle dans la mobilisation politique sur une base identitaire s'est aussi accru significativement et ce, autant au sein des majorités que des minorités.

Alors que les divers modèles traditionnels de citoyenneté sont remis en question, d'importants débats sur la pertinence respective des diverses approches de « gestion » de la diversité, telles que l'assimilation, l'intégration, l'interculturalisme ou le multiculturalisme, connaissent un développement marqué. Ces questions intéressent non seulement les chercheurs et les décideurs, mais également les citoyens « ordinaires ». L'essentiel des controverses porte sur la priorité et la conciliation de quatre objectifs sociétaux d'importance égale, souvent complémentaires mais parfois conflictuels: la valorisation du pluralisme, l'actualisation de l'équité, le respect de valeurs démocratiques ainsi que la promotion d'un espace civique harmonieux. La recherche d'un équilibre souhaitable à cet égard ne peut être basée seulement sur des considérations normatives. Elle nécessite, en effet, une analyse contextuelle comparative du degré auquel ces objectifs sont atteints dans différentes sociétés, ce qui a des conséquences immédiates sur la définition des encadrements institutionnels, des politiques, des programmes ainsi que des actions qui devraient être mises en place.

Certains considèrent que de telles comparaisons ne sont légitimes que si elles impliquent des sociétés qui appartiennent à des aires de civilisations communes ou connaissent un niveau équivalent de développement, *i.e.* donc, pour l'essentiel, les pays d'immigration occidentaux.

Cependant, un tel positionnement épistémologique limite grandement la pertinence de telles entreprises, car on exclut alors la plus grande démocratie multiculturelle du monde, l'Inde, dont les expériences dans le domaine de la diversité, qu'elles soient positives ou négatives, sont susceptibles de faire émerger bien des leçons pour d'autres pays. C'est pour cette raison que le Centre d'études ethniques des universités montréalaises (CEETUM) et le *Center for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies* (CCULAS) ont initié une collaboration pour développer la recherché et les échanges dans le domaine du multiculturalisme, du nationalisme, de la diversité et de l'équité, qui a culminé en 2008 par la signature d'une entente de coopération officielle, la première à être signée dans le domaine des sciences sociales entre une université indienne et une université canadienne de langue française. Après avoir organisé une première conference à Delhi en 2005 intitulée *Multiculturalism: Policy Concerns and Problem Area in Canada and India*, ces deux institutions ont en effet été convaincues que le développement des comparaisons sur cet enjeu s'imposait, spécialement avec le Québec, étant donné la spécificité de son contexte sociologique et politique. En effet, même si la dynamique des relations ethniques est beaucoup plus complexe en Inde et que le pluralisme y origine non principalement de l'immigration mais essentiellement de nombreux processus historiques, la construction d'une société qui soit à la fois pluraliste et inclusive constitue un défi commun dans les deux sociétés. Elles partagent également la même tension entre un engagement marqué en faveur du libéralisme sur le plan légal, la forte popularité normative du républicanisme ou du nationalisme ainsi que l'existence d'un communautarisme *de facto* prévalant au niveau de la société civile. Elles ont aussi connu des controverses similaires portant sur la place de la religion dans l'espace public, qui ont remis en question leur modèle commun de

laïcité ouverte, ainsi que sur les effets limités des approches traditionnelles de discrimination positive sur la diminution significative des inégalités intergroupes.

Comment faire en sorte que l'accommodement des pratiques culturelles soit compatible avec le libéralisme et les droits humains, et tout spécialement l'égalité des sexes ? Devrions-nous mieux définir les limites de la diversité dans un contexte où le fondamentalisme religieux est en croissance ? Les différents programmes d'affirmation positive visant à combattre les inégalités ont-ils été efficaces ou, au contraire, ont-ils essentiellement contribué à accentuer les différences de classe à l'intérieur des groupes-cibles ? Jusqu'à quel point le débat actuel autour du pluralisme est-il associé à une augmentation des inégalités entre groupes ethniques, linguistiques et religieux ainsi qu'à une promotion des attitudes ou des comportements intolérants ? Quel devrait être le rôle à cet égard deux institutions majeures au sein des sociétés démocratiques, l'éducation et les médias ?

C'est ce type de questions, parmi d'autres, que 20 experts indiens et québécois d'origines et de disciplines diverses ont discuté durant le séminaire international « *Repenser l'équité en Inde et au Québec: vers des sociétés inclusives* », tenu à Montréal le 27 novembre 2011. Le séminaire a été soutenu par le Secrétariat aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes (SAIC) du gouvernement du Québec et co-organisé par le CEETUM et le CCULAS, avec l'aide de deux nouveaux partenaires, le Pôle de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (PRIAS) de l'Université de Montréal et l'Association des études canadiennes (AEC). Le séminaire a aussi réuni, sur invitation, un plus large public de chercheurs, d'étudiants et de partenaires des divers niveaux de gouvernement et d'organisations communautaires intéressés à la question, qui ont participé activement aux discussions.

Le séminaire visait trois objectifs principaux: 1) permettre à un groupe choisi de chercheurs indiens et à un groupe élargi de chercheurs et de décideurs québécois de se familiariser avec leur contexte respectif de relations ethniques, avec un accent particulier sur les questions d'inclusion et d'équité ; 2) soutenir l'identification d'intérêts communs dans le domaine de la recherche ou du développement des politiques publiques et ce, tant au niveau théorique et empirique que pratique ; 3) permettre l'identification de projets de collaboration futurs et éventuellement, à moyen terme, d'un agenda de recherche commun. Lors de la dernière session du séminaire, il est apparu clairement que les échanges et les interactions entre les participants avaient permis de développer une atmosphère favorable à des collaborations futures. La publication de ce numéro spécial de *Diversité canadienne* représente un premier pas dans cette direction.

Cependant, les articles que les lecteurs trouveront dans ce volume ne sont pas le simple reflet des présentations données durant le séminaire, mais résultent des échanges tenus durant cet événement. Dans la mesure du possible, nous avons encouragé des contributeurs indiens et québécois à produire ensemble des articles comparatifs. Dans la plupart des autres cas, les contributions québécoises ou indiennes couvrent des enjeux similaires et reflètent des préoccupations communes. Étant donné l'importance grandissante de la communauté sud-asiatique au Québec, nous avons aussi demandé à certains experts de ce domaine de partager leur réflexion sur divers enjeux qui concernent ce groupe dans la province.

Les 23 articles dans ce volume sont regroupés autour de quatre grands thèmes, dont la pertinence scientifique et politique est évidente. Cinq articles couvrent la question du rôle des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques dans la gestion des défis liés à la diversité. Six articles se penchent sur les questions entourant la laïcité et la diversité religieuse. Six articles abordent le rôle de l'éducation et des médias dans la construction d'une société inclusive. Et, enfin, les cinq derniers discutent comment les deux sociétés combattent l'inégalité. Nous sommes particulièrement fières d'avoir réussi à convaincre tant de personnes d'origines et de disciplines si diversifiées de contribuer à notre projet. Du côté québécois, les auteurs proviennent de sept universités, institutions publiques ou associations de la société civile. La contribution indienne est aussi impressionnante, avec des auteurs de sept institutions académiques, gouvernementales ou privées, situées dans quatre États indiens.

Nous espérons que cette publication permettra aux lecteurs des deux contextes de mieux comprendre les enjeux liés à l'équité et la diversité dans l'autre société et les convaincra de l'intérêt d'intensifier les collaborations dans la recherche de solutions aux problèmes communs. La revue devrait être particulièrement utile dans les nombreux centres d'études canadiennes québécoises ou francophones qui connaissent un développement significatif en Inde et dans le plus petit nombre, toutefois croissant, de centres d'études indiennes ou sud-asiatiques au Québec. Les lecteurs indiens qui parlent ou qui étudient le français ainsi que certains lecteurs québécois qui sont moins à l'aise avec la langue anglaise trouveront également un sommaire très complet, de 1 000 mots en français à la fin de chaque article.

Nous n'aurions pas pu mener à bien cette publication sans le soutien généreux du SAIC du gouvernement du Québec ainsi que celui d'autres partenaires, entre autres l'AEC, le CEETUM ainsi que la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur l'Éducation et les rapports ethniques. Nous aimerions remercier tout particulièrement, madame

Josée Bergeron, Conseillère du gouvernement québécois au SAIC, pour son engagement en faveur du projet. Nous voulons également souligner l'apport de l'équipe de l'AEC qui a été responsable de l'édition finale de la revue, et plus particulièrement celle de Sarah Kooi, directrice des publications. Des remerciements spéciaux sont aussi adressés à Valérie Amiraux, la titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur le pluralisme religieux, à Karine Bates, la directrice du PRIAS ainsi qu'à Jacques Ledent, le directeur de l'axe *Intégration des personnes issues de l'immigration: spatialité, économie et cohabitation*, du CEETUM qui, de concert avec les trois coéditeurs, ont participé au comité éditorial. Finalement, nous avons apprécié la coopération rapide et la flexibilité des différents auteurs dans la réponse aux commentaires de ce comité éditorial, ce qui a permis de faire en sorte que ce numéro spécial soit à la fois d'une excellente qualité académique et accessible à un large public.

INTRODUCTION – RETHINKING EQUITY IN INDIA AND QUEBEC: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES

Marie Mc Andrew, Priti Singh and Émilie Parent

In this new century, the issue of relations between "ethnic" groups, defined by various markers such as language, culture or religion, is more relevant than ever. Many societies, whether or not marked by a deep historical diversity, have been transformed by the intensification and the diversification of migratory flux at the international or national level. Moreover, while many analysts predicted that ethnicity would become less salient for individuals and groups, due to globalization and the emergence of new solidarities, it is still a major explanatory variable in the persistence of inequalities. Its role as a basis for identity politics, whether within majorities or minorities, has also increased significantly.

While traditional models of citizenship are being challenged, important debates on the respective relevance of various approaches to "manage" diversity such as assimilation, integration, interculturalism or multiculturalism are thriving. These questions are of interest as much to researchers and decision-makers as to ordinary citizens. Controversies focus on the priority and the conciliation of four equally important social objectives, often complementary but sometimes conflictual: the valorization of pluralism, the actualization of equity, the respect for democratic values and the fostering of a harmonious civic space. The search for the right equilibrium in this regard cannot be based only on normative considerations, but needs a contextual analysis contrasting the extent to which these objectives are achieved in various societies, which impacts the definition of institutional arrangements, policies, programs and actions that should be put forward.

Often, such comparisons are deemed to be legitimate only when contrasting societies who share a common civilization or an equivalent level of development (e.g. western immigration countries). Nevertheless, such an epistemological position significantly limits the relevance of such endeavours, as it excludes the largest multicultural democracy of the world, India, whose experiences in the area of diversity, both positive and negative, can bear many lessons for other countries. Which is why the Centre d'études ethniques des universités montréalaises (CEETUM) and the Center for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies (CCULAS) started a collaboration to foster research and exchanges in the areas of multiculturalism, nationalism, diversity and equity, that culminated in 2008 by the signing of an official AOC, the first ever in the area of social science between an Indian and a francophone Canadian university. After organizing a conference in Delhi in 2005, on *Multiculturalism: Policy Concerns and Problem Area in Canada and India*, both institutions became convinced that more comparisons on such topics were warranted, especially within Quebec, given its specific sociological and policy context. Indeed, even if the dynamic of ethnic relations is much more complex in India and that pluralism there originated not mainly from immigration but largely through layers of historical processes, the construction of a pluralist but yet inclusive society constitutes a major challenge for both societies. They share a common hiatus between a strong legal commitment to liberalism, a high normative popularity of republicanism or nationalism, and a dominant *de facto* communautarism at the level of civil society. They have also experienced similar controversies on the place of religion in the public space, which challenged their common model of open secularism, as well as on the limits of traditional approaches of positive discrimination to radically decreased intergroup inequalities.

How can we ensure that the accommodation of cultural practices be compatible with liberalism and human rights, especially gender equality? Should we better define the limits of diversity in a context of growing religious fundamentalism? To what extent have various affirmative action programs targeting inequality been successful or just increased class differences within target groups? To what extent is the current debate around pluralism associated to an increase in inequality between ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, and to a fostering of intolerant attitudes or behaviours? What the specific role of two major institutions within democratic societies, education and the media, in this regard?

It is such questions, among others, that 20 Indian and Quebec experts from diverse backgrounds and disciplines addressed during the International Seminar "*Rethinking Equity in India and Quebec: Towards Inclusive Societies*", held in Montreal on November 7th 2011. The Seminar was supported by the Secrétariat aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes (SAIC) of the Quebec Government and co-organized by the CEETUM and the CCULAS, and two new partners, the Pôle de recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (PRIAS) of the University of Montréal and the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS). It also gathered a wider invited audience of researchers, students, as well as partners from various levels of government and of community organizations interested in the subject, who actively participated to the discussion.

The Seminar aimed at three main objectives: 1) Allow selected Indian researchers and a wider group of Quebec researchers and decision-makers to get better acquainted with their respective context of ethnic relations, with a special focus on inclusion and equity; 2) Foster the identification of common research interests or policy concerns at the theoretical, empirical and practical levels; 3) Serve as the basis for the definition of further collaborative ventures as well as, in the middle run, for a common research agenda. It became quickly apparent that the exchanges and interactions between participants had produced an atmosphere inviting to further collaboration. The publication of this special issue of *Canadian Diversity* is the first step in this regard.

Nevertheless, the articles readers will find in this volume are not a mere reflection of the papers presented during the Seminar, but the results of the exchanges held during the event. Whenever possible, we encouraged Indian and Quebec contributors to co-author common articles. In many other instances, Quebec or Indian articles cover similar topics and mirror common concerns. Given the growing importance of the South Asian community in Québec, we have also solicited some experts in the field to offer their reflection on various issues concerning this group in the province. The 23 articles in this volume are grouped around four main themes whose scientific and political relevance is obvious. Five articles study the role of the governmental and non-state actors in responding to the challenge of diversity, trough policies, programs and actions. Six articles inquire about Secularism, religious diversity and ethnic relations in the two contexts. Six

articles are covering the topic of the role of education and of the media in building an inclusive society. The last five articles discuss how both societies are fighting inequality. We are especially proud to have been able to convince so many people from such diverse backgrounds and disciplines to contribute to our endeavour. On the Quebec side, authors come from seven universities, public institutions or civil society associations. The Indian contribution is also impressive: with authors from eight academic, governments and private organizations from four Indian States.

We hope that this publication will allow readers from both contexts to better understand issues of equity and diversity in the other society, as well as convince them of the interest of increased collaboration in the search for solving common problems. The journal should be particularly useful in the many centers for Canadian, Quebec or Francophone Studies thriving in India and in the lesser, but growing , number of centers for Indian or South Asian Studies in Quebec Indian readers who speak or study French as well as some Quebec readers less familiar with English will also find a very substantive summary of 1000 words in French at the end of each article.

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
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PART 1

Responding to the challenges of diversity:
Governments' and non-state actors' policies,
programs and actions

THE INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN INDIA: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Kumar Suresh, Professor, Department of Educational Administration, National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi.

Akhtar Majeed, Late Professor, Department of Political sciences and Director, Centre for Federal Studies, Hamdard University, New Delhi.

INTRODUCTION

The state in India is constitutionally mandated to accommodate diversity and difference arising out of differential location of social and cultural groups. The state is additionally obligated to protect and promote the identity and rights of minorities. How the federal state in India has attempted to protect the distinctive identities and cultural practices of minorities and created enabling space for promotion of equity through a network of public institutions, and intervention through public policies remains a critical area of enquiry. The paper is an attempt to reflect on this issue. It examines how the federal state in India has created space for accommodating minorities and touches upon the extent to which the state, over the years, has initiated policies and programmes for promoting equity and inclusion of minorities. Creating enabling conditions for realizing the economic and political rights of minorities is one of the basic requisites of accommodation. How the federal state in India has been advancing this goal through policy intervention is one of the critical concerns of the paper.

CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF EQUALITY AND RIGHTS OF CULTURAL AUTONOMY

Constitutional protection and recognition of minorities can be located both in the context of equality clauses of citizenship rights and differential rights of autonomy. The equal rights of citizenship provided in the constitution are enabling rights. These entitle the members of the minority communities to claim equal treatment without being discriminated against because of their socio-cultural location and religious affiliation. The citizenship rights of equality guaranteed under the Articles 14, 15(1) and 29(2) of the Indian Constitution are particularly relevant in this regard. Besides equality rights of citizenship, minorities have also been provided distinctive rights for protecting their autonomy sphere. Creating a sphere of autonomy for groups and communities and protecting them constitutionally and institutionally is envisaged as a prerequisite of multicultural accommodation and its political and institutional manifestations in India. The fundamental rights of religious freedom and secular positioning of state and different affirmative measures of the state towards protection and promotion of diversity and group difference are important pointers in this regard. The sphere of cultural autonomy in India can be located in three interrelated contexts: (a) freedom of religion and conscience as ensured under the Articles 25-28, (b) cultural and educational rights guaranteed to minorities in Articles 29 and 30 and (c) cultural autonomy guaranteed to all tribal groups covered under the provisions of the fifth and sixth Schedules of the constitution (Suresh, 2009).

POLICY OF SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Freedom of Religion is ensured under the Articles 25-28 of the Constitution. This set of rights envisages secularism as the fundamental principle, basic to the constitutional structure of India. The principle of secularism is pronounced in the constitutional positioning of the state as "religion neutral," meaning thereby that the state in India has no religion. This may have two different contextual implications: (i) no preference to be given to any religion and there is no privileging of one over the other. It additionally underscores that no religion would be unequally treated except in accordance with the demands of welfare and equalizing instance of the state, and (ii) non-intervention of the state in the religious affairs of the community, with exception of public order, morality and health (Bhargava, 2010). In other words, the state is supposed to act without prejudice and discrimination. The issue of inter-group equality and full enjoyment of religious freedom is not as simple as it appears. The problem of discrimination on grounds of religion and religious intolerance is experienced by minorities in various forms. This limits the possibility of religious freedom, equality rights of citizenship and the full realization of minority rights (Majeed, 2004).

PLURAL LANGUAGE POLICY AND PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES

The official language policy of the Union of India recognizes the multilingual character of Indian society. It follows a plural language policy as a viable option to address the language issue in the multilingual context of India. However, the language policy of India constitutes a problematic site as it has its own criteria of language classification. This system recognizes and classifies a language by its inclusion in the Eighth Schedule. If a language is classified as national language it is entitled for state support and patronage. However, the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India lists only twenty-two languages as national languages of India. All other languages are classified as "dialects." Most of the languages outside the Eighth Schedule are struggling for official recognition and state patronage.

Urdu, one of the national languages included in the Eighth Schedule is generally associated with the Muslim minority community. In order to promote Urdu, the Government of India had set up the National Council for Promotion of Urdu Language (NCPUL). The Council has been functioning since April 1996 as an autonomous body for the promotion of Urdu, Arabic and Persian languages. The Government has also set up the National Council for Promotion of Sindhi Language. However, minority linguistic groups have their own grievances regarding the promotion and development of their respective languages. The official approach to language policy is subjected to criticism because of its classification of languages in different categories: national languages, regional languages, dialects and mother tongues.

On the protection of linguistic minorities the constitution of India makes provision under Articles 29, 30, Article 350A and Article 350B of the constitution. Article 350A provides that it "shall be the endeavor of every state and of every local authority to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups; and the President may issue such directions to any state as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities." Article 350B says: "(i) There shall be a Special Officer for linguistic minorities to be appointed by the President. (ii) It shall be the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under this Constitution and report to the President upon those matters at such intervals as the President may direct, and the President shall cause all such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament, and sent to the Governments of the States concerned." As a part of the provision made in Article 350B, the Commissioner for linguistic minorities investigates all matters relating to safeguards provided for linguistic minorities. Despite constitutional protection, the problem of protecting the linguistic minorities remains baffling. Many languages are subject to neglect in the absence of state support.

CREATION OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

In spite of the safeguards provided in the Constitution and the laws in place, the incidence of violence and discrimination was widely reported especially during the first three decades of independence. In order to address this problem, the Government of India established the *Minorities Commission* in 1978, consisting of a Chairman and two other members. Though the Commission was given a wide array of functions, there was a lack of corresponding power. It functioned as a non-statutory body for 14 years until the Parliament enacted the National Minorities Act in 1992, changing the name of the Commission to National Commission for Minorities and giving it a statutory status. The *National Commission for Minorities* (NCM) now consists of a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and five members nominated by the Central Government. Five members including the chairperson must be from the minority communities. The Commission works under the Ministry of Minority Affairs of the Government of India. The main function of the Commission is to monitor the working of the safeguards provided in the Constitution and laws enacted by Parliament and the State Legislatures. It also investigates specific complaints regarding deprivation of rights and safeguards of minorities and takes up such matters with the appropriate authorities.

The Minorities Commission (1978-1991) and the statutory body of the National Commission for Minorities (1992-till date) have not been very effective because of a number of constraints including the operational dynamics of politics and limited power.

A significant intervention by the federal government towards the protection and promotion of minority rights is the creation of the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) which has been established through the promulgation of an Ordinance in 2004. The Commission is mandated to look into specific complaints regarding deprivation or violation of rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice as enshrined in Article 30 of the Constitution. This was an attempt to redress the grievances of minority educational institutions. This Commission acts as a quasi-judicial body and has been endowed with the powers of a Civil Court. It has three roles namely adjudicatory function, advisory function and recommendatory powers.

Though it is too early to pass any authentic judgment about the effectiveness of the institution, a critical review of the power and competence of the institution indicates that the institution can go a long way in protecting the rights of the minority educational institutions.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES

A number of affirmative measures have been initiated by the federal state during the past two decades for the welfare, development and overall protection of minorities. The efforts are directed towards correcting the imbalances, which have emerged over a period of time. The Gopal Singh Committee, constituted under the chairmanship of Gopal Singh back in 1983 had pointed out the deficit of development and inter-group inequality, for example among the Muslim minority. In order to correct this imbalance the first major public policy intervention came in the form of the 15 Point Programme in 1983 as guidelines to the states and union territories. The objective was the welfare of minorities. The 15 Point Programme focused on three critical areas of minority protection and development: (i) prevention and adequate measure of checking the communal riots; (ii) ensuring adequate representation of minorities in the work force; and (iii) improvement of the socio-economic conditions of minorities through specifically focused programmes. The ambit of the 15 Point Programme has been expanded significantly in recent years in the light of the observations and recommendation of the Sachar Committee, a high power committee constituted by the government of India to study and report on the socio-economic status of the Muslim Minority (Government of India, 2006). In its Report submitted in 2006, the Committee pointed out the backwardness of the Muslim minority groups. In light of these developments, the 15 Point Programme has been recast. The Prime Minister's New 15 Point Programme has a wider coverage, addressing the overall development of minorities. The focus areas of the programme include enhancing both the opportunities for education and the equitable representation of minorities in economic activities and in the job market.

As a part of the affirmative action, different ministries of the federal government have initiated programmes and schemes specifically directed towards enhancing educational and employment opportunities for minorities, especially Muslims. In order to enhance opportunities in education, the ongoing programmes have been extended specifically to the minority areas. Modernization of *madrasas* (educational institutions), the improvement of their quality of education and of their infrastructure, an equitable and accessible education, and scholarship schemes for the students belonging to the minority communities are some of the areas in which the federal government has intervened.

Similarly, in order to expand economic and employment opportunities, a variety of programmes and support systems have been created. The establishment of the National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation (NMDFC) in 1994 on the recommendations of the National Commission for Minorities is one such measure. The major objectives of the corporation include: promoting economic and developmental activities for the benefit of backward sections amongst minorities, assisting individuals or groups of individuals belonging to "belonging to a minority" by way of loans and credits, establishing economically and financially viable schemes and projects; promoting self-employment and other ventures for the benefit of minorities; extensions of loans and credit to the eligible members of minorities for pursuing general/professional/technical education or training at graduate and higher levels; assisting the state-level organizations for dealing with the development of minorities by way of providing financial assistance or equity contribution and in obtaining commercial funding or by way of refinancing; working as an apex institution for coordinating and monitoring the work of the corporation/boards/other bodies set up by the State Governments/Union Territory Administrations for, or given the responsibility of, assisting minorities in their economic development.

There are different schemes initiated by the NMFDC. The Loan scheme is one of the most important components of these activities. Four different categories of loan schemes are provided to the minority communities through NMFDC. These include: 1) term loan scheme for any commercially viable and technically feasible venture; 2) margin money loan scheme to give monetary assistance to beneficiaries; 3) education loan scheme with the aim of facilitating job-oriented education among the weaker section of minorities; and 4) micro-financing schemes, providing micro-credit to the poorest through NGO's. Other schemes include vocational training to members of minority communities, marketing assistance to craft persons, and assistance for design development and skills development.

Furthermore, ninety districts of the country, having large minority populations, have been identified as backward. These districts constitute the major focus of programmes and schemes directed towards development and inclusion. Similarly capacity building programmes among the members of minority communities are in operation. Coaching schemes for disadvantaged groups including minority students are being supported by the government within and outside the university system. Special training and programmes for skill building have been initiated keeping the minority community at the centre of focus.

CONCLUSION

It is then evident that the federal state in India has created space for the protection of minorities and the promotion of equity and inclusion through the mechanism of constitutional engineering, the network of necessitated institutions and an array of public policies including affirmative action and capacity building programmes. The provisions appear to be comprehensive and inclusive. But the gap between policy and practice still exists. The Sachar Committee Report clearly points to the deficits of democracy and development and the exclusion of a large section of minority population. This is indicative of the deficient functioning of the federal state so far as the issue of equity, security and inter-group equality are concerned. Unless the gap between policies and their actual implementation is bridged, there can hardly be any possibility of equity and inter-group-equality. Minorities will continue to lag behind.

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L'INCLUSION DES MINORITÉS EN INDE: LES ENCADREMENTS LÉGAUX ET POLITIQUES

En vertu de sa constitution, l'État indien a l'obligation de protéger et de promouvoir l'identité et les droits des minorités. Les membres de ces minorités sont reconnus comme citoyens à part égale et leur identité distincte est protégée. Les droits fondamentaux concernant d'une part, la liberté de religion et le positionnement laïque de l'État, et d'autre part, les différentes mesures d'affirmation favorisant la protection et la promotion de la diversité, constituent d'importants mécanismes constitutionnels. L'autonomie culturelle en Inde se trouve dans trois contextes différents mais interdépendants: (a) la liberté de religion et de conscience, assurée par les articles 25 à 28, (b) les droits culturels et éducatifs garantis pour les minorités dans les articles 29 et 30 et (c) l'autonomie culturelle garantie pour les groupes tribaux, tant pour ceux vivant sur un même territoire que pour ceux qui sont dispersés sur le territoire, en vertu des dispositions des 5e et 6e réservations dans la constitution.

La liberté de religion est garantie en vertu des articles 25 à 28 de la Constitution. La laïcité y est définie comme le principe fondamental à la base de la structure constitutionnelle de l'Inde. Le principe de laïcité fait partie de la position constitutionnelle de l'État et de sa « neutralité religieuse » ; il n'y a donc pas de religion propre à l'Inde. Cela peut avoir deux implications contextuelles: (i) aucune religion ne sera favorisée ou privilégiée par rapport à une autre. Cela sous-entend qu'aucune religion ne sera traitée injustement, sauf si c'est nécessaire pour le bien-être de l'État et ses objectifs de société égalitaire, (ii) la non-intervention de l'État dans les affaires religieuses des différentes communautés, à l'exception des interventions concernant la sécurité, la moralité publique et la santé. Dans un contexte de grande diversité religieuse, et en présence d'une religion majoritaire et de nombreuses minorités religieuses, l'État se doit d'agir pour maintenir l'égalité entre les groupes, sans préjugés et sans discrimination.

La politique indienne des langues officielles reconnaît le caractère multilingue de la société indienne. Elle suit une politique linguistique plurielle, une option viable pour répondre à la question de la langue dans le contexte multilingue de l'Inde. Cependant, cette politique linguistique est problématique car elle est régie par ses propres critères de classification linguistique. Le système de classification résulte dans la reconnaissance et la non-reconnaissance d'une langue et son inclusion dans la 8e réserve. Si une langue est classée comme langue nationale, elle a droit au soutien de l'État. Toutefois, la 8e réserve de la Constitution identifie seulement 22 langues comme langues officielles. Toutes les autres sont classées comme dialectes. La Constitution indienne prévoit des mesures pour protéger les minorités linguistiques (articles 29, 30, 350A et 350B de la Constitution).

L'État indien a créé certains mécanismes institutionnels dont l'objectif principal est d'assurer la protection et la promotion de l'identité des minorités, ainsi que d'assurer l'équité parmi les communautés

minoritaires. La *National Commission for Minorities* (NCM), la *National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions* (NCMEI), ainsi que la *National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation* (NMDFC) sont particulièrement importantes à cet égard. Tous ces mécanismes institutionnels ont des mandats et des objectifs variés, mais travaillent collectivement à la protection des minorités.

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les politiques publiques de l'Inde ont permis la mise en place de certaines mesures en matière de bien-être, de protection sociale des minorités et de leur développement. Ces mesures cherchent à corriger les déséquilibres apparus au fil du temps. La première initiative d'importance en ce sens fut le Programme en 15 points de 1983, qui donnait des directives aux états et aux territoires de l'Union en matière de bien-être des minorités. Le Programme en 15 points était axé sur trois aspects essentiels de la protection des minorités et de leur développement: (i) comment prévenir les émeutes communales et les mesures à prendre, le cas échéant; (ii) comment assurer une représentation adéquate des minorités sur le marché du travail, et (iii) comment améliorer les conditions socio-économiques des minorités grâce à des programmes spéciaux. La portée du Programme en 15 points a été élargie de manière significative ces dernières années.

Différents ministères du gouvernement fédéral ont lancé des programmes visant spécifiquement l'amélioration des possibilités d'éducation et d'emploi pour les minorités, en particulier les Musulmans. Pour accroître les possibilités en éducation, les programmes en cours ont été implantés spécifiquement dans les zones à forte population minoritaire. Parmi les interventions gouvernementales en matière d'éducation pour les minorités, mentionnons la modernisation et l'amélioration des infrastructures des madrasas, une éducation de qualité et accessible, ainsi que des programmes de bourses pour les étudiants issus des communautés minoritaires.

Le gouvernement a également créé des programmes et des systèmes de soutien pour accroître les possibilités en matière d'économie et d'emploi, parmi lesquels la mise en place de la NMDFC. Cet organisme contribue à élargir les perspectives économiques et le pouvoir d'action des minorités désavantagées. Il apporte un soutien économique sous forme de prêts. Il fournit également du micro-crédit aux plus pauvres par le biais des ONG. D'autres programmes comprennent, entre autres, de la formation professionnelle pour les communautés minoritaires; de l'aide à la commercialisation pour les artisans et de l'assistance pour le développement du design et pour la mise à niveau des compétences.

Ces dispositions semblent exhaustives et inclusives. Toutefois il y a encore des écarts entre les politiques et la pratique. Le rapport Sachar mentionne clairement d'un côté, le déficit démocratique et le retard de développement, et de l'autre, l'exclusion d'une grande partie de la population minoritaire. Ceci indique certainement que l'État fédéral n'est pas si efficace dans la gestion de l'équité, de la sécurité et de l'égalité entre les groupes. À moins de combler l'écart entre les politiques et leur réelle mise en œuvre, l'équité et l'égalité entre les groupes restent quasiment impossibles.

QUEBEC IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND INTERCULTURALISM POLICY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

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QUEBEC'S INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The motivation of modern Quebec to control its immigration, and especially to ensure the integration of immigrants to a societal project reflective of its trajectories and values, where both the French language and interculturalism are central, is the result of a number of factors, some of which will seem more obvious than others to an Indian public. To begin, it should be noted that the *Québécois* identity, and the accompanying territorial nationalism, is a relatively recent concept (Juteau, 2000). From the British conquest in 1759 up until the so-called *Quiet Revolution* of the sixties, French-Canadians across Canada, and even the North-American Diaspora, viewed themselves as a single minority people, based on ethnic nationalism. In contrast, in the collective consciousness, the other components of the Quebec society (*i.e.* Anglophones and Allophones, each accounting for approximately 8% of the province's population) were clearly part of another group – called the *English*, *English-Canadians*, or *Others*, as the case may be. The question of "French-Canadians" still elicits vigorous debate in Quebec to this day. While for some this categorization appears antiquated, and based on ethnic relations wherein Francophones in Quebec were economically dominated, for others the category of French-Canadians instead permits us to define a culturally and historically specific community. For the latter group, this notion of "French-Canadians" allows us to distinguish it from the broader, more inclusive term "Quebecer." Indeed, the government of Quebec officially uses the term "Quebecer" to define all people living within the province. It is not surprising, therefore, that an immigrant selection carried out exclusively by the Federal Government, then massively Anglophone, and the fact that immigrants blended almost exclusively into the Anglophone community, were not viewed as a social problem before the end of the sixties.

The increased importance of immigration as an issue of public debate was also intimately linked to the demo-linguistic issue. Given the low fertility rate of the Francophone community, as is the case in most Western societies, the integration of immigrants into one community or the other may well determine the linguistic future of Montreal. Although Montreal is the second largest French-speaking city in the world, Francophones (individuals having French as a mother tongue) only account for a little less than 60% of the population (whereas they make up 80% of the province's total population) (Statistics Canada, 2012a). It is worth noting that, like the notion of French-Canadians, the term Francophone is also subject to interpretation. For the purposes of this article, we will use the notion of "First Official Language Spoken" and consider that the term Francophone refers to people who learned French as their first language and continue to understand and use it (Statistics Canada, 2012b). According to Statistics Canada's latest census, the percentage of Quebec's population that claims French as the language most often spoken at home decreased from 82.7% in 2006 to 82.5% in 2011.

As for Quebecers who speak exclusively French at home, the percentage decreased from 75.1% in 2006 to 72.8% in 2011. In Montreal, where lives the majority of people who do not have French as a mother tongue, 16.5% claim to usually speak a language other than French or English at home. It also bears mentioning that in the Quebec context, these Allophones, as they are termed, are more likely to speak French at home than in the two previous censuses (24% in 2011 versus 23% in 2006, and 21% in 2011) (Statistics Canada, 2012a).

With respect to this last challenge, the decision to open up, rather than to react with a defensive reflex, seems influenced by the specificity of the Canadian and North-American contexts (Mc Andrew & Trinh, 2005). Indeed, even though our societies are not free from intolerance or racist lapses, the conviction that immigration represents a key economic, cultural and social contribution to the development of any society marks the public discourse and the collective consciousness. What is more, the governments of Quebec and Canada have chosen an approach based on the professional skills of prospective immigrants. In the Quebec context, however, the selection of skilled immigrants – approximately 75% of all immigration for 2012 (MICC, 2012) – also includes an evaluation of their knowledge of French that does not automatically lead to the rejection of a candidate if he/she can accumulate points with regard to other criteria comprised in the selection grid.

Overall, immigration and integration have represented over the last twenty years an area of peaceful collaboration between the Federal and Provincial governments, even when a sovereignist party was in power in Quebec. In contrast, for example, with the question of international representation of Quebec, that has fuelled more controversy (Balthazar, 2004). Multiculturalism and interculturalism, *i.e.*, what happens, in the long run, with Canadian/Quebec identities when newcomers influence and change the social fabric, has proved more contentious. However, as we will see later, although differences exist in this regard, tensions there reflect mainly competing nation building processes or, at least, a fight for primary/secondary allegiance among newcomers. Before delving into this issue, it is useful to review the main characteristics of the immigration, integration, and interculturalism approaches developed in Quebec over the last thirty years.

THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE SELECTION AND INTEGRATION POLICY

Although the Quebec Government has been active in these fields since the seventies, it is only with the Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration, *Let's Build Quebec Together* of 1990 (MCCI, 1990), that it clearly set out its main normative framework, goals and action perspectives in this regard. More specifically, the Selection Policy is based on two major objectives:

- A selection of immigrants that contributes to the development of a Francophone society and a thriving economy, in keeping with Quebec's values of family reunification and international solidarity.
- A gradual increase in immigration levels according to the needs of the host society.

The level and makeup of the migratory movement which, since 2005, has reached an average of approximately 49,000 individuals a year (for a total population of 8,054,756 in 2012) (MICC, 2012), are defined following a public consultation process, through a balancing of demographic, economic, linguistic and humanitarian objectives. It should be noted, in this regard, that, although prior knowledge of French increases the chances of selection, this criterion is not eliminatory, in recognition of the fact that many Allophone and even Anglophone immigrants are likely, over the longer term, to contribute to the vitality and the Francophone character of Quebec. Nonetheless, knowledge of French, or the prospective immigrant's potential to learn the language, remains an important element in the selection policy for skilled immigrants. As a result, today the top five countries of origin for immigrants to Quebec are, in order, France (9.5% of total immigration), China (9.1%), Haiti (8.7%), Morocco (7.1%) and Algeria (6.5%). These five countries account for a total of 31.7% of immigrants who arrived in 2012 and all except Chinese are Francophones or at least francotropes (MICC, 2012).

Today, the Department of Immigration and Cultural Communities pursues a wide variety of objectives, both through programs managed directly by the Department as well as in collaboration with community organizations active in Quebec, and as such it is impossible to provide the reader with a full assessment of these initiatives. It would be naïve, however, to present the actions of the Quebec Government as a panacea. Even though Quebec society has now clearly moved beyond the obstacles related to its specificity, the problems experienced today are more in line with those arising elsewhere in Canada or in other immigration countries. This is specifically true with regard to the economic performance indicators for the immigrant population (Picot & Hou, 2003) and with problems related to religious diversity (Bouchard & Taylor 2008). Here, the so-called reasonable accommodation crisis of 2006, and the creation of the "Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles" which followed, is a good example of how, to this day, religious diversity may give rise to vigorous debate and create divisions among the population of Quebec. In this regard, the evolution of debates within Quebec society over the last thirty years is largely in line with international trends, although these debates sometimes appear quite specific in the Canadian context, as we will see in the next part of this article.

INTERCULTURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM: COMMON TRENDS AND DIFFERENCES

Despite a dichotomous opposition between multiculturalism and interculturalism, when one focuses on actual programs and practices instead of political rhetoric, it is clear that Canadian multiculturalism and Quebec interculturalism have much in common (Juteau *et al.*, 1998). They share a high commitment to diversity, considered a major feature of collective identity, as well as a definition of equality that goes further than the formal definition, to include equity (both governments recognize systemic or indirect discrimination and have adopted compensatory and equalization programs). Both policies also clearly value the Human Rights perspective (whether the *Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms* or the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*) as the main framework for managing diversity.

Nevertheless, two relatively important differences are worth mentioning, even if they may be more questions of stress than radical opposition. On the one hand, it is clear that in Quebec there has been a stronger preoccupation with the balancing of rights, especially when they are potentially conflictual, such as equality between men and women and religious liberty, both at the level of policy documents and of public debate. This tendency has meant, paradoxically, that interculturalism has overall been a more liberal and less communitarian policy, especially in its application, than its Canadian multicultural counterpart. Obviously, this does not mean that the rest of Canada is indifferent to the issue of the potential danger of cultural relativism, nor that Canadian multiculturalism does not have any legal or normative limits. But clearly, it is not an issue that figures very highly either in official statements or in political discourse there. This difference may also explain why the Quebec policy has been credited, especially by some critics of multiculturalism (Bissoondath, 1994), with fostering a better sense of security among the majority, or, at least, has not been criticized as much as multiculturalism for its potential negative impact on social cohesion. On the other hand, because it has been so focused until very recently on linguistic and cultural issues, Quebec interculturalism has given a weaker recognition to the persistence of interethnic inequalities and to the role of racism in this regard, both at the level of political rhetoric and of actions initiated or supported by the Government. It is difficult, however, to state whether this trend results from the limits of the normative conception put forward or from the reality of ethnic relations in Quebec, where, until relatively recently, Francophones were still among the most socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Whatever their real or putative differences,

multiculturalism and interculturalism share common weaknesses and have faced some similar criticisms. Among these weaknesses, they share the incapacity to reduce the deep, entrenched reality of interethnic inequalities, especially among visible minorities or immigrants from developing countries. And by recognizing diversity within the paradigm of democratic values, they both are actually promoting *soft assimilationism* much more than *radical pluralism* (Juteau *et al.*, 1998). This characteristic may explain why religious diversity in both contexts, but especially in Quebec, where the stress on democratic limits to diversity has been more pronounced, has raised so many visible and vocal controversies.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen from this brief overview, over the last thirty years, Quebec has developed its own approach in matters of immigration, integration and intercultural relations. Although not always different from their Canadian counterparts, the actions carried within this framework have a distinct character, both in their conception and in their strengths and weaknesses. The question we wish to raise in our concluding remarks, which should be relevant to the Indian debate in the area of pluralism, is that of the role that complementary, and sometimes contradictory policies of diversity management, coexisting within the same territory, can play in insuring that specific challenges experienced by non-dominant national minorities may be accommodated. Indeed, it is clear that, in this regard, the Canadian Government has been rather daring, at least when assessed from an international perspective. It did actively support the involvement of Quebec in immigration and integration and cooperated with it heartily in these domains, while allowing, or at least not actively fighting, Quebec's initiative to develop its own model of multiculturalism, *i.e.* interculturalism.

What impact has this relative openness had on Canadian society?

1) First, it is clear that over the last thirty years diversity, especially ethno-cultural diversity originating from migration, which used to be considered with fear, and the survival of a redefined minority Francophone culture in Canada, have come to be considered as complementary and not antithetical. Although pockets of resistance to the pluralistic transformation of the province still exist in Quebec, overall the analysis of both public policy and opinion polls clearly shows that this has been a success, or at least that the reality is now not very different in Quebec than in simpler majority-dominated immigration societies.

2) Although not fully founded as we have shown above, the myth of Quebec having a specific approach in terms

of integration and inter-culturalism has probably contributed to that feeling of cultural security. There is now a sense among Quebecers that they own the diversity management policy: they love to believe that their model is better than the one of English Canada (Mc Andrew, 1996). Whether this is true or not, it has certainly contributed to bringing them much closer to the rest of Canada through a pluralistic identity redefinition. Some could argue that cultural security is not yet dominant in Quebec, but our analysis of the mutation of public debate over twenty years seems to, at least, indicate that the traditional cultural insecurity, based on a *besieged ethnic group mentality* is slowly, for better or worse, being replaced by an insertion into the matrix of post-modern cultural insecurity, shared with many other nations across the world.

3) The fact that Quebec has been relatively successful in integrating newcomers in a common Francophone but pluralistic culture also means that it has come closer to the identity model prevailing in the rest of Canada. There is now, especially in Montreal, a greater degree of distinction between sharing a language and sharing a culture, as well as a more instrumental relation with the French language, as a tool for civic participation, at least among minority groups.

4) However, before Indian policy-makers infer from these conclusions any indication regarding the positive impact of a decentralization of policies on regional conflicts, it is important to keep in mind that this coming closer of cultures, has not meant that *Québécois* feel any more or any less Canadian. The level of support for autonomist movements has not widely changed these last thirty years, and, while first generation immigrants tended to have a stronger Canadian national identity and commitment, there are some indications that, due to political socialization within the school system, their offspring are evenly split, as are *"old stock"* Francophone Quebecers, on the political future of the Province. Thus, as often exemplified by international studies on the construction of ethnic relations (Schermerhorn, 1970), greater similarity of cultural markers has not meant lesser salience of ethnic boundaries, at least in the short run. But neither does this constitute compelling evidence for the reverse argument *i.e.* that insuring more sensitivity to the specific challenges experienced by the Francophone minority in the area of immigration, integration and diversity management has, in any way, contributed to centrifugal tendencies in Canada.

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LA POLITIQUE QUÉBÉCOISE D'IMMIGRATION, D'INTÉGRATION ET D'INTERCULTURALISME: UN BILAN CRITIQUE

La seule lecture du titre de cet article devrait piquer la curiosité du lecteur. Considérant que d'ordinaire ce sont les États souverains qui décident des politiques d'immigration et orientent les programmes qui en découlent, il peut sembler en effet particulier de faire mention d'un quelconque rôle du gouvernement du Québec, un gouvernement provincial faut-il le rappeler, dans l'élaboration et la gestion de politiques migratoires et d'intégration des immigrants. Toutefois, le titre de cet article prend tout son sens si on considère la nature même de la fédération canadienne. Outre les considérations d'ordre constitutionnel, il faut également revoir ce qui, historiquement, a permis aux différents gouvernements du Québec qui se sont succédé depuis les années 1970 d'accroître leur mainmise sur la gestion de l'immigration et des domaines afférents. Influencés par le désir d'assurer la pérennité du fait français au Québec, les divers efforts de la part des gouvernements québécois pour accroître leur pouvoir en matière de sélection et d'intégration des immigrants ont, pour ainsi dire, porté fruits depuis les 40 dernières années. C'est en effet depuis la Révolution tranquille de 1960-1970, qui initie notamment des débats au niveau des référents identitaires au Québec, que l'idée que cette province obtienne plus de contrôle sur son immigration a fait son chemin.

Alors que la notion même de «Québécois» était utilisée de manière très ponctuelle avant les années 1960, celle de Canadien-français était communément utilisée et servait à décrire une communauté d'histoire et de culture pan canadienne. Ce n'est qu'à partir des années 1960 que la catégorie «Québécois» s'est imposée et que la question migratoire est devenue un réel enjeu de société. Qui plus est, il faudra attendre à la fin des années 1960 pour que la communauté anglophone et les allophones du Québec ne deviennent ce que l'on pourrait considérer comme un «problème social». Il faut dire également que l'inscription de la nouvelle dynamique ethnique entre les Québécois, les anglophones et les allophones est largement influencée par les débats démo-linguistiques. Ainsi, et en considérant le bas taux de fertilité qui caractérise le Québec post-révolution tranquille, l'intégration des immigrants au sein de la communauté québécoise francophone ou de la communauté anglophone dans la région montréalaise, où plus de 80% des nouveaux arrivants s'installent, va structurer cette nouvelle dynamique ethnique. De

cette dynamique naît la conviction que les immigrants contribuent au développement économique, culturel et social du Québec.

Aujourd'hui, tant le gouvernement du Québec que celui du Canada orientent leurs efforts de recrutement vers les immigrants qualifiés, ceux qui possèdent des compétences professionnelles en lien avec les demandes du marché du travail et qui, pour le contexte québécois, possèdent également des compétences suffisantes en français. Ces deux aspects, compétences professionnelles et compétences linguistiques, vont peu à peu avoir des effets structurants sur les flux migratoires. À un point tel qu'en 2012, quatre des principaux pays d'origine des immigrants s'installant au Québec appartiennent soit à la francophonie (France) ou à des régions du monde où l'utilisation du français demeure importante (Maghreb, Haïti).

Les acquis en matière de sélection et d'intégration des immigrants a permis au Gouvernement du Québec de se doter de compétences et d'une expertise comme on en retrouve peu de la part d'un gouvernement provincial. Toutefois, cela ne garantit pas que ces compétences et cette expertise soient la panacée à tous les problèmes vécus par les immigrants. Le Québec n'échappe pas aux problèmes liés à l'intégration socio-économique des immigrants et des minorités ethniques de manière générale, comme nous le rappelle les problèmes d'insertion au marché de l'emploi, saillant chez les membres des minorités visibles, ou les problèmes entourant l'acceptation de la diversité religieuse illustrés par la Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles en 2006.

En matière de politique d'immigration et d'inté-gration, les débats sont nombreux et portent pour beaucoup sur la comparaison entre le multiculturalisme canadien et l'interculturalisme québécois. Dans ce débat, où il est parfois difficile de faire la distinction entre la rhétorique et les contenus des programmes et pratiques, le multiculturalisme et l'interculturalisme ont beaucoup en commun. Ils sont tous deux dédiés à la diversité et à la notion d'égalité et ils reconnaissent l'existence et la persistance de la discrimination directe et indirecte. Qui plus est, tous deux valorisent pleinement les droits de la personne à travers deux Chartes, l'une québé-coise et l'autre canadienne. Toutefois, on ne saurait passer sous silence deux différences importantes entre le multiculturalisme et l'interculturalisme. Dans un premier temps, il existe au Québec des préoccupations évidentes quant à l'équilibre des droits, spécialement

ceux qui ont trait à l'égalité des femmes et aux libertés religieuses. Cela témoigne, paradoxalement, que l'interculturalisme est une politique, dans l'ensemble, plus libérale que communautarienne, surtout si on la compare avec le multiculturalisme canadien. Dans un deuxième temps, parce que jusqu'à récemment il mettait l'accent sur les enjeux linguistiques et culturels, l'interculturalisme est plus réticent à reconnaître la persistance des inégalités inter ethniques et le rôle du racisme à cet égard. Il est difficile d'évaluer si cette tendance au sein de l'interculturalisme québécois témoigne des limites normatives de cette politique ou si cela résulte de conditions historiques spécifiques au sein desquelles les Québécois francophones ont été,

pendant des siècles, l'un des groupes les plus défavorisés au niveau social et surtout économique. Cet article montre comment et dans quelles conditions le Québec a, depuis plus de 40 ans, développé une approche qui lui est propre en matière d'immigration, d'intégration et de relations interculturelles. En guise de conclusion, nous aimerions insister sur un aspect pertinent pour les débats qui ont cours dans le contexte indien. Cela a trait à l'importance du rôle que des politiques de gestion de la diversité, coexistant sur un même territoire et pouvant être parfois complémentaires et d'autres fois contradictoires, ont dans l'assurance que les défis vécus par les minorités nationales non-dominantes peuvent être accommodées.

THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN INDIA: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SACHAR REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The Prime Minister's High Level Committee to "Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of Muslim Community of India" under the chairmanship of the venerated civil rights activist and former Judge Rajinder Sachar was set up in March 2005. The report of the commission, submitted in November 2006, deals with the three inter-related issues of concern to India's 156 million Muslims: identity, security and equity. All being important, the Committee however, given its terms of reference, chose to focus specifically on equity.

INEQUITY AND THE INDIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY

On identity-related issues, the report admits to a near-absence of "spaces of interaction" between Muslims and other socio-religious communities. For instance, in the understanding of "patriotism," Indian Muslims carry the double burden of being labelled as "anti-national" and, at the same time, as being "appeased." While Muslim cultural markers *i.e.* beard, skull-cap etc. are a source of suspicion and ridicule, gender issues get a typical Muslim slant. When talking of Muslim women, almost no one talks of their life – their health, education, income, etc. The gender-based discourse remains almost exclusively confined to issues like *hijab*, marriage and divorce. The problem gets compounded when Islam is berated for its backwardness with no effort whatsoever to identify factors of discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from the developmental-democratic processes. The Committee itself had only two tasks before it: to highlight the relative deprivation of Muslims vis-à-vis other socio-religious communities; and secondly, to identify possible areas of state intervention.

On security-related issues, the report laments the constant fear of communal violence: its deleterious economic impact on "opportunity structure" for Muslims; an "inferiority complex" bred by being branded as anti-national, with more police stations than schools in Muslim

localities; and ghettoization, specially in the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat pogrom, which has further shrunk the spaces for interaction and denied them necessary physical and social infrastructure.

THE SACHAR REPORT: EDUCATION AMONG MUSLIMS

How can we explain the inability of Muslims to access political representation and resources for development? The Sachar Committee presents a wide data range culled mainly from government sources and presents few perspectives in the light of equity issues. In fact, its methodology can be questioned; relying on bare-bone data does not reveal the entire complexity of marginalization and exclusion. Nevertheless, equity key aspects that the report deliberates upon pertain to population, education, economy and employment, infrastructure, and government employment.

Refuting the myth of a Muslim population explosion and of Muslims overtaking all other religious communities somewhere in the not-so-distant future, the report confirms that population growth among Muslims has declined in most states during the 1991-2001 period. The Committee further opines: "Given the current trend, Muslim population will not increase beyond 18-19% by the end of the 21st century", compared to their present 14% of the total Indian population.

It is not conservatism but the failure of state to provide secular educational institutions in Muslim-dominated areas that explains the pathetic condition of access to education. Muslim communities are mainly rural but compared to other socio-religious communities have a higher ratio of urbanization; yet the literacy rate among Muslims is at 59.1% compared to the national average of 65.1%. It is more glaring in the case of Muslim women. Drop-out rates are higher among Muslims (25% of Muslim children, in the age-group 6-14 years, either never go to school or drop out); and incidence of child labour is higher among Muslims compared to all other socio-religious

communities. It cannot be blamed on poverty every time; the truth is schools have not been set up in Muslim areas. For example, in more than one thousand Muslim-dominated villages in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, there is nothing by way of a mainstream educational institution.

In "premier" educational institutions, Muslim enrolment is only at 4% at undergraduate and at 2% at postgraduate level. Worst, the disparity in the graduate attainment rates between Muslims and all other socio-religious communities has been widening since 1970. It is neither religion nor culture but the absence of state-funded schools and Muslim yearning for education that explain the establishment of *Madrasas* (Muslim-oriented religious schools which some time combine a modicum of secular education). Still however, no more than 3% of children in the school-going age attend *Madrasas*.

Article 30 of the Indian Constitution allows the establishment of minority-run educational institutions; Sachar bemoans the state's antipathy towards recognition of minority educational institutions. Over a period of four years (April 2002-March 2006), only 106 crore (1 crore=10 million) rupees were allocated under the much-touted programme of modernization of *Madrasa* education. Sections of the Indian society including well-informed ones continue to brand *Madrasas* as breeding ground of fundamentalism, even terrorism. One would find more unemployed graduates among Muslims than in other communities; as a result, mainstream Muslims do not see education as a road to social mobility.

THE MUSLIMS AND THE ECONOMY

Sachar finds very low participation of Muslims in formal sectors of the economy. Most Muslims are self-employed in petty trading and manufacturing and traditional crafts; this makes their economic fortunes more vulnerable to political disruptions and violence. Their concentration in informal sectors makes them particularly vulnerable to market-oriented economic policies. With access to banking largely denied, either because banks shun opening branches in Muslim-dominated areas or simply find Muslims "ineligible" for credit, opportunities opened by economic liberalization remain beyond reach; while the negative effects of economic liberalization on traditional occupations and crafts are witnessed in the daily lives of the Muslims. In other words, Muslims are unable to enter the "opportunity structure" under economic liberalization, while their "inherited asset structures" get dwindled and decimated by the forces of globalization.

Muslims have not benefitted from the average annual growth of about 6% during the years 1993-94 and 2004-5 to the same extent as other communities. They remain essentially hewers of wood and drawers of water. While incidence of poverty among them dropped noticeably in rural areas as a result of general rural poverty alleviation

programmes, it fell only marginally in urban areas; still however, a significantly higher ratio of Muslim households is in the less than five hundred rupees expenditure bracket. On average, poor Muslims consume only 75% of the poverty line expenditure, which is the lowest of all socio-religious communities. More seriously, one finds an inverse relationship between physical and social infrastructure in the Muslim localities, villages and towns. They have a very poor rate of benefitting from government programmes; for instance in UP where they constitute 24% of the poor, their share in various government programmes is limited to 3% to 14%. Their lower participation in professional, technical, clerical and managerial work, both in public and private sectors, indicates their inability to access social security, status and power.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As for their representation in top echelons of civil services, Muslim representation is only 3% in the Indian administrative service, 1.8% in Foreign Service and 4% in the police services. This was in 2003-04 and remains almost the same in 2011-12. Significantly, the proportion of Muslim representation in civil service has declined since 1960. Thanks to the electoral cartography, representation of Muslims in legislative and other decision-making bodies at the national, state and local levels is not only low, compared to their population and their high electoral participation, it is also on the decline. Sachar points out that several electoral constituencies with sufficiently large Muslim electorate are simply declared as "reserved" for SCs (*i.e.* certain Hindu castes which are declared eligible for the benefits of "reservation" because of their historical deprivation and marginalization and exclusion); raising the invidious prospect of conflict between Muslims and the Dalits (historically and socially deprived, marginalized and excluded castes among Hindus).

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACHAR REPORT

To reverse the process of marginalization and exclusion in terms of access to political representation and developmental resources, Sachar recommends the strengthening of legal and public policy provisions; the establishment of a national data bank covering all socio-religious communities; the establishment of an autonomous assessment and monitoring authority to assess the degree of benefits of various government programmes reaching to different communities; an equal opportunity commission to scrutinize the grievances of the marginalized sections; and providing of incentives with a diversity index. On denial of political representation, it suggests eliminating anomalies in the identification of the so-called "reserved" electoral constituencies. Sachar goes on to recommend the path of nomination so as to bring Muslims in the process of

governance; evaluation of textbooks writing; more inclusive admission to education institutions; teachers' training programmes and hostel facility for minority students.

THE MISRA REPORT AND OTHER STEPS TOWARDS EQUITY FOR MUSLIMS

Another report, commonly known as Ranghanath Misra Report, came out in 2007, and recommended 10% reservation for all Muslims, irrespective of their social stratification, in educational institutions and public sector employment. Further, it recommended inclusion of Muslims, identified by certain markers as "outcastes" (*Arzal*) to be included in the list of Scheduled Caste, since by occupation and social status they share discrimination and exclusion almost similar to the so-called "low-caste" Hindus; and called for inclusion of more Muslim communities (both from the *Ajlaf* and *Arzal* stratifications) in the list of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) so as to also extend to them the benefit of reservation under the Mandal formula of extending reservations to the Hindu OBCs.

A broad-based three-tier social stratification characterizes the Muslims in the entire Indian sub-continent, covering the present-day India, Bangladesh and Pakistan: *Ashraf* are those who claim descent from high lineage foreigner Muslims who entered the Indian sub-continent centuries ago; *Ajlaf* are believed to be descendants of converts from Hinduism and other religions who mainly belonged to intermediate castes; and *Arzal* are converts from castes which are hereditarily engaged in menial work. Since the Indian Constitution does not allow religion-based reservation, the Misra Report has generated more political heat with diametrically opposite viewpoints being expressed. On one hand, the argument is that religion-based reservation is against the very tenets of Indian secularism or, that it is a recipe for national disintegration. The contrary view is that reservation alone can redress the political under-representation of Muslims; reservation in educational institutions and jobs for all Muslims including their inclusion in SC and OBC lists alone can bring them out of the morass of marginalization and exclusion, for which the public policies of the last 60 years are clearly responsible.

In the initial years after the Sachar report came out, the incumbent coalitional United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government responded with seeming alacrity and sincerity. Madhav Menon led an expert group to "examine and determine the structure of an Equal Opportunity Commission"; the group submitted its report in February 2008. Amitabh Kundu was asked to "propose 'diversity index' and to work out the modalities for implementation"; he also submitted a report in June 2008. Besides, a National Data Bank has been set up in the Ministry of Statistics and Programme implementation to collect data on the socio-economic facilities for various socio-religious communities; a high-level committee was constituted, which has also since submitted its report, on the delimitation law which has allowed gerrymandering; and an Autonomous Assessment and Monitoring Authority has also been created in the Planning Commission of India to analyze data in order to formulate appropriate policies.

In the aftermath of the Sachar report, a series of immediate steps were taken, mostly in the education sector. A Lunch scheme was extended to upper primary schools in all 3479 educationally backward blocks – an administrative sub-unit in a district; similarly, 77 blocks where large populations of Muslims are concentrated have been identified to establish institutes for teachers' training; some initiatives have been proposed to provide girl hostels in minority concentration districts and proposals have been mooted to establish polytechnics with hostel facilities in all such districts. It is also agreed to undertake revision of the *Madrasa* modernization programme and preparation of the textbooks – based on the themes of secularism and multiculturalism – under the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in light of the National Curricula Framework. Still some other initiatives include the opening of more public sector banks in minority-dominated areas; the establishment of centres for the study of inclusion-exclusion of minorities, SCs and STs in 35 universities, including one in JNU; and a training programme to sensitize government officials.

The much-publicized Prime Minister's 15 Point Programme for the Welfare of Minorities including Muslims has been in place since before the submission of the Sachar report. The 15 Point Programme focuses on a certain percentage in the allocation of developmental funds for minority-dominated areas. The Programme addresses mainly the questions of scholarships for minority students; of raising the corpus fund of Maulana Azad Educational Foundation (intended to promote modern education among Muslims); extending the *Indira Avas Yojana* to help in housing for those below the poverty line; and raising the capital outlay of the National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation for generating more self-employment among minorities. Leadership training programmes for minority women, computerization of the state-level *wakf* boards (government-mandated bodies to administer and manage Muslim denominational properties such as mosques, mausoleums, Madrasas, graveyards and other assets), etc. were also mooted.

CONCLUSION

How can we respond to the Sachar report and the various other reports and measures dealing with the iniquitous conditions of Indian Muslims? Some, among the liberal sections of scholars and other public figures which includes a section of Muslim intelligentsia, see the findings of the report as a severe indictment of Indian state and all that has not been right with Indian secularism. Nevertheless, the report, as the first one to be made public, has been widely appreciated for its frankness in dealing with the critical issue of equity for India's Muslim minority. Sceptics, comprising again sections of Muslim intelligentsia, dub it as a political ploy of the ruling United Progressive Alliance; it is an eye-wash, and yet one more attempt to hoodwink the gullible Indian Muslims. The right-wing political parties, mainly those belonging to the so-called *Sangh Parivar* (political parties and varieties of other organizations claiming to be cultural, religious, etc. who subscribe to the ideology of a majoritarian Hindu nation as espoused by the parental Rashtriya Swyam Sevak Singh (RSS – National Voluntary Service Organisation)), described the report as one more instance of appeasement of the Muslims and yet another case of pseudo-secularism of the UPA government.

In fact, one need not comment; the report calls for some introspection regarding its outcome. Due to maybe political apathy, bureaucratic antipathy, indifference of larger society or even the inertia of the Muslim elite, truth is there is not much to be seen by way of outcome. For instance, efforts at banking and credit facilities under the 15 Point Programme have so far benefitted minorities other than Muslims, with banks taking credit for providing loans to minorities while still manoeuvring to keep Muslims out of the game. Perhaps wanting to steer clear of any political controversy, Sachar also does not contextualize the issue of equity with the politics that produce insecurity – both physical and social – and the processes of discrimination and exclusion. Without ensuring security and citizenship in letter and spirit, the concern for equity remains confined more to words than deeds. On the positive side however are the myriad efforts made by the community itself to improve its socio-economic lot. But these may or may not be related to the awareness generated by the Sachar Committee report.

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LA COMMUNAUTÉ MUSULMANE EN INDE: LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DES RECOMMANDATIONS DU RAPPORT SACHAR

En mars 2005, le Premier Ministre a mis en place un comité de haut niveau dirigé par Rajinder Sachar afin de produire un rapport sur le statut socio-économique et sur le niveau de scolarisation de la minorité musulmane. Le rapport, présenté en novembre 2006, se penche surtout sur les questions d'équité pour les 156 millions d'Indiens de confession musulmane. Le comité devait cerner les causes expliquant leur incapacité à accéder aux ressources et aux institutions qui favoriseraient leur développement économique et leur donneraient accès à une meilleure représentation politique. Le comité devait aussi identifier les domaines dans lesquels l'État pourrait éventuellement intervenir. En ce qui a trait à l'équité, le comité a abordé les thèmes suivants: la population, l'éducation, l'économie et l'emploi, les infrastructures, et les emplois dans la fonction publique. Les données recueillies ont permis de réfuter certains préjugés. Ainsi, le rapport a montré que la croissance de la population musulmane ne menace aucun autre groupe en Inde, puisqu'elle ne représentera que 18-19 % de la population indienne à la fin du siècle courant. D'autres résultats ont montré que tout n'est pas rose avec la laïcité indienne. En effet, 25 % des enfants musulmans (âgés de 6 à 14 ans) ne vont pas à l'école ou ont abandonné l'école et seulement 3 % des jeunes musulmans fréquentent les madrasas, car les écoles laïques sont absentes ou inadéquates dans les secteurs habités par les Musulmans. En plus, le nombre d'enfants de cette communauté qui travaillent est plus élevé que dans les autres groupes. Par ailleurs, le taux d'alphabétisme des Musulmans se situe sous la moyenne nationale et est tout simplement pitoyable chez les femmes de la communauté. On trouve plus de diplômés sans emploi chez les Musulmans que dans les autres communautés. Ils ne perçoivent donc

pas l'éducation comme un outil de mobilité sociale. En outre, le pourcentage d'étudiants et de professeurs musulmans dans les collèges et les universités réputées se situe entre 2 % et 4 %.

Le pourcentage de Musulmans dans le secteur formel est négligeable. Ils travaillent plutôt dans le secteur informel comme petits marchands, artisans et petits manufacturiers ce qui les rend vulnérables à l'agitation politique et à la violence communale. La libéralisation économique a accentué leur vulnérabilité face aux forces du marché. Ils ne semblent pas profiter de la croissance économique de l'Inde. Sachar remarque que les Musulmans n'ont pas bénéficié autant que les autres communautés de la croissance économique annuelle de 6 % de 1993-1994 et de 2004-2005. Ils semblent incapables de s'intégrer aux nouvelles structures favorisant la croissance alors que leurs structures traditionnelles sont menacées par la mondialisation et la libéralisation économique.

Plus sérieusement, le rapport note une relation inversée entre les infrastructures physiques et sociales dans les localités, villages et villes de la communauté musulmane. En outre, la communauté ne profite pas des programmes sociaux de façon équitable. Une grande proportion de foyers musulmans vit avec moins de 500 roupies par mois. Les dépenses des Musulmans les plus pauvres se chiffrent à 75 % du seuil de pauvreté. Ce pourcentage est le plus faible de toutes les communautés religieuses. Leur présence anémique dans les domaines d'emploi professionnels, techniques, administratifs et de gestion, à la fois dans les secteurs public et privé, montrent à quel point il leur est difficile d'accéder à la sécurité sociale, à un certain statut social et au pouvoir. Ainsi, les Musulmans n'occupent que de 2 % à 4 % des postes les plus importants de la fonction publique, et ce nombre est en déclin depuis les années 1970 tout comme leur représentation aux assemblées législatives et à tout autre forme d'organes décisionnels. Plusieurs circonscriptions électorales comprenant un nombre important d'électeurs musulmans sont simplement réservées pour les castes répertoriées.

Le comité a aussi identifié des interventions possibles pour l'État: renforcer certaines dispositions des lois et des politiques publiques, établir une banque nationale de données et une agence d'évaluation et de suivi indépendantes afin d'évaluer dans quelle mesure les divers programmes sociaux gouvernementaux profitent aux communautés culturelles et religieuses auxquelles elles sont destinées, ainsi que de mettre sur pied une commission sur l'égalité des chances. Il suggère aussi d'instaurer un indice de la diversité, qui permettrait d'encourager les initiatives publiques et privés visant la diversité. Finalement, il suggère aussi d'éliminer les anomalies dans l'identification des circonscriptions électorales *réservées*.

Dans la foulée de la publication du rapport, on a observé une abondance d'activités sous forme de comités et de commissions, de rapports et de projets. Parmi ceux-ci, il faut mentionner le rapport Ranganath Misra de 2007 qui recommanda de réserver 10 % des places dans les établissements d'enseignement publics et des postes de la fonction publique pour les Musulmans de tous les statuts socio-économiques; d'inclure des communautés musulmanes hors-castes dans la liste constitutionnelle des SC, et d'inclure davantage de communautés musulmanes dans la liste des « Autres classes défavorisées » (OBC). En fait, le rapport Misra a généré plus d'activités politiques que le rapport Sachar, puisqu'il a soulevé la possibilité que des Musulmans et des Chrétiens de basses castes puissent avoir accès au système de quotas. Cependant, comme par hasard, après six ans, le rapport Sachar a été oublié. En dehors de certains changements cosmétiques et d'un intérêt académique occasionnel, l'équité pour les Musulmans n'est pas un enjeu important dans la politique nationale. Le comité aurait dû être acclamé pour son travail; mais sur le terrain la réalité demeure plus sombre que ce que montrent les données obtenues de sources gouvernementales. Il faut également porter un jugement critique sur la méthodologie du rapport qui ne met pas en relation la question de l'équité et les politiques responsables du sentiment d'insécurité et des processus de discrimination et d'exclusion. Puisque la sécurité et la citoyenneté pour tous sont garanties sur papier, mais non dans les faits, l'équité pour les Indiens musulmans demeure une idée utopique.

THE STORY OF MONTREAL: A COSMOPOLITAN METROPOLIS WITHOUT A MUNICIPAL POLICY?

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THE CITY: A PERFECT ENGINE FOR INTEGRATION

Although both the selection of immigrants and initial settlement programs have traditionally been the responsibility of central governments, the management of the resulting cultural diversity is generally left to local communities and municipal governments. Faced with rapidly changing urban realities due to the increase of international immigration, as well as to numerous political reorientations imposed by higher levels of government, some municipalities have adopted very general policy guidelines. However, most are struggling with the daily management of challenges posed by the recognition of cultural diversity. City life implies a particular kind of society, even more so in a metropolis with unique means for integrating newcomers. It is therefore important to understand these means and the particular flavour attached to each city. Given that each city has its own structure and history, each needs a unique strategy for encountering diversity.

Immigration and the metropolis have been linked for a long time. No one has better explored this link than Berlin sociologist Georg Simmel in *The Metropolis and Mental Life* (1903). For Simmel, *The Stranger* (1908) is not reduced to the immigrant, but is more broadly defined as somebody from outside. This is an experience shared by many inhabitants of a metropolis. A century later, *La métropole des individus*, written by one of the most renowned French urban sociologists, Alain Bourdin, opens by revisiting Simmel, whose writing inspires this eminently modern reflection: "The metropolis is simultaneously a social organisation, an everyday individual experience and a codified set of ways of living and thinking" (Bourdin, 2005, p. 22). The typical cultural form of the metropolis is cosmopolitanism, which involves an exposure to a mix of cultural and social frames of reference, giving the individual the simultaneous experience of both proximity and distance from others. As we see below, both of these frameworks are important for living together harmoniously in urban settings.

Immigration and the metropolis have also inspired another philosophical trend, around the idea of the fragmented city. In this narrative, attention is focused on social and ethnic divisions and segregation, betraying a strong sense of nostalgia for a lost social cohesion (often a utopian ideal). This narrative is anchored in urban experiences in countries like France and the United States, but it is debatable if it fits the experiential past of Canadian cities. The three largest gateway cities for immigrants, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, do not share the same history of urban development. When Europe dominated the affairs of the world, Montreal topped the Canadian urban hierarchy. However, with the ascendance of the United States, Toronto surpassed Montreal both demographically and economically. The more recent rise of the Asian economies has contributed to rapid economic growth in Vancouver. The specific characteristics of these three metropolises have shaped different stories of immigration. Understanding these stories helps to establish the role of urban fabric and sociability in building a cosmopolitan city.

Montreal has many distinguishing features. It is an "in-between" city, torn between two philosophies regarding the integration of immigrants. On one hand stands the federal model of multiculturalism. On the other stands the Quebec model of inter-culturalism, which recognizes diversity while emphasizing exchange and integration within a shared culture marked by the French language. My hypothesis is that inter-ethnic "living together" owes very little to either of these policies, but a great deal to the daily experience of Montrealers. This experience is deeply grounded in the neighbourhood life.

Montrealers originate from a wide variety of countries. The weight given to the French language in Quebec's immigration policy has encouraged an important flow of migrants from Haiti, Algeria, Morocco and France. The city also lacks large ethnic enclaves, which are flourishing in Toronto and Vancouver. Finally, recent immigration, for

example by North Africans, is dispersed across the island of Montreal, even much more than earlier waves of European immigrants. We now turn to the history of immigration in Montreal from an urban perspective, before returning to the challenges of municipal policies in the 21st century.

A FORGOTTEN FIRST CHAPTER?

Today, religious pluralism seems to make the immigration question much more complex than it was before Quebecers rather recently discovered secularism, and came to adhere to what the French call laïcité. The founding narrative of the metropolis seems to have been largely forgotten. The city began with a missionary project that pushed a handful of French devotees who landed on the island in 1642 to "convert the savages," as the Iroquois were known by the settlers. A few years after this, the Priests Society of the Saint-Sulpice Seminary sent four missionaries to create the ideal Catholic society, a Christian city to be built on the island. Today, the Sulpician Seminary still houses missionaries in the shadow of Notre-Dame Basilica, in what is now called Old Montreal. Another distinguishing feature of early Montreal was the cadastral survey, a way of dividing land to give all early inhabitants access to the river. It created a series of *côtes*, which began as portions of land divided into plots that were bisected along their length by a road (Marsan, 1981). These territories were important for social cohesion and they structured neighbourhood life in particular ways. The resulting neighbourhoods coincided first with parishes, and later with suburbs. This urban form was later perpetuated by immigrants who developed "ethnic villages" at the turn of the 20th century. Nevertheless, throughout the French regime, Montreal remained a very small and quite homogeneous city, albeit one from which expeditions were launched that swept across a good part of the continent.

A RISING METROPOLIS: A MOSAIC OF NEIGHBOURHOODS, YET NOT QUITE COSMOPOLITAN

After the British Conquest of 1759, settlers of French, Scottish, Irish, American and British descent built a mosaic of neighbourhoods, and the urban landscape became increasingly segmented along ethnic lines, with linguistic, religious, and cultural divisions. Separate networks of cultural, charitable, and economic organizations were set up in each neighbourhood. This served to minimize tensions between diverse groups (McNicoll, 1993). This socio-spatial segregation was in response to the need for cultural well-being, and it facilitated coexistence between different groups. This model of integration by way of segmentation was imitated by immigrants arriving from other parts of the world from the turn of the 20th century onwards.

However, in 1901 less than 5% of Montreal's population was composed of immigrants, which led historian Paul-André Linteau to argue that Montreal was hardly a cosmopolitan city at that time (Linteau, 1982). A few groups of newcomers were nevertheless in the process of laying the foundations of a new geography of immigration. Jews, Chinese migrants of Cantonese background, and African-Americans settled in different districts of the city, beginning to build what are still considered today their "founding neighbourhoods." This concept draws on the work of Belgian sociologist Jean Remy (1990), who discusses the processes and spaces that construct the cosmopolitan city. He focuses on cities in the Mediterranean basin between the late middle Ages and the end of the 19th century, revealing that the cosmopolitan city is first built on a combination of homogeneous neighbourhoods and central public places. Rather than framed by imposed norms of integration, city life in such places thrives on social interactions between different groups. These are based on the translation of codes of behaviour from one vocabulary to another within those interstitial spaces where exchanges can take place freely. The ease of interacting with people from the same cultural background, and the comfort of being able to take one's distance from city life, are as important to the overall cosmopolitan dynamic as inter-cultural exchanges in public places. A founding neighbourhood can grow even when residential trajectories take immigrants elsewhere. It operates as a compromise between home country and host country, but typically becomes a distinctive urban form and even an attractive destination for others in the contemporary city. A good example is Montreal's Chinatown, located at the end of the traditional immigrant corridor of Boulevard Saint-Laurent. A more recent one is Little Maghreb on Jean-Talon Street. However, founding neighbourhoods can also be contested places, inciting negotiation and sometimes even conflicts, as in the case of the Petite-Bourgogne, the neighbourhood where African Americans settled and which was, in the 1990s, supposed to be the founding neighbourhood of Black communities.

FROM THE GOLDEN AGE OF LITTLE HOMELANDS TO MULTI-ETHNIC NEIGHBOURHOODS

The mid-20th century brought significant waves of primarily European immigrants. First Italians arrived, then Greeks and Portuguese. These immigrants, often from rural backgrounds and with little education, not only quickly made a place for themselves in the city, but they also changed the architectural and culinary landscape of Montreal. The Italians produced their own version of the Montreal "duplex," row or terraced housing made up of two apartments, one directly on top of the other. The Greeks made their mark in the restaurant business, and

the Portuguese played a decisive role in the re-conquest of central neighbourhoods. Despite arriving with little money and earning low wages, the Portuguese managed to buy and renovate old housing that, until then, native Montrealers had regarded with disdain as dilapidated working-class housing. Painting façades in bright colours, the Portuguese took over part of a district that would become one of the hippest in the metropolis, the Plateau Mont-Royal. This Montreal of "little homelands" inspired the novelist Claude Jasmin (1972), and became a campaign slogan for municipal elections in the 1970s. Montrealers began to jump onto the band-wagon of cosmopolitanism, with its hedonistic variety of gastronomic and other consumer choices. Continued immigration made a deep and lasting impression on the lifestyle of Montrealers, particularly those living in the central districts, where the high concentration of immigrants offered a partial buffer against a demographic decline caused by an exodus to the rapidly-growing suburbs.

The 1980s and 1990s saw another transformation in Montreal's landscape, as Canada's immigration policy was overhauled. This opened the country to migrants from so-called "Third World" countries in the wake of the Geneva Convention. The country adopted a point system to attract immigrants based on their human capital. Family reunification policies were deracialized, and the target numbers of immigrants for Canada and Quebec were repeatedly raised. These new waves of immigrants came from more urban areas and from a wider range of countries. They were also better educated than the native-born population. Former ethnic villages became markedly multi-ethnic neighbourhoods. Immigrants also settled for the first time in neighbourhoods situated further from the city centre. An extensive study of community life on inter-ethnic "living together" shows that public sociability was certainly detached, but relatively peaceful. Immigrants tended to be deeply involved in community life, and the most multi-ethnic neighbourhoods seemed to have the least inter-ethnic tensions (Germain, 1995). The return of economic growth in the middle of the 1990s, as well as a relatively affordable housing market and new culinary traditions brought by recent immigrants seem to have done more to foster mutual concessions than any official integration policy. A sort of "soft cosmopolitanism" or "cosmopolitanism by default" was on the rise, in large part thanks to the spread of a particular kind of metropolitan mentality among many Montrealers (Germain & Radice, 2006). Damaris Rose found the seed of a discourse of cosmopolitanism in neighbourhoods such as Mile-End, where Anglophone students and marginal Francophone and European gentrifiers came to share the same public spaces in the middle of an immigrant corridor (Rose, 1995).

While the adjacent neighbourhood of Petit-Plateau became the heartland of a Francophone cultural avant-garde, inspired by the Quiet Revolution, the Mile-End remained an in-between space. It was a little haven of peace in a city often troubled by linguistic and political tensions, where a number of very diverse groups found themselves embracing a cosmopolitan indeterminacy and a sense of multiple commitments. However, the idea of cosmopolitanism has also, on occasion, triggered resistance in the context of a minority society such as Quebec, embroiled in debates over national sovereignty. Daniel Latouche highlights this in his discussion of Montreal's cosmopolitanism of the bazaar (Latouche, 1990), in which hypersensitivity leads to the perception that diversity poses a threat to Québécois identity, which risks being defined only in terms of a common French-Canadian culture.

At the turn of the 21st century, territories of immigration became more fluid. Neighbourhoods that were formerly bastions of Francophone of European descent began to be settled by new immigrants. Numbers of recent immigrants also rose in the West Island, traditionally home to long-established Anglophones. The spread of immigrants to the outer suburbs is still limited compared to the geography of immigration in Toronto or Vancouver, but it is growing. On the island of Montreal, many middle-class suburbs are quite multi-ethnic, which is less common beyond the island. One major exception is Brossard, on the south shore of Montreal. With the establishment of immigrants from Hong Kong since the 1980s, a very multi-ethnic and wealthy suburb has developed there. Dansereau *et al.* demonstrate that immigrants are living in much diversified urban milieus, from downtown to the suburbs, from poor areas to upper middle class sectors of the city (Dansereau *et al.*, 2012).

A STORY WITHOUT A MUNICIPAL POLICY?

It would be unfair to end this story without a short word about the multi-dimensional role of municipalities on the island of Montreal. Two of these dimensions are worth highlighting here. One is symbolic, and significant for appreciating a local culture of hospitality towards newcomers. For example, in 2004 the City of Montreal adopted the *Déclaration de Montréal pour la diversité culturelle et l'inclusion*, and more recently the city was recognized as *Cité interculturelle* by the Council of Europe. Early on, Montreal's was among the first municipalities to express concern for welcoming diversity and recognizing the legacies of previous waves of immigrants within public places, such as with the former Place du Portugal. Mayor Bourque (1994-2001) was particularly devoted to that goal, and regularly conveyed a cosmopolitan vision for the city. The mayor of Brossard since 2009, Paul Leduc, is also proud

to underline the multiethnic quality of his wealthy suburb. The other dimension worth noting is more pragmatic, and has taken very different forms in municipalities of the Montreal region. It is highlighted in a study we conducted in 2001-2003, concerning management practices in social housing, sports and leisure facilities, and in the zoning of places of worship, three municipal domains important for new and old Montrealers alike (Poirier *et al.*, 2006). While municipal actors have often been caught off-guard by matters of religion, interesting learning and negotiation opportunities at the local level have happened in *ad hoc*, but effective ways. This demonstrates an ability to arrive at "compromises of co-existence," even on sensitive questions such as religion (Germain & Gagnon, 2003). On housing issues, municipal responsibilities will be crucial in the future, with the dramatic shortage of sufficient and affordable rental housing. The city is still a strong engine for integration, but municipal policies will be required to help new immigrants facing ever greater difficulties in finding affordable homes. This seems to be one of the new challenges that need to be resolved for the sake of a happy cosmopolitan metropolis.

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L'HISTOIRE DE MONTRÉAL : UNE MÉTROPOLE COSMOPOLITE DÉPOURVUE D'UNE POLITIQUE MUNICIPALE ?

La sélection et l'établissement des immigrants relèvent des prérogatives des gouvernements d'instances supérieures, laissant la gestion de la diversité culturelle aux instances locales et municipales. Toutes les municipalités n'adoptent pas nécessairement des politiques formelles à cet effet. Il faut dire que la ville, et a fortiori une métropole, est un corps social qui a des vertus particulières en matière d'intégration, comme l'avait bien montré Georg Simmel au début du XXᵉ siècle. Un siècle plus tard, Alain Bourdin reprendra ses propos pour définir *La métropole des individus* comme une organisation sociale, une expérience individuelle quotidienne et un ensemble de codes de vie et de pensée. Le cosmopolitisme est alors la forme culturelle typique de la métropole ; l'individu y expérimente simultanément proximité et distance avec autrui, à l'occasion d'une exposition à une variété de cadres de références sociaux et culturels.

Comprendre l'histoire d'une métropole et ses vertus d'intégration devient donc une tâche importante, avant même qu'il soit question d'une politique municipale d'intégration. C'est donc cette histoire que l'on va retracer, en quelques étapes. Le premier chapitre, généralement oublié par les temps qui courent, des temps tourmentés par un débat sur la laïcité, nous rappelle pourtant la mission religieuse qui a présidé à sa fondation en 1642. Cette histoire est aussi d'emblée celle de quartiers correspondant à son cadastre et qui vont devenir des piliers dans la mosaïque montréalaise sur le mode de l'intégration par segmentation après la Conquête anglaise de 1759. Les premières vagues d'immigrants internationaux poursuivront ce modèle, avec les quartiers fondateurs des premières communautés juives, chinoises, et de Noirs américains au tournant du XXᵉ siècle, alors que le cosmopolitisme de Montréal semble encore balbutiant. Le modèle se poursuit avec l'arrivée des premières vagues d'immigrants européens, quelques décennies plus tard. Mais ces immigrants italiens, grecs et portugais vont eux aussi transformer le paysage architectural… et culinaire de Montréal. Ces petites patries, pour reprendre l'expression de Claude Jasmin, consacrent le cosmopolitisme des Montréalais,

version hédonique, mais contribuent aussi à endiguer le déclin démographique amorcé avec l'exode vers les banlieues. À partir des années 1980, le paysage montréalais se transforme à nouveau avec l'arrivée d'immigrants en provenance des pays du Tiers-Monde, pour reprendre l'expression de l'époque, et les petites patries ou villages ethniques deviennent des quartiers résolument multiethniques, comme le seront bientôt à peu près tous les quartiers montréalais. Le retour de la croissance économique au milieu des années 1990, un marché du logement relativement ouvert et les nouvelles habitudes culinaires apportées par les immigrants vont stimuler un apprivoisement de la diversité culturelle et une cohabitation certes distante, mais néanmoins harmonieuse de façon plus efficace que n'importe quelle politique interculturelle. Si on peut discuter de l'interprétation à donner à ce cosmopolitisme ambiant, on ne peut nier sa vigueur, notamment dans ce quartier interstitiel qu'est le Mile-End.

Aujourd'hui, les immigrants sont établis dans une grande diversité de milieux de vie, comme le montrent plusieurs études. Dans cette histoire de l'immigration à Montréal retracée à grand trait, il n'est pas fait mention du rôle des politiques municipales. Pourtant, elles interviennent à deux niveaux. Le premier, mais non le moindre peut être qualifié de symbolique. Il correspond par exemple à la *Déclaration de Montréal pour la diversité culturelle et l'inclusion*, adoptée par la Ville de Montréal en 2004. Ces gestes symboliques sont importants pour envoyer aux nouveaux Montréalais un message d'hospitalité. Sur un deuxième niveau, il faut situer les différentes pratiques de gestion municipale de la diversité dans des domaines aussi variés que les sports et loisirs ou l'aménagement des lieux de culte. Plusieurs recherches ont montré la diversité de ces pratiques dans la région montréalaise, mais aussi la capacité de faire des compromis de coexistence dont elles témoignent. Aujourd'hui, de nouveaux enjeux se dessinent pour l'instance municipale à Montréal dans le domaine du logement: de grands logements locatifs abordables étant devenus une denrée rare à Montréal, ce qui risque d'entraver la poursuite de la construction de la métropole cosmopolite. C'est à ce niveau que les municipalités pourront peut-être le plus efficacement accompagner le travail d'intégration opéré par ailleurs par la fabrique urbaine.

THE ROLE OF NGO'S IN THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN MONTREAL: THE EXAMPLE OF SOUTH ASIANS

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INTRODUCTION

Immigrant integration is a complex process involving time and a large number of civil socisecularety actors. It also encompasses many dimensions. Linguistic and economic integration are often at the forefront. Nevertheless, a full integration implies political and social participation. For Kunz (2005), successful immigrant integration depends on social capital. For this author, social capital is defined as: "networks of social relations that provide access to need resources and supports."

Both *bonding* and *bridging* social capital are key factors for integration. The *bonding* social capital, defined as ties that bind similar individuals together, plays an important role in the pre-migration and immigration stages, as well as for settlement. This social capital supports the immigrant by: 1) giving him basic information on the receiving country resources, and 2) helping in meeting basic needs (employment, housing, welcoming community, security, etc.). This social capital helps immigrants to get by, orienting them and permitting a better adaptation to the new environment. *Bonding* social capital helps overcome the *culture shock* associated to migration. The *bridging* and *linking* capitals are also useful for a better integration. They forge links between immigrants and other networks encompassing individuals of different social, economic and cultural backgrounds. These social capital categories favourize the access to more resources and improve civic and political participation. Social capital is produced by individuals as well as groups. The latter is called *collective social capital* in the literature. It is more of a "political," social capital category.

Our research objective was to understand the creation of the collective capital by the Montreal South Asian associative network. In this paper, we will explore how the collective social capital helps South Asian immigrant integration. We will begin with a short section on the methodology. Then we will present their associative network and explore with some case studies how it helps integration. We will conclude with a discussion on South Asian NGO's role in immigrant integration.

METHODOLOGY

My interest for the South Asians is grounded in my work experience at the city of Montreal. This immigrant group, composed mostly of Indian immigrants, was chosen because it has greatly contributed to the city's socio-demographic and cultural transformation in the past fifty years and it is still not well-researched in Quebec. In 2006-2007, I conducted 39 semi-structured interviews with first and second generation community leaders. These South Asian leaders were quite representative of the group diversity and gender ratio in Montreal. The recruitment strategy involved key informants, community members, and public civil servants who worked with this group.

THE COMMUNITY NETWORK

Their community network has developed gradually with little governmental support. Cities like Montreal and Dollard-des-Ormeaux have been helpful to their community development. South Asian associations received support in different ways: financial supports through various social programs, free or low cost offices for their NGO's, etc. Some leaders claim that the South Asian community is not well understood and discriminated against: "We are not White. We were never truly accepted. One of the important problems is the lack of understanding of the so-called Host society. In fact it is racism. It became worst after September 11th." The 2006 census indicates three concentration areas of the South Asian visible minority in the center of the island of Montreal: Parc-Extension, de la Savane and Norgate (Figure 1). Visible minority refers to the visible minority group to which the respondent belongs. The *Employment Equity Act* defines visible minorities as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or

non-white in colour" (Statistics Canada, 2007). Those areas are economically deprived. They are regarded as "ethnic enclaves." Nevertheless, some important temples and small associations are located in middle class Montreal boroughs and cities as LaSalle, Dollard-des Ormeaux and Brossard.

Source: Statistique Canada, census 2006 **2.** Credit: Nathalie Vachon, INRS

The South Asian associative network has diversified itself. In 2007, forty-seven (47) associations were identified in the Montreal metropolitan area. The community structuralization took place in the fifties. Nowadays, the South Asian network has achieved a good institutional completeness. Those associations give some services (orientation, document translation, language courses, etc.) and collaborate with the governmental agencies responsible for the immigrant settlement services. They organize social and recreational activities. We have divided the segments of the network in nine categories, according to their orientation and their types of activities (Table 1).

The first in importance is the religious one (30% of the whole). It is composed by a diversity of institutions: *mandirs*, *gurdwara* and Islamic associations. The second category is the national or regional one (20% of the whole). The countries represented are: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, which are the four major South Asian immigrant countries of origin. The others are sectoral (ex.: business, culture, social, etc.). We observed a diversity of members from various countries in the social category. This sector represents the most important category of the South Asian network (60%). Forty per cent of the network is religious or ethnic. The ties that are created by this network are multiple. On the one hand, this network is characterized by *bonding* links. Those links help the South

Asian immigrants associations in finding basic resources for their members. They are as well supportive in meeting first needs and contribute in defending immigrants' social and civil rights, helping South Asian integration. The *bonding* links favour the South Asian "post-migratory identity" which is, according to some authors, more political than ethnic.

Table 1: South Asian Associative Categories in Montreal – 2007

CATEGORY	ASSOCIATION NAME
1) Business	Quebec-India Business Council, Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce
2) Communication	Asia Canada Leader Multicultural Newspaper, India vision, Images du Bangladesh, Hindus Post inc., Nouvelles asiatiques canadiennes, Pragati, Bharat Times,
3) Culture	Kala Bharati Foundation, Nrithyala Foundation, Société de culture hindoue, Société de musique Bharatya, Société Durkai Amman Koyil, Kathakali Opus IX
4) Education	Hindi Quebec Association, Centre d'études et de ressources de l'Asie du Sud
5) Social	Club de l'âge d'or du peuple d'origine indienne, Himalaya Seniors du Quebec, Bharat Bhavan Foundation, Canadian Sikh Council
6) Sport	Cricket Club
7) Region	Association Thamilar Olli, Association mondiale tamoule, Association Eelam du Québec, Association goanaise du Québec, Pakistan Association of Quebec inc., Association des Pakistanais Khybec du Québec, Société pakistanaise-canadienne du Québec, International Society of Bangladesh
8) Religion	Association Gurudawara Guru Nanak Darbar, Association internationale pour la conscience de Krisna Canada, Association islamique Shiane Haidery inc., Association zoroastrienne, Centre de yoga Iyengar, Hindu Mission of Canada inc., Mission Saiva du Québec, Maison de Dieu Québec (Gurudawara Sahib Quebec, inc)., Shree Ramji Temple Mandhata, Hindu Temple hindou of Quebec, Temple Ramgi, Gurbani Sagar (Montreal-Sri Guru Ravidass Temple)
9) Women	South Asian Women Community Center, Cercle des femmes d'origine indienne

Source: Répertoire ethnoculturel de Montréal 2007 et enquête terrain

On the other hand, the analysis of South Asian associations links indicates that most of them have some regular and frequent ties with other networks (Table 2). Their network produces as well *bridging* and *linking* collective capital linking some individuals to the civil society and enabling them to find more resources as well as improving their social and political participations.

**Table 2: Strengths of South Asian Organizations Links
with other Networks – Montreal 2007**

ORGANIZATION	LINKS STRENGHT			
	NONE	WEAK	MEDIUM	STRONG
South Asian Alliance of Quebec			X	
Quebec Goan Association			X	
National Association of Canadians of Indian Origins in India				X
India-Canada Association		X		
South Asian Women Community Center				X
Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce		X		
Cercle des femmes d'origine indienne		X		
Club de l'âge d'or du peuple d'origine indienne			X	
Quebec-India Business Council				X
Canadian Sikh Council			X	
Bharat Bhavan Foundation				X
Kala Bharati Foundation				X
Nrithyala Foundation	X			
Bharat Times Journal			X	
Himalaya Seniors du Québec			X	
Maison de Dieu Québec (Gurudawara Sahib Quebec, inc).			X	
Hindu Mission of Canada			X	
India-Canada Organization			X	
International Society of Bangladesh			X	
Hindu Mandir Dollard-des Ormeaux		X	X	

Source: Anna Maria Fiore Field work 2007

SOME CASE STUDIES

We will present in this section five examples of associations that have produced collective social capital to explore how they have been helpful in immigrant integration. We have selected those associations because they have many Indian members, they have existed for years and have produced three types of collective social capital (*bonding*, *bridging* and *linking*) (Table 3).

The *Kala Bharati Foundation (KBF)* has a diverse membership (Indian, Bangladeshi, French Canadian and other origins). In the 1990s, a municipal cultural program helped them to reach a larger public. They organized activities mixing Indian and Quebec modern dance traditions. Furthermore, educative projects were done with various schools. The association developed *bridging*

Table 3: Case studies

ORGANIZATION NAME	FOUNDATION DATE	ACTIVITIES
Kala Bharati Foundation	1981	Cultural (neoclassical Indian dance)
Bharat Bhavan Foundation	1984	Social and recreational
South Asian Women Community Center	1981	Woman center
Canadian Sikh Council	2001	Social and civil right
Quebec-India Business Council	2004	Business

ties with the Canada Arts Council and the Quebec Dance Association. This NGO has produced *bonding* and *bridging* social capital. For a short period, with government support, the *bridging* ties were improved. With the disappearance of those governmental programs, the NGO's actions and projects were undermined. Today the *bridging* activities have a limited impact despite members' commitment. Further cuts affecting the federal government programs have had negative impacts on KBF.

The *Bharat Bhavan Foundation* (BBF) favoured the integration of the most vulnerable immigrants. The organization produced *bonding* ties between members of various national and religious groups. In the 1990s, their charter was modified to include the local community's social, educative and economic development. It democratized its structure and increased women's participation. One woman was the president of the association and another one was coordinator of a section in 2007. Many projects improving the *bridging* capacity of the organization with other networks (cities, provincial and federal governments) were developed. Later on, the Quebec government's support decreased. The activities of this center are today largely self-supported. The association's *bridging* activities are less frequent and valorized and the *bonding* activities have gained importance.

The *South Asian Women Community Center* (SAWCC) has gone through a long process to gain recognition and support. It survived many years with the support of South Asian volunteer women and the city of Montreal. This NGO's originality rests in its specific feminist approach. It first faced marginalization, even from its own community. Their feminist vision was antagonistic towards some South Asian associations who criticized it sometimes strongly because "it breaks the family." Also, their feminist perspective was different from the mainstream feminist NGO's in Quebec. For example, men, generally relatives (sons, husbands) may become member

of the SAWCC, although they are not admitted on the board of directors. Consequently, it was not recognized as a women's center and didn't receive financial support from Quebec. After its participation to the World March of Women in 1995 it finally integrated the mainstream feminist associative network. It now belongs to the *Regroupement des centres de femmes du Québec*. Since then, it has been supported by the Quebec government and has been able to improve its services and activities. It has gained recognition among civil society as well as within the South Asian community. From a *bonding* type of NGO it has evolved to a more *bridging* category.

The *Canadian Sikh Council* (CSC) is another relatively new organization. This NGO was created to sensitize the civil society about Sikhism, and stand against discrimination, particularly discrimination based on religion and race. It has been active in various issues linked to the Sikh community and immigrant integration. This NGO is self-supported by the members. It has some contacts with the Quebec government, the city of Montreal and other institutions regarding various issues. It has collaborated with Canadian universities to implement courses on Sikhism. It cooperates with governmental and non-governmental agencies to assist immigrants and refugees. It helps Montreal school boards to inform parents about youths' and students' integration. For CSC, education is crucial to improve public awareness regarding Sikh Quebecers, but the lack of resources (due to a small community and lack of governmental help) is an obstacle to building some regular activities to improve *bridging* ties with the civil society.

The *Quebec-India Business Council* (QIBC) was founded by former members of the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC). Initially the "secessionists" wanted to break the links with ICCC because this federative organization was Toronto based. It promotes the business interests of its members as well as helps trade relations between India and Quebec. This association includes South Asian members as well as Quebecers. It's a self-support association. QIBC has some important sponsors, such as Desjardins, CAE, and Air Canada. It organizes different networking activities (luncheon seminars, cocktails, etc.). It also has a student grant program. It was part of the Quebec government seed mission in India in 2005. The QIBC activities are clearly oriented toward *bridging* ties.

CONCLUSION

The South Asian community is one of the most heterogeneous ethnic groups in Montreal. Languages, nationalities, religions, gender, class and casts are some of the factors that may be claimed as obstacles to

solidarity, cooperation and integration. Our research has documented the completeness of their associative network. This network is almost self-supported. From the data we collected, we find evidence as well of the existence of an important *bridging* and *linking* collective social capital which helps integration to the new society. Some South Asian associations have regular ties with civil society. Nevertheless, some organizations are still not well recognized and supported. For some of them the governmental support has decreased with the reorientation of diversity management policies of both federal and provincial governments. This brings us to the question of whether the South Asian network can solve all the integration problems. The answer is complex. The South Asian is the most segregated group of the Montreal metropolitan area. This trend is even higher for the third generation (Apparico, Rivet & Leloup, 2006). The South Asian isolation index has increased in recent years (Hou & Picot, 2004). Furthermore, South Asians are concentrated in poor "ethnic enclaves" of Montreal. South Asians have in average a lower income than the whole Quebec population. The unemployment rate is also higher than the Quebec population (15% to 7%) (Quebec MICC, 2010). Linguistic integration is also a sensitive issue. If a major part of the group knows English (87%), only about half know French (48.2%). Furthermore, the proportion of persons who know neither French nor English (8%) indicates the necessity of special support measures. Finally, data indicate a high proportion of departure from the province, especially for the Indian immigrant economic category (Quebec MICC, 2011).

But when we took a closer look at the data, we observed some positive integration indicators. A modest suburbanization of some Canadian-born South Asians in higher socioeconomic areas illustrates an upward mobility. The proportion of persons over 15 years old who have a university degree is also higher when compared to the Quebec population. Ultimately, those indicators suggest that the classical integration assimilation model does not apply to South Asians in Quebec. Rather, it appears that the segmented integration model (Safi 2008) involving various economic integration and cultural acculturation degrees illustrates better the Quebec South Asian case. The South Asian *bonding* associative social capital remains the major resource for them while *bridging* collective social capital has been declining. It appears that NGO's collective capital "cannot replace other forms of capital to produce unrealistic social and economic outcomes beyond the material limits of its contextual boundaries" (Li, 2004, p. 187). Is the South Asian example appearing to sum up a "new trend" in immigrant integration silently questioning the Quebec political agenda regarding social equity?

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LE RÔLE DES ONG DANS L'INTÉGRATION DES IMMIGRANTS À MONTRÉAL: L'EXEMPLE DES SUD-ASIATIQUES

L'intégration des immigrants est complexe, demande du temps et comprend plusieurs dimensions: linguistique, économique, sociale et politique. Il s'agit d'un processus individuel et collectif dans lequel à la fois l'acteur et la société civile ont une part importante. Pour Kunz, l'intégration des immigrants dépend du capital social. Nous explorons ici à travers l'exemple des Sud-Asiatiques comment le capital social collectif peut soutenir l'intégration des immigrants. Nous utilisons les catégories du capital social (*bonding*, *bridging* et *linking*) développées par Putnam et Woolcook pour qualifier l'influence du capital social associatif sur leur intégration.

Cette recherche exploratoire est basée sur l'analyse de 39 entrevues réalisées en 2006-2007 auprès des leaders de première et de deuxième génération de ce groupe. Cette analyse nous a permis de dresser un portrait du réseau associatif sud-asiatique et de qualifier le capital social collectif produit par ses organisations. À la lumière de l'analyse de quelques indicateurs courants d'intégration tels que la ségrégation, l'indice d'isolement, le revenu, le taux de chômage, la connaissance du français et la présence des immigrants, nous discuterons du rôle du capital social collectif immigrant sur l'intégration.

Cet article comprend trois sections. La première porte sur la méthodologie. La seconde sur le réseau associatif sud-asiatique à Montréal. La troisième présente quelques études de cas représentatives de la diversité des organisations de ce groupe. L'analyse de ces organisations nous permet d'explorer dans le temps comment le capital social collectif a contribué à l'intégration des immigrants. En conclusion nous discutons des limites et des contraintes du capital social immigrant sur l'intégration.

Le réseau associatif sud-asiatique s'est développé depuis les années 1950 à Montréal avec peu de support gouvernemental. Il est peu connu et reconnu par la société civile. Néanmoins, en dépit des ressources limitées de la communauté, le réseau a atteint un bon niveau de complétude institutionnelle. Nous avons recensé 47 associations sud-asiatiques au Québec localisées dans la région de Montréal, surtout au centre, à l'Ouest de l'île et dans les banlieues Sud et Nord. Nous avons classé les organisations sud-asiatiques en neuf catégories: affaires, communication, culture, éducation, femmes, social, sport, région, religion. Si les deux catégories les plus importantes sur le plan numérique sont celles de la religion et des régions (40 %) – entre autres, en raison de la grande diversité nationale et religieuse de ce groupe – le réseau associatif est majoritairement composé d'organisations sectorielles (60 %) qui regroupent des personnes de cultures et de nationalités diverses.

Ces associations réalisent de nombreuses activités éducatives, économiques, sociales, culturelles et religieuses. Certaines de ces organisations donnent également des services importants favorisant une meilleure intégration des immigrants: orientation, information, interprétariat, traduction de documents, accompagnement dans les démarches administratives diverses liées à l'établissement, cours de langue, etc. Celles-ci jouent également un rôle de passerelle entre les immigrants et les organismes d'établissement subventionnés par le gouvernement du Québec puisqu'elles sont en mesure d'offrir de l'interprétariat dans plusieurs langues et dialectes sud-asiatiques peu connus au Canada. Les liens créés par les associations sud-asiatiques sont multiples. Le réseau sud-asiatique forge des liens entre les membres de ce groupe soit un capital social *bonding*. De plus, la majorité des organisations sud-asiatiques produit des liens avec d'autres réseaux (*bridging* et *linking*).

Nous avons présenté les études de cas de cinq organisations dont les domaines d'activités touchent à des enjeux importants d'intégration pour ce groupe sur le plan culturel, social, des droits de la personne et économique. L'analyse diachronique des activités de ces organisations permet d'explorer l'influence de divers facteurs sur l'orientation des liens créés par les associations comme le financement gouvernemental. Cette analyse met en lumière la production de plusieurs types de capital social par les organisations ainsi que le rôle important que le soutien étatique peut jouer dans la création de liens entre les associations immigrantes et d'autres réseaux. Elle révèle que la décroissance du soutien financier pour certaines associations dans les années 1990 a eu des répercussions sur l'impact des activités. De plus, les obstacles rencontrés par certaines organisations pour être pleinement reconnues par la société civile limitent et retardent leur potentiel d'intervention dans le domaine de l'intégration.

L'examen de certains indicateurs statistiques sur la situation des Sud-Asiatiques au Québec nous permet de mieux saisir certaines dimensions de l'intégration de ces immigrants qui ne semble pas correspondre au modèle d'assimilation classique. D'une part, certains indicateurs révèlent que ce groupe est l'un des plus ségrégués et isolés de Montréal même pour les personnes de troisième génération. Les Sud-Asiatiques ont également des revenus plus bas et un taux de chômage plus élevé que l'ensemble de la population québécoise. De plus, l'intégration linguistique de ce groupe est également une question controversée puisqu'une part importante de leur population ne connaît pas le français. En outre, la présence des Sud-Asiatiques au Québec est plus faible que celle d'autres groupes d'immigrants. Par contre, une analyse plus approfondie des données statistiques indique que certains immigrants et immigrantes réussissent beaucoup mieux à s'intégrer. Une suburbanisation modeste dans des quartiers de classe moyenne est documentée. La proportion de personnes âgées de plus de 15 ans détenant des diplômes universitaires est aussi plus élevée que celle observée pour l'ensemble de la population du Québec. De plus, la présence d'hommes et de femmes dans des secteurs professionnels comme les affaires, les finances, l'administration, les sciences et l'enseignement est également observée. Il apparaît donc que le modèle d'intégration des Sud-Asiatiques serait davantage un modèle segmenté impliquant des niveaux d'intégration économique et sociale différenciées. L'exemple des Sud-Asiatiques semble questionner l'importance du capital social collectif des immigrants dans leur intégration ainsi que les pratiques et les politiques de la société civile dans ce domaine.

PART 2

Secularism, Religious Diversity
and Ethnic Relations

THE SECULAR STATE IN QUEBEC: CONFIGURATION AND DEBATES

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"DE FACTO" SECULARISM IN QUEBEC

Quebec does not have a national constitution (since it comes under the Canadian constitution) or a law proclaiming state secularism. However, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms adopted in Quebec in 1976, as well as the 1982 Canada Act, contain express clauses guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion, equality, and freedom of expression for all citizens. No state religion is instituted (at the provincial or federal levels). Religious activities are not subjected to any constitutional constraints. No provision is made to financially support Churches, and the state does not collect any taxes to be redistributed to religious communities. Nor are buildings of worship maintained at the expense of the state. For several decades, in numerous decisions issued by various courts, the jurisprudence has reiterated that state neutrality is an obligation that the state must respect in order to ensure equality and freedom of conscience for all citizens.

The state of Quebec is therefore, de facto, a secular state: it is not associated with a religion, does not aim to advantage or disadvantage any religion, and guarantees freedom of conscience and religion (Milot, 2002). Paradoxically, according to the preamble to the 1982 Canada Act, "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law." While some may see this as an indication that Canada and hence the provinces are not secular, it must be noted that in all decisions handed down by the Supreme Court and the Federal Court, reference to God is legally ineffective in the interpretation of the law (*O'Sullivan* c. *M.R.N.* [1992]; *Baquial* c. *Canada (M.E.I)* [1995] 28 C.R.R.).

Most democratic countries are also, de facto, secular states. But in fact, the criterion of official separation between Church and State is not always enough to determine whether a state is secular. In the case of England, for example, the country may still have an official religion, but general laws are promulgated without having first been submitted to the authority of the Church of England, and furthermore, all citizens enjoy equal rights.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF SECULAR STATES

Secularism doesn't exist in a "pure" form, but instead functions as a regulating ideal that takes on various configurations within each democratic society. Secularism is a "development of the political realm by virtue of which freedom of religion and freedom of conscience are guaranteed, in conformance with a will to establish equal justice of all, by a state that is neutral toward the various conceptions of the good life coexisting in society" (Milot, 2002).

There is therefore not one model of secularism; instead, there are different types of arrangements between states and religions, as clearly illustrated by Quebec, Indian and French modi vivendi with the secular state. These variations are not directly linked to the fundamental principles of secularism, such as neutrality, freedom of conscience and religion, or equality. Rather, their differences lie in the way governments, courts of justice and citizens interpret these principles, whether secularism is openly proclaimed by the state or not.

For example, neutrality can take the form of an equal distancing of all religious influences, with symmetrical support given to each denomination in the areas of social assistance, education or tax exemption. Conversely, neutrality can be interpreted as the radical absence of any form of state action in the religious domain. These dissimilarities are normal, since secularism—like democracy or law—takes shape in the context of a specific political and legal history. Contrasting attitudes can therefore be observed from one secular state to another, such as accepting or prohibiting distinctive religious symbols among employees in public institutions.

Hence, all democratic states guarantee the internal dimension of the freedom of conscience and religion. However, when it comes to the external dimension of religious belonging (religious practices and requirements), they are observed to adopt very different acceptance criteria with regard to the scope and limits of the freedom of expression. Moreover, secular states do not all share the same vision of the role of religion in public life.

Quebec and Indian secularism largely distance themselves from French republican secularism in the way they do not strictly relegate expressions of religious belonging to the private sphere (Baubérot & Milot, 2011). Quebec and Canadian secularism favours a strong protection of individual rights. This logic of individual rights includes protecting believers against the group pressure to conform. In other words, an individual may differently and sincerely interpret a religious requirement that is not applied as strictly by other adherents. This broad and liberal interpretation of rights relative to freedom of conscience may be seen as a hallmark of Quebec and Canadian secularism, since, even in the interpretation of the law, "Any ambiguity or hesitation should be resolved in favour of individual rights," (Multani, 2006) and "irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials" (Syndicat Northcrest, 2004).

In contrast, Indian secularism does not seem to conceive of political life without religion and the contribution of various religious communities in the public sphere (Bhargava, 2010; Das & Nair, *intra*). Although article 14 of the Indian Constitution sets out that "the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India," this guarantee is not equivalent to the logic of human rights as understood in the West.

This said, differences between conceptions of the place of religion in the public sphere arise more sharply when they clash within the same society. This is the case in Quebec, as we will see, but also in India, where secularism is more strongly criticized today than it was when it was written into the country's constitutional preamble in 1976 by the 42nd Amendment. This criticism has come from different currents, including the Bharatiya Janata Party that promotes a Hindu national ideology (Sen, 2005).

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL USAGE OF THE NOTION OF SECULARISM

Before the turn of the present century, the word "secularism" rarely came up in Quebec debates. In 1999, a task force working on the place of religion in schools published a report recommending that the public school system be secularized (Task Force, 1999). The school was the last public institution to remain legally denominational (Catholic or Protestant), even if the internal secularization of schools was the rule rather than the exception. The recommendation was put forward as way of respecting the freedom of conscience and the equality of all citizens, as well as the need for the school to align itself with the secularization of Quebec society. On July 1st, 2000, public schools in Quebec relinquished denominational status.

At the time, even if the report's title included the word "secular," the social and political usage was instead to talk about "deconfessionalization," a neologism that sought to mark a distance from the radical representation of French secularism. The report went so far as to describe the secularization promoted in its recommendations as "open secularism." It thus wished to assert that secularization did not mean schools would reject any individual expression of religious belonging or any religious instruction. To the contrary, the report reaffirmed that freedom of conscience and religion remained an individual right protected by the Charter of Rights, and it recommended that religion be taught from a cultural standpoint to promote a better understanding of diversity. Today, a class on ethics and religious culture is offered in all schools throughout Quebec.

However, several years were to pass before secularism would arise in social and political debates, and when it did, it was linked with the expressions of religious belonging in public life. More specifically, a number of citizens, politicians and secular advocacy groups strongly reacted to accommodations granted for religious reasons so individuals could respect religious requirements relating to dress, culinary habits, or work schedules in public institutions. Indeed, "reasonable accommodation" is a legal obligation, an extension of the right to equality.

By declaring accommodation obligatory, the Supreme Court wished to remedy cases of involuntary discrimination, referred to as "indirect" discrimination. Reasonable accommodation applies to all cases in which discrimination is prohibited by art. 15 of Constitution Act, 1982 (race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability). An example is work schedules that are established for all employees, but conflict with moments of worship for certain denominations. If legitimate and evenly applied norms, regulations or policies produce indirect discrimination against certain persons, then institutions or businesses must seek accommodations taking these individual needs into account, within reasonable limits. These limits can be based on the excessive cost of a request, its hindrance to the functioning of an institution, or the rights of others (Woehrling, 1998).

Among other things, accommodation offers a way to eliminate obstacles to the participation in or dealing with public institutions. Hence individuals do not need to choose between maintaining expressions of religious belonging (for example carrying a religious symbol) and enjoying inclusion as members of a public institution. Reasonable accommodation therefore preserves the neutrality of the state, which, consistent with this principle, should not infringe on any religious belief.

Even so, requests for accommodations made in the name of religion produce greater disturbance than any other motives. A woman undergoing chemotherapy and wearing a headscarf is not a problem, while a similar veil worn by a Muslim woman is perceived as an ostentatious and ideological symbol at odds with the value of equality between men and women. This example illustrates how, even if we live in a society that values individual autonomy, accommodation requests stemming from personal "choice" (particularly religious) appear to be less admissible than those arising from "circumstances" (an accident or illness). And yet, the Charter of Human Rights precisely includes freedom of conscience and religion with a view to protecting personal choices.

DIVERGING CONCEPTIONS OF SECULARISM IN QUEBEC

In Quebec, highly contrasting conceptions fuel debates on secularism: on one hand, a national and French-style republican conception, and on the a pluralist and liberal conception of integration (Milot, 2009a).

Issues of secularism in Quebec involve factors associated with a specific social context. Quebec is the only Canadian province with a majority of French speakers, but also of declared Catholics. For this population—a minority in Canada—the question of identity is especially acute. The complex problem of secularism is very revealing of this fact, as it is situated at the crossroads of common values, citizen integration, and, more fundamentally, national identity. It is in Quebec that the starkest criticism has arisen about the apprehended social effects of accommodations granted to individuals in public institutions for religious reasons. In 2007, a commission on accommodation practices related to cultural differences was mandated by the Quebec government to look into the situation (Commission, 2008). It concluded that the problem had to do with "perceptions," since accommodations do set guidelines and can promote integration.

Those who oppose accommodations for religious reasons see them as a threat to Quebec identity and a risk of losing ground in gender equality, since religions are "by their essence" unfavourable to women (the veil carried by Muslim women is especially cited in this regard). Secularism is thus defined by the prohibition of any public manifestation of religious belonging and is a gauge of sharing common values. Additionally, in this vein, government employees displaying religious symbols contravene the neutrality of the state. Republican secularism requires the "apparent" or visible neutrality of individuals. The French model of secularism, at least in some of the forms it has taken—such as the March 15th, 2004, law on the wearing of religious symbols, or the requirement of apparent neutrality among employees—is attractive to the proponents of this position.

Other population segments favour a conception of secularism that is more welcoming of all public manifestations of religious belonging. In this view, religious expression has its place in the public sphere as long as it respects the rights of others and the public order. The adherents of this position maintain that religious expression in public life is not a negation of common values. From the perspective of an open secularism, individuals can be non-secular in their personal lives, while being full-fledged members of a secular political society. Likewise, from this standpoint, it is impossible to presume that religious symbols worn by state employees interfere negatively with the accomplishment of their work. Furthermore, the appearance of neutrality does not mean that non-apparent convictions (racism, etc.) cannot induce a bias in the work of state employees.

Although a plurality of conceptions is normal and healthy in a democratic society, it appears difficult to reconcile these antagonistic visions. Since each political party adopts a different vision of secularism, it remains to be seen what impact the integration of diversity might have on a charter of secularism, as promoted by the Parti Québécois, which is leading a minority government at the time of writing (Milot, 2009b). One of the aims of this charter is to ban religious symbols in the public sphere. It is not as yet evident if this will nurture a more inclusive common sphere of citizenship and the ability to live together.

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L'ÉTAT LAÏQUE AU QUÉBEC: CONFIGURATION ET DÉBATS

Même si le Québec a connu un réel processus de laïcisation pendant les deux derniers siècles, celui-ci s'est déroulé sans incorporation explicite dans le droit du principe de laïcité ou de séparation de l'État et des religions, comme ce fut le cas en France ou aux États-Unis. Le Québec est néanmoins un État laïque qui n'est lié à aucune Église, qui ne favorise ni ne défavorise aucune religion et qui garantit la liberté de conscience et l'égalité de tous les citoyens. La laïcité québécoise se distancie largement de la laïcité républicaine française, en ce qu'elle ne relègue pas à la stricte sphère privée l'expression de l'appartenance religieuse. La laïcité québécoise et canadienne privilégie une protection forte des droits individuels. Cependant, cette approche est critiquée par les tenants d'un nationalisme identitaire au Québec et il y a débat sur les modes d'intégration de la diversité, notamment religieuse, à la société québécoise.

Par rapport aux débats canadiens concernant l'aménagement de la diversité religieuse, les débats entourant la laïcité au Québec intègrent des variables liées au contexte spécifique du Québec. Même si les politiques québécoises attestent de l'importance de l'immigration, il s'agit de la seule province canadienne avec une majorité francophone, mais également de catholiques déclarés. Pour cette population, minoritaire au Canada, la question identitaire se pose de manière plus aiguë. La problématique relative à la laïcité en constitue un excellent révélateur. Elle croise la question des valeurs «communes», de l'intégration citoyenne et, plus fondamentalement, celle de l'identité nationale. Ainsi, c'est au Québec que se formulent les critiques les plus vives concernant les effets sociaux appréhendés des accommodements consentis aux individus dans les institutions publiques, pour des motifs religieux.

Soulignons que le terme laïcité est entré récemment dans l'usage social au Québec, principalement en lien avec la question des aménagements de la diversité religieuse dans la sphère publique. On peut aisément discerner au cœur de cette soudaine appropriation populaire du terme laïcité des attentes pour que l'État définisse clairement la laïcité québécoise et les exigences qui en découleraient. Ces attentes révèlent une tension vive au sein de la société québécoise entre deux conceptions divergentes de la laïcité: une conception plus stricte de la laïcité, évacuant toute expression religieuse de la sphère publique pour favoriser le partage des valeurs communes ; une laïcité qualifiée d'« ouverte » qui allie l'expression de la diversité religieuse à un gage d'intégration. Il existe un spectre de positions à l'intérieur de chacune, mais il s'agit de deux tendances lourdes, portées par des acteurs différents, et qui sont illustrées, entre autres, par deux manifestes parus à quelques semaines d'intervalle en 2010: le «Manifeste pour un Québec laïc et pluraliste» et le «Manifeste pour un Québec pluraliste».

D'une part, le Parti québécois, des groupes laïcistes militants et des segments nationalistes-conservateurs de la population se font les défenseurs d'une conception de la laïcité justifiant une limitation stricte des diverses formes d'expression religieuse dans la sphère publique. La religion et les préceptes qui en découlent devraient être confinés à la sphère privée. Ce positionnement est basé sur le postulat que la religion relève de l'ordre de l'option personnelle (parfois même une forme d'aliénation) et que son expression publique peut entrainer un non-respect des valeurs communes, notamment le principe d'égalité hommes-femmes, et entraver le processus de convergence identitaire. Afficher une appartenance religieuse peut devenir une menace pour le vivre ensemble. La laïcité est alors

présentée comme une valeur de la société québécoise. D'autre part, d'autres segments de la population se montrent favorables à une conception de la laïcité plus accueillante à l'ensemble des manifestations publiques de l'appartenance religieuse. Reflétant une approche libérale et inclusive, la laïcité « ouverte » invite à reconnaître l'importance de la neutralité de l'État et de ses institutions, mais également, l'importance tout aussi grande de la liberté de conscience et de religion, permettant aux citoyens d'exprimer leurs convictions religieuses dans la mesure où cette expression n'entrave pas les droits et libertés d'autrui. Cette approche, pour ses défenseurs, favoriserait une meilleure intégration que la non-reconnaissance de la diversité religieuse et donc, de composantes fondamentales de l'identité de plusieurs citoyens.

Si les pratiques d'accommodements raisonnables s'exercent depuis plus de vingt ans au Canada, dont au Québec, elles paraissent menaçantes pour une partie de la population qui craint l'effritement de l'identité québécoise et la neutralité de l'État. Pourtant, les lois et les politiques publiques doivent prendre en considération le fait qu'un État qui ne veille pas à apporter des correctifs aux discriminations indirectes que subissent des citoyens, même si celles-ci ne sont pas voulues par lois générales, perd sa neutralité, car il laisse se produire des inégalités. C'est ainsi que les accommodements raisonnables sont compatibles avec la neutralité de l'État et parfois nécessaires pour la préserver.

Toutefois, il est remarquable de constater à quel point les demandes d'accommodement dérangent davantage si elles sont formulées au nom de la religion plutôt que d'un autre motif. Ainsi, il est tout à fait accepté qu'une femme qui subit des traitements de chimiothérapie porte un foulard pour couvrir sa tête, alors qu'un voile semblable arboré par une femme musulmane est perçu comme un signe ostentatoire et idéologique, allant à l'encontre de la valeur d'égalité entre les homme et les femmes. Cet exemple illustre que même si nous vivons dans des sociétés où l'autonomie individuelle est valorisée, les demandes fondées sur un « choix » personnel (religieux tout particulièrement) semblent moins recevables que celles relevant de « circonstances » (accident, maladie). Pourtant, c'est précisément pour protéger ce choix personnel que les Chartes des droits de la personne incluent la liberté de conscience et de religion.

VISIONS OF SECULARISM IN INDIA

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INTRODUCTION

Secularism in contemporary India invariably alludes to almost any issue and/or problem emerging from an interface between politics and religion in public life. Secularism is important because it is central to the very idea of India, both as a multi-cultural nation-state and as a heterogeneous civilization. Its meanings vary in accordance with one's vision of India. Such visions are influenced not only by history and politics but have profound epistemological and ethical moorings. This makes secularism extremely complex, irrespective of whether one attempts to understand it as a variegated concept or observe it as a phenomenon in constant flux.

WORLDS OF A WORD

The word "secularism" in India offers many complex shades of meaning. It may be understood as the State's expression of goodwill (or equal respect) towards all religions (*sarva dharm samabháva*), and/or the State's policy of religious neutrality (*dharm nirpekshtá*). Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime-minister, noted that it was not easy to find a good equivalent for the world "secular" in Hindi, one of India's many languages (Madan, 1998, p. 311). Notwithstanding, Indian visions of secularism seem prior to the word itself.

The conventional opinions in the debates on secularism in India are that it is derived from the West. Consequently, Indian secularism is all too often contrasted with Christian, American, and French ideas about the relationship between religion and politics. Therefore, one is obliged to allude to these, however briefly, in a discussion on Indian secularism. The word "secularism" is derived from *saeculum*, *saeculi* meaning century/the times/a generation/spirit of the age, and so on. It appears to have evolved from within a Christian context and denotes a certain distance, or separation between the mundane (government and politics) and the domain of the Church (sacred or spiritual) (Taylor & Bhargava, 1998). This idea is traditionally traced back to pope Gelasius I († *ca.* 496 CE).

In English, one of the earliest appearances of the word "secularism" may be found in George Holyoake's *Principles of Secularism* (1851), where secularism is understood as a "series of principles intended for guidance of those who find theology indefinite, or inadequate, or deem it unreliable. […] A secularist guides himself by maxims of positivism, seeking to discern what is in nature – what ought to be in morals – selecting the affirmative in exposition, concerning himself with the real, the right, and the constructive" (Holyoake, 1871).

In the case of the United States of America, the First Amendment of its constitution prohibits the establishment of a national religion and a preference for one religion over another, or even, irreligion. Religious liberty is conjoined with a "wall of separation between the State and religion" in America (Chandoke 2011). In France, the equivalent of this idea of the secular is reflected in the principle of *laïcité*, which was variously enshrined in the civil code of 1805, the laws of education that emphasized moral and civic instruction rather than a religious one in schools (during the 1880s), and also, in the law of separation of Church and State (1905) (Bauberot, in Bhargava, 1998).

The modern Indian State has incorporated these and other experiences, and in doing so, Indian secularism may have morphed into a distinct variant (Bhargava, 2007). It is loaded with multiple values emanating from divergent sources, and hence the Indian visions of secularism appear to be paradoxical. If we are to understand these without ironing out the creases for the sake of easy clarity, we must necessarily retrace the paths of history.

SINEWS OF HISTORY

Since the first decade of the 20th century, the question that worried many Indian national leaders was how could followers of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism, as well as those of numerous other lesser known religions, coexist peacefully in India. The question of conviviality became increasingly relevant as the relations between assertive groups within majority and minority religions frequently clashed, and often, violently. However, there is a history to these communal clashes dating back to the mid 19th century.

The first major challenge to British colonial rule in India was the Revolt of 1857, whereby peoples and leaders, Hindus and Muslims, combined forces against their common foe. Once the revolt was quelled, the British government consciously enacted a policy of playing-off the

Hindus against the Muslims. Consequently, communal identities were strengthened and sectarian conflict became widespread. By the early 20th century, communal riots and separate electorates for different communities became a recurring feature of Indian socio-political life.

Would separating politics from religion be a feasible *modus vivendi*? Mohandas Gandhi, considered by many to be the father of the Indian nation, thought that religion could not be separated from politics (Ghandi, 1921). Instead, he believed that by immersing oneself in one's own religion, one could discover traditions of tolerance and peaceful coexistence (Brown, 2008). However, certain other leaders felt that there was an urgent need to protect vulnerable sections of Indian society and envisioned a different path based on a regime of rights that evolved out of the trajectories of the American and European Enlightenment.

These leaders reckoned that the followers of minority religions and the depressed classes required the protection of the State through a discourse of rights. Thus, the *Swaraj Constitution* of 1928, which was one of the earliest attempts at redacting a constitution for a free India, contained a section titled "Fundamental Rights," which guaranteed, amongst other rights, those of freedom of conscience and the free practice of religion. The philosophy and scope behind the freedom of religion as mentioned in the *Swaraj Constitution* was expanded during the debates of the Constituent Assembly (1946-49) that drafted the Constitution of the Republic of India, which came into force on January 26th, 1950. To understand this constitutional vision of secularism, we must revisit the circumstances of Indian independence. The British policy of playing-off Hindus and Muslims through a divisive politics of identity and communal electorates eventually strengthened the belief that Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations. As freedom from British imperial rule became imminent in the decade of the 1940s, the call for a separate state for Indian Muslims, the largest religious minority in British India, became more strident. Consequently, independence in August 1947 was preceded by a partition of the country into two states: Islamic Pakistan and India.

The creation of Pakistan on the basis of religion raised a number of problems. If Pakistan was created for Muslims, should all Muslims of undivided India be transferred to the new Islamic state? Would this convert India into the natural home of its majority religious population, the Hindus, and Hindus alone? What, then, would be the fate of other religious minorities in India like the Sikhs and Christians? What was at stake in those years surrounding independence was nothing less than the idea of India. From all the possible paths, the leaders envisioned that India will be secular, and this particular vision is reflected in the constitution of independent India.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF SECULARISM

In the Indian Constitution, freedom of religion includes the freedom to propagate one's own religion (art. 25.1), to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes (art. 26), and the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice (art. 30.1). The articles 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution also prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. As these rights are enforceable by a court of law, and because no law could violate these rights, this part (Fundamental Rights/Part III) is often alluded to as the "conscience" of the Indian Constitution.

The complexity of the secular character of the Indian Constitution is reflected in certain other provisions as well. Religious instruction is prohibited in State educational institutions (art. 28); separate electorates for different religious communities that were introduced by the British are non-existent (art. 325); the proceeds of taxation can not pay the expenses of any religious denomination (art. 27), while the State may financially support certain religious shrines (art. 290 A). In certain cases, the State is compelled to intervene in religious matters against the oppressive caste system, which is a salient socio-religious practice based on notions of purity and hierarchy. The State is also obliged by its constitution to protect dissenting citizens from the binding orthodoxy/orthopraxy of their corresponding religions.

In sum, the religious liberties along with other provisions in the Indian Constitution requiring the State to intervene in religious matters demonstrate that the State engages with religious communities in a highly calibrated manner. This constitutional vision of secularism appears to be indeed singular. And yet, perhaps ironically, the word "secular" was absent from the Indian Constitution until 1976, when it was inserted into the preamble by the forty-second amendment. This does not however imply that the original un-amended Constitution was not secular. Rather, the constitutional vision of secularism is so fundamental that it cannot even be amended by the parliament of India (legislature) as it forms part of the "basic-structure" of the Constitution. From a reading of the text of the Indian Constitution, we could conclude that the Indian State is (or claims to be) secular because of a series of positive liberties:

1. All citizens (both as individuals and as groups) have the freedom of religion, to embrace a different religion than the one into which an individual was born, and also to reject all religions.
2. No individual or community would be discriminated against on the grounds of religion.
3. The freedom of religion is expressly granted to religious minorities by the Indian Constitution (articles 29 and 30).

4. There is no State religion but the State is neither irreligious nor anti-religious, and it will honour all religions equally without discrimination.
5. Indian secularism does not erect a strict wall of separation between the State and religions. Instead, the State has a calibrated response to religious matters.
6. The constitutional visions and practices of secularism are based on the principle of equality and are exercised through a regime of rights.

This constitutional vision of secularism often comes under duress. There are at least two kinds of stress: first, when the constitutional values come into conflict with the practice or rules of a religion, and second, when one constitutional value comes into conflict with another constitutional value. Some possible aporias are listed below.

If a certain religious tradition permits the voluntary annihilation of one's life (like *Santhara* or *Sallekhana* of Jainism), would that be permissible as it contravenes the right to life as given in the Indian Constitution? If the personal laws of certain religions arguably discriminate against women, would these outweigh the Constitutional provisions of equality (as in the Shah Bano case of the 1980s)? In such instances, should the values of the Indian Constitution take precedence over religious values? Here, the conflict is between constitutional and religious values. This is the aporia of the first kind but the second is far more complex.

The Indian Constitution goads the State towards a uniform civil code for all its citizens while it provides minorities with rights to practice their own religion. A uniform civil code might be a path towards ensuring equal treatment of all its citizens, but it might conflict with the personal laws of many communities. Thus, the constitutional value of equality comes into conflict with the constitutional value of the freedom of religion. In such instances, what would be the most appropriate response, and would that response be inherently consistent? If there any answers to such questions, these are certainly neither easy nor can these be predetermined theoretically without reference to the particular context.

The Indian visions of secularism have also undergone another set of crises different from the constitutional duress referred to above. These crises were more real, extremely divisive, and very dangerous to both State and society. During the decade of the 1980s, India was turning into a conflictive society. Some of those events include the brutal violence against the Sikhs, a minority religious community, in November 1984; the revival of the extremist politics of the Hindu right-wing in the mid-1980s, which eventually led to the destruction of a 16th century mosque

in December 1992; the increased frequency of planned violent clashes (or targeted rioting) between the majority and minority communities, including terror attacks; negligence or indifference by the State apparatus in quelling violence and/or compensating victims; certain controversial judgments by the Supreme Court of India, for example the 1996 "Hindutva judgement" of Justice Verma; and the cunning inculcation of fear in the hearts of both the majority and the minority communities by different political parties through their pernicious propaganda with the sole purpose of garnering electoral benefits.

It is precisely in such conjunctions that the Indian intellectual engagements have been most vigorous, resulting in a variety of responses. These encompassed complex theoretical studies, critical works of art, the recognition that academic curricula, teaching, and learning at all levels ought to be socially sensitive, the enrichment of public debates in various forums, and finally, a more direct engagement with the institutions of the State. The vast range of these responses highlighted the ethical necessity of Indian secularism while underlining as well its epistemological limits.

BETWEEN ETHICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

The vision of secularism as written into the Indian Constitution speaks largely in the language of rights, which is an outcome of the American and European traditions of Enlightenment. However, if we move from the text of the Constitution toward those debates of the Constituent Assembly (1946-49) which produced this document, one notices that the members of the Assembly frequently alluded to traditions of conviviality, empathy and tolerance that were, and still are, present in the ethos of the Indian civilization. The constitutional vision of secularism if expressed solely in the language of rights and duties of citizens and the State might be sufficient to secularize the Indian State. But would it suffice to secularize Indian society?

To genuinely secularize both the Indian State and its plural society, it is perhaps essential that we continue our rediscovery of how various communities have coexisted over such a long duration on the subcontinent. It is a historical fact that many people in India have professed and practiced more than one religion simultaneously, and continue to do so. There are shrines of common worship, where followers of different religions pay their respects.

A reinvention of these traditions, and especially that of *ahimsa* (non-violence), would prevent any culture, community, discourse, or tradition from appropriating or hegemonising the ideas and practices of conviviality. India thus is a witness to many visions of secularism,

some of which are indigenous to her civilization while certain others originated from other parts of the world, and these have coalesced to create diverse visions of Indian secularism.

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LES VISIONS DE LA LAÏCITÉ EN INDE

Le concept de laïcité (« *secularism* » en anglais) en Inde est associé à presque tous les problèmes résultant de l'interaction entre la politique et la religion dans l'espace public. C'est une notion importante qui est au cœur même de la nation et de la civilisation indienne. Mais son sens varie selon la vision que chacun a de l'Inde. Le terme anglais « secularism » vient du latin *saeculum, saeculi* qui signifie le *siècle/l'époque/une génération/l'esprit du temps* etc. Il semble avoir évolué au sein de la théologie chrétienne et implique une coupure entre le monde ordinaire et l'Église.

Le terme « secularism » apparaît en anglais dans *Principles of Secularism* (1851), de George Holyoake qui le définit comme un ensemble de principes servant à guider ceux qui jugent que la théologie est vague, inadéquate ou qu'elle n'est pas digne de confiance.

Son équivalent en français est la notion de laïcité, plusieurs fois mentionnée dans le code civil de 1805. Cette notion apparaît aussi dans les lois sur l'instruction (dans les années 1880), qui mettent l'accent sur l'instruction morale et civique dans les écoles plutôt que sur l'éducation religieuse. La notion de laïcité apparaît dans les lois exigeant la séparation de l'État et de l'Église.

En Inde, la définition du terme « secularism » prend différentes nuances. Ainsi, il est tantôt défini comme de la bonne volonté ou le respect égalitaire de chaque religion (*sarva dharma samabháva/sadbháva*), tantôt comme une politique de neutralité religieuse (*dharma nirpekshtá*). Nehru, le premier premier ministre de l'Inde indépendante, fit d'ailleurs remarquer qu'il était difficile de trouver un équivalent pour *séculier* en Hindi, l'une des langues nationales de l'Inde.

Depuis le début du XXᵉ siècle, la principale préoccupation des chefs politiques indiens est la coexistence pacifique entre les Bouddhistes, les Chrétiens, les Hindous, les Musulmans, les Jaïns, les Juifs et les Sikhs (et les membres des autres minorités religieuses moins connues). D'ailleurs, cette question de cohabitation religieuse a pris plus d'importance puisque certains groupes religieux majoritaires et minoritaires entrent fréquemment en conflit, et souvent violemment.

Dans un tel contexte, la séparation du politique et du religieux constitue-t-elle un *modus vivendi* possible ? Pour Mohandas Ghandi, cette séparation n'était pas possible. Il croyait plutôt qu'en se plongeant dans sa propre religion, il était possible de trouver des traditions de tolérance et de coexistence pacifique. Mais pour certains leaders, il était urgent de protéger les membres vulnérables de la société indienne.

Certains d'entre eux, animés par un esprit juridique et inspirés par le siècle des lumières européen et américain, envisagèrent une voie différente, sans toutefois désapprouver Gandhi. Ces leaders pensaient que les membres des minorités religieuses devaient être protégés par l'État dans un discours sur les droits qui fut incorporé dans la Constitution de la République indienne, qui entra en vigueur le 26 janvier 1950.

Dans la Constitution indienne, la liberté religieuse inclut la liberté de diffuser sa propre religion (art. 25.1), d'établir et de maintenir des institutions à des fins religieuses ou caritatives (art. 26), et le droit pour les minorités d'établir et de gérer les établissements d'enseignement de leur choix (art. 30.1). Les articles 15, 16, et 19 de la Constitution interdisent aussi la discrimination basée sur la religion. La complexité du caractère laïque de la Constitution indienne se reflète aussi dans certaines de ses dispositions. L'instruction religieuse dans les établissements d'enseignement publics est interdite (art. 28). Le système d'électorats séparés pour les différentes communautés religieuses, mis en place par les Britanniques en Inde, n'existe plus (art. 325). Les revenus d'impôt ne doivent pas servir à financer les différentes confessions religieuses (art. 27), bien que l'État ait le droit de financer certains sanctuaires religieux (art. 290 A). Bref, la liberté de religion et d'autres dispositions de la Constitution indienne indiquent clairement que les relations entre l'État et les communautés religieuses sont régies par des procédés égalitaires.

Donc, nous pouvons en déduire que l'État indien est (ou prétend être) un état laïque car:

1. Tous les citoyens (comme groupes ou individus) ont le droit à la liberté de religion, ont le droit de se convertir à une autre religion que leur religion de naissance, ou de rejeter toute religion.
2. Aucune personne ou communauté ne sera victime de discrimination à cause de sa religion.
3. La liberté de religion est accordée aux minorités religieuses par la Constitution indienne (articles 29 et 30).
4. Il n'existe pas de religion d'état, et l'État ne favorise pas l'une ou l'autre des religions. L'État n'est pas antireligieux ou non-religieux, et traite chaque religion de la même manière, sans discrimination.
5. En matière religieuse, l'État propose une optique neutre, au lieu de séparer la religion de la politique.

Cette vision de la laïcité s'exprime en termes de droits humains; elle est influencée par le siècle des lumières du monde occidental. Cependant, en nous déplaçant du texte de la Constitution pour nous attarder sur les débats de l'Assemblée constituante (1946-1949) à l'origine de ce document, nous remarquons que les membres de l'Assemblée mentionnent souvent la tradition d'empathie et de tolérance qui se trouvait et se trouve encore dans la civilisation indienne. Bien que cela soit suffisant pour assurer la sécularisation de l'État indien, est-ce assez pour laïciser la société indienne?

Afin de s'assurer de la laïcisation de l'État indien et de sa société, il faut peut-être redécouvrir comment plusieurs communautés ont pu coexister aussi longtemps dans le sous-continent. C'est un fait historique reconnu: plusieurs personnes en Inde suivaient et pratiquaient simultanément plusieurs religions, et ce phénomène se poursuit même aujourd'hui. Il existe des sanctuaires religieux communs, où des membres de différentes communautés se rendent pour prier.

La redécouverte de ces traditions, et particulièrement celle de non-violence (*ahimsa*), pourrait empêcher qu'une communauté, discours ou tradition ne s'approprie ou ne s'accapare des idées et des pratiques de tolérance et de convivialité. L'Inde a donc non seulement généré plusieurs points de vue sur la laïcité, certains provenant de sa civilisation et certains provenant d'ailleurs mais elle a également favorisé leur coexistence. C'est ce qui rend les différentes visions de la laïcité en Inde aussi intrigantes que charmantes.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN QUEBEC, REAL AND IMAGINED, VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE

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INTRODUCTION

In Quebec, the religious landscape has been shaped by a very rapid secularization process that started with the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, just as globalization began to open the province to new religious influences. Our research, done in collaboration with five other researchers, aims at documenting: 1) the new religious diversity that appeared in Quebec over the last decades; 2) the meaning of religion in the everyday lives of the Québécois today. Although the study concerns the whole of the province, this presentation is based mainly on data that have been collected in Montreal, the province's largest and most multicultural city. Over the past three years, observations have been carried out on religious groups that represent (1) religions established in Quebec since the 1960s (e.g., Baha'i; Neo-shamanism, including Druidism and Wicca); (2) new forms of religious practice in long-established religions (the case of some Jewish and Catholic congregations); (3) religions imported by immigrants (including Islam, Hinduism, certain forms of Buddhism); (4) congregations of long-established religions that include a substantial proportion of immigrants among their members. Thus far, observations have been completed on a total of 100 groups in Montreal (out of a total of 137 to date). Of the Montreal groups, 38 have been studied in-depth through extended participant observation and interviews with members and leaders. The second phase of the study (2010-2014) is extending the research to the regions of Quebec outside Montreal where several dozen more groups are under study.

Research assistants have carried out observations of religious rituals and other religious activities such as neighbourhood prayer groups as well as social activities involving members of the group, like communal meals and picnics, funding events, and courses that are sponsored by the group. They have also interviewed members who vary in terms of gender, age, profession, matrimonial status, and level of commitment to the group. The interviews cover individuals' personal and religious trajectories, the role of the religious group in their everyday lives, their level of economic, social, and ideological commitment to the religious community, and when relevant, religious activities pursued outside the group's purview. Meintel and Mossière devised the tools for the team study on the basis of their own extensive fieldwork, in a Spiritualist church for Meintel and in a Congolese Pentecostal congregation for Mossière. In what follows, we present Montreal's current religious landscape, looking at some of the trends that emerge from our findings. This is followed by a closer examination of our findings regarding immigrant religious groups.

THE QUEBEC CONTEXT

Most of the religious currents mentioned herein took root in Quebec in the wake of the "Quiet Revolution" (*la Révolution tranquille*), a time of dramatic social change in the province (1960-1966) (Linteau *et al.*, 1989). During this period, the state took over the social welfare, as well as the educational and health systems, that had long been the fief of the Catholic Church. Meanwhile the religious practice of the Catholic faithful was declining rapidly (Bibby, 1990) and the ranks of the clergy and other religious were being depleted. As the political system was liberalized in the 1960s, Quebec society became thoroughly secularized and far more open to religious diversity (Linteau *et al.*, 1989). The new climate of religious freedom that developed has made for an ever more diversified religious landscape.

Recent years have seen the apparition of an ever-increasing number of places of worship in the province, especially in cities (Germain & Gagnon, 2003). This is partly due to immigration. The relative demographic weight of immigrants has been growing steadily, from 5.6% of the province's total population in 1951 to 9.4% in 1996 (Immigration et Communautés Culturelles Quebec, 2004). By 2001, according to census data, this figure had risen to almost 10%. Religious diversity among native-born

Québécois has also grown a great deal in recent years. While some have converted to Islam, Buddhism or to Evangelical religions (Mossière, 2010), others have discovered forms of spirituality that have either developed in situ from various sources or that present themselves as contemporary versions of ancient traditions such as Druidism, Native-inspired shamanism, Wicca and so on. Note that none of these require conversion, so those that were brought up Catholic sometimes retain certain elements of Catholic identity and religious observance (Meintel, 2012/2011). Many of these spiritual currents involve beliefs in spirits and spirit contact. One of the major findings from our ongoing team study, as well as in Meintel's work on Spiritualists, is that the mainstream Quebecois (French-speaking, born in Quebec and baptized in the Catholic faith) who frequent such groups are unlikely to discuss this openly with others. We have found that this is true of those who frequent many other groups in our study, be they practicing Catholics or members of Protestant congregations. Public discussion of religion tends to focus on Islam and visible markers such as the veil or the *kirpan* (a ceremonial dagger carried by Sikh males). Thus, we find that although Quebec's religious landscape is quite diverse, much of this diversity remains socially invisible.

SOME TRENDS OF THE CURRENT QUEBECOIS RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

Among the main findings of our study we note the enormous variety of religious resources now available to the Québécois; roughly speaking, we could say that rapid secularization on the institutional level, and generalized anticlericalism on the ideological level have created a religious void in the lives of the Catholic-born majority while at the same time, globalization has increased religious diversity and brought new symbolic resources to the province. Whether they formally change religion or (more often the case) do not, immigrants and non-immigrants are highly mobile across religious traditions and groups. Indeed, while some thousands have converted to religions such as Islam, which is attracting the highest numbers at the moment, converts are but the tip of the iceberg when it comes to crossing religious boundaries. Most of the Quebecois-born participants in the non-Catholic groups we study retain a Catholic identity, while finding new ways to experience the sacred in their lives. Such behaviours bring about new religious hybridities, like Neoshamanism or Wicca-related practices. We have found that young people are the most active in introducing innovations in various types of religious groups and networks, sometimes adding political involvement to their spiritual commitment; for example, regarding environmentalism and the protection of Mother Earth. Healing usually has an important if not central role in the religious currents

we have studied (Meintel and Mossière, 2011). A lot of creativity is found in the forms of sociability religious gatherings may take, some of which are sustained by the extensive use of websites. Many are aimed at spontaneous and time-limited experiences, like some rituals related to their members' life experiences (abortion for example) or meditations dedicated to full moon.

We find that local religious institutions, including Catholic ones (with some exceptions), show remarkable adaptability to modernity and to the new attendees it brings in their spaces: immigrants, homosexuals, etc. Moreover, religious groups represent important sites of interethnic relations. In fact, virtually none of the groups we have encountered is monoethnic and most include individuals from a number of national backgrounds (e.g. Haitians, Vietnamese). Immigrant groups are often religiously diverse. However, immigrants bring more Catholics than any other religion to Canada and of these, many come to Quebec (Castel, 2004), especially Montreal. At the same time that these new arrivals bring their own styles of Catholic worship, the archdiocese may also accommodate such groups by creating "missions" instead of territorial parishes (as, for example, in the case of Tamils) while existing parishes offer services in the language of these new populations (Polish, Laotian, etc.). Hispanic Catholics have given new vitality to the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Quebec. This relates to our findings about immigrant religious groups, to which we now turn.

ROLES AND ACTIVITIES OF IMMIGRANT RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN QUEBEC

Among the religious groups we have met, those formed by immigrants tend to be greatly concerned with giving members the help they need to adapt to the new society: they support newcomers in the settlement process by providing them with material, social, and emotional resources, along with recreational activities, information, and advice for finding employment and housing. For example, the "murids" or Senegalese Muslim brotherhoods offer substantial material assistance to any member who is newly arrived from Africa. This includes providing housing and hospitality, often for months. It is worth noting that informal resources offered by religious groups to their immigrant members do not substitute for public institutions and government-provided services; rather, they complement the resources provided by the state and often convey information about them to new arrivals. For example we found cases of Congolese Pentecostal families who have taken in unaccompanied minors. In this respect, immigrant religious groups provide community structures that help compensate for social ties and support that have been attenuated by migration.

Immigrant religious groups are also highly helpful for providing symbolic resources that allow migrants to give value to the difficult experiences associated with migration. For example, some Muslims and Pentecostals we have met consider religious belonging as a source of pride and a positive distinction that distinguishes them from the Other. One Pentecostal Haitian believer Mossière has interviewed finds in her faith the tools for transcending her previous experiences of discrimination based on racial categorization: *"Now I don't see this one as Black or this one as White. We are all human beings doing the work of God. I have White friends, we talk on the phone, but they have been baptized. You have to differentiate whether or not people are baptized."* Furthermore, we find that most of the religious groups also position themselves and their members in the new society in ways that are valued in religious terms. These prompt a variety of attitudes toward the host society. A minority of Evangelical groups adopts a sectarian approach; their religious rhetoric presents proselytizing as a way of improving Quebec society. In their view, Evangelical immigrants are endowed with the mission of saving Christian souls in a province one of them describes as *"devastated for decades because of the collapse of Catholicism."*

Attitudes regarding visibility in the host society vary between religious groups, and even within the same tradition: some Muslims adopt a discreet profile while others prefer to organize activities that make them known to the wider public in a positive way. Likewise, in a certain African Pentecostal congregation, the leader has organized a blood donation campaign although blood has been refused by health associations because their Africans members' countries of origin are considered as involving a high risk of AIDS. We also note various strategies for dealing with the challenges of fitting into a secular society. Often religious groups choose to emphasize the commonalities between the religious community's vision of the world and the dominant Québécois world view. A Congolese pastor explains that sermons and Pentecostal norms are aimed at making members into *"good citizens"* and promoting their social and economic participation and mobility in their new country. This perspective is illustrated by his pastoral approach, which he terms "The Church in the City." The same pastor runs seminars to help members adapt to Québécois laws and norms. A typical activity that he organized was entitled, *"How to Interpret Marriage as a Christian, in Accordance with Quebec Law."* Along this line, most religious groups we have encountered espouse a discourse of integration or adaptation and see their members as social actors who can make a positive contribution to Quebec society. Religious leaders often mention the important role of immigrants for the province's prosperity, cultural enrichment, and social development.

Overall, we find many instances where religious practices have been adapted to the conditions in Quebec: although the prohibition on paying interest makes it nearly impossible for Muslims to acquire a home in Quebec, the imam of a mosque in our study suggested that his followers respect the spirit of the rule rather than the rule itself, that is, the principle that wealthy people should not abuse the poor by imposing usurious rates of interest. On the individual level, we find considerable religious change over the life course, for example, in how religion is practiced and the intensity of religious practice. Further changes can be expected as religious groups evolve over time and the second generation comes of age, especially regarding the issue of the language of worship.

The main divergences with the host society revolve around differing interpretations of family models. For example, Tamil Catholics wish that Quebec society would provide better examples for young people; they see a causal relationship between the low levels of religious practice among the Québécois and the breakdown of family structures, as expressed in high rates of divorce, cohabitation without marriage, single-parent families and children born out of wedlock. Tamil priests often point proudly to the low divorce rate among their members. By comparison, the non-immigrant groups in our study are typically less preoccupied with their place in the wider society, and take their members' status as Québécois and Canadian as a given. At the same time, they are usually less developed on the community level; in many cases, non-immigrant groups provide religious and spiritual services but little in the way of sociability for their members.

CONCLUSION

The rapid secularization of the 60s, in conjunction with new migration patterns and the increased mobility of the Québécois all contributed to creating a religious diversity that is in fact quite different from the imagined diversity one finds in Quebec mass media. That is, the term "religious diversity" tends to evoke Muslim veils and Sikh kirpans; moreover, there is a certain widespread stereotype that imagines locals as nonreligious, and immigrants as religious. Apart from the fact that much immigrant religiosity is nearly invisible (small, mobile, materially poor congregations; observant Muslims who do not frequent mosques or do not wear distinctive signs of religious belonging), the one of non-immigrants is even more so. The Quiet Revolution seems to have made religion something of a social taboo; even practicing Catholics are unlikely to advertise the fact. The word "religion," in fact, is widely resisted, connoting "clerical authority" to many. Those we interviewed often consider themselves *"spiritual"* rather than religious; moreover, those who are active in an open religious group such as the Spiritualist congregation

Meintel studies – including those who work as healers and mediums at church services – if asked about their religion, will often say something like, *"Well, I was brought up Catholic."* All this makes for a little known religious diversity that involves non-immigrants just as much as it does immigrants.

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LA DIVERSITÉ RELIGIEUSE AU QUÉBEC, RÉELLE ET IMAGINAIRE, VISIBLE ET INVISIBLE

Le paysage religieux québécois a connu un processus de sécularisation très rapide ayant débuté dès la Révolution tranquille des années 1960, alors que la mondialisation commençait à introduire de nouvelles influences religieuses dans la province. Notre recherche ethnographique, réalisée en collaboration avec cinq autres chercheurs, vise à documenter la nouvelle diversité religieuse qui est apparue au Québec au cours des dernières décennies, ainsi que la signification du religieux dans le quotidien des Québécois. Bien que le projet couvre tout le Québec, nous présentons ici les résultats des données recueillies à Montréal, la ville la plus grande et la plus multiculturelle de la province. Au cours des trois dernières années, l'équipe de recherche a effectué des observations et des entrevues auprès de 100 groupes religieux situés à Montréal (sur un total de 137 groupes dans toute la province), dont 38 ont fait l'objet d'études plus approfondies. Les groupes visés représentent (1) des religions établies au Québec depuis les années 1960 (par exemple les Baha'is, les groupes néo-chamaniques, incluant le duidisme et le wicca); (2) de nouvelles formes de pratiques religieuses apparues au sein de traditions religieuses établies depuis longtemps (dans le cas de certaines églises catholiques ou juives); (3) des religions importées par les immigrants (incluant l'islam, l'hindouisme, certaines formes de bouddhisme); (4) des congrégations de religions établies depuis longtemps qui incluent un nombre important d'immigrants parmi leurs membres. Dans cette contribution, nous présentons le paysage religieux québécois actuel en soulignant quelques-unes des tendances qui ressortent de nos données. Dans une seconde partie, nous présentons plus spécifiquement les groupes religieux composés d'immigrants.

Un des résultats les plus significatifs de notre projet consiste en la relative invisibilité de la religiosité des Québécois dits « de souche », soient les personnes francophones, nées au Québec et baptisées catholiques. En fait, les individus qui fréquentent de tels groupes restent généralement discrets quant à leurs pratiques et n'en parlent pas à leur entourage. Tandis que les débats publics concernant la religion tendent à se concentrer sur l'islam et sur les marqueurs visibles du religieux tels que le voile ou le *kirpan*, nous soutenons que bien que le paysage religieux soit relativement varié, une grande part de cette diversité demeure relative invisible socialement.

Parmi les caractéristiques principales du paysage religieux québécois actuel, nous trouvons une grande variété de ressources religieuses désormais disponibles aux Québécois; il semblerait que le processus de sécularisation ainsi que l'anticléricalisme généralisé qui a suivi la Révolution tranquille aient créé un vide de références pour la majorité des Québécois nés catholiques, au moment même où de nouvelles ressources religieuses pénétraient la province. Nous

observons également une grande mobilité des individus entre les traditions et groupes religieux. En effet, si on compte plusieurs milliers de convertis à l'Islam, ceux qui traversent les frontières religieuses sans changer d'affiliation sont encore plus nombreux. Ainsi, beaucoup de Québécois «de souche» que nous avons rencontrés disent s'identifier au catholicisme, tout en adoptant de nouvelles façons d'expérimenter le sacré, à travers le spiritualisme par exemple. De tels comportements définissent de nouvelles hybridités religieuses, telles que les pratiques néo-chamaniques ou celles liées à la Wicca par exemple. À cet égard, les jeunes se montrent particulièrement innovateurs pour créer de nouveaux types de regroupements religieux, qui impliquent parfois un activisme politique en sus de leur engagement spirituel, par exemple dans le domaine environnemental pour la protection de la «Terre Mère». Soulignons à cet égard que la guérison occupe généralement une place centrale dans ces courants religieux. Les formes de sociabilité religieuses démontrent également la grande créativité des groupes religieux puisque certains recourent au médium Internet tandis que d'autres privilégient les expériences collectives spontanées et limitées dans le temps.

Par ailleurs, les résultats montrent que les institutions religieuses, en particulier catholiques (à quelques exceptions près) font preuve d'une grande flexibilité pour s'adapter aux nouveaux défis nés de la modernité, en particulier aux nouvelles populations qui se présentent à elles (homosexuels, immigrants). De façon générale, les congrégations religieuses constituent d'importants espaces d'interactions ethniques. En effet, aucun des groupes que nous avons rencontrés n'est monoethnique et la plupart comptent des individus provenant de divers horizons nationaux. Les populations d'immigrants sont d'ailleurs également fort diverses au niveau religieux (par exemples, les Haïtiens et les Vietnamiens). Notons toutefois que les populations immigrant au Québec sont majoritairement catholiques, et qu'ils introduisent ainsi leur propre style liturgique et obligent les paroisses locales à certains accommodements, notamment au niveau de la langue de culte. Les catholiques d'origine latino ont par ailleurs insufflé un nouvel élan au mouvement charismatique au Québec.

Dans ce paysage, les groupes religieux composés d'immigrants se démarquent par leur souci d'aider leurs membres à s'adapter à leur société de résidence en leur offrant une variété de ressources matérielles, sociales, émotionnelles, et psychologiques, etc. Ces services complètent bien souvent ceux offerts par les associations gouvernementales. Pour ces populations, la religion constitue un langage symbolique qui leur permet de reformuler leur expérience migratoire en des termes valorisants. À cet égard, les groupes religieux affichent une variété d'attitudes relativement à la société québécoise: si une minorité adopte une approche sectaire ou prosélyte, d'autres préfèrent rester discrets tandis que certains groupes organisent des activités destinées à les faire mieux connaître au public plus large. Face à l'attention médiatique dont ils font l'objet, beaucoup de ces groupes comme certains Pentecôtistes choisissent de souligner les convergences de point de vue qui les rapprochent de la société québécoise en soulignant combien les immigrants ont à apporter à leur pays d'accueil en termes économique, culturel et social. D'ailleurs plusieurs groupes ont adapté leurs pratiques religieuses aux contraintes de leur nouvel environnement. Ce sont toutefois les modèles familiaux qui restent le point de tension le plus important puisque de nombreux groupes tels que les Catholiques Tamouls considèrent le haut taux de divorce, de monoparentalité ou de concubinage ayant cours dans la société québécoise comme de mauvais exemples et voient un lien de cause à effet entre la faiblesse du lien familial et le taux de pratique religieuse relativement bas des Québécois «de souche».

CHRISTIAN MINORITY IN INDIAN MULTICULTURAL DIVERSITY: ISSUES OF EQUITY, IDENTITY AND EMPOWERMENT

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INTRODUCTION

India is not a nation of immigrants; it is a homeland, a civilization society. Since liberal multiculturalism is a product of immigrant societies, there are significant differences between the Indian model of diversity and the Western liberal multicultural scheme. The Indian constitution does not declare India to be multicultural and Indian identity is closely associated with the majority Hindu culture. Therefore communities that differ from it are designated as minorities. Nevertheless, guarantees in the Constitution protecting the rights of these minorities made a multicultural society possible in India. Yet minorities are seen in religious context only. The problem, thus, does not lie in the mere distinction between majority and minorities but with the idea that irreconcilable differences exist between them as well as in the persistence of discrimination. Moreover minorities and majorities are seen to increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, national anthem or public holidays (Raj and Mc Andrew, 2009).

In this article, after recalling the complexity and diversity of the Hindu majority and the definition of various minorities, we examine the situation of one of the most important religious minorities of India, the Christians, as well as some of the challenges it faces in terms equity, identity, and empowerment.

MAJORITY AND MINORITIES: COMPLEX AND CONTESTED CONCEPTS IN INDIA

The Hindu majority is itself not a culturally homogeneous community because of the presence of four hierarchical castes (almost similar to class in Western context) containing numerous sub-castes within them. The hierarchical caste system, which has dominated Indian society for over 3000 years, was developed by the Brahmins (Hindu Priests) to maintain their superiority over the less educated and less skilled (Kethineni, 2010). Over time, the caste system was formalized into four distinct classes (*varnas*). At the top of the hierarchy are the Brahmins, who are considered arbiters in matters of learning, teaching, and religion. Next in line are the *Kshatriyas* who are warriors and administrators. The third category is the Vaisyas, who belong to the artisan commercial class. Finally, the Sudras (Backward Caste) are farmers and peasants. It is significant that conversion to Christianity or accepting Christ as Saviour has taken place in all the four castes since the first century when Christ's disciple Thomas brought the Gospel of Christ to people of South India and still continues today.

Beneath the four castes there is a fifth group, which is not included as part of the Indian caste system. Individuals from this group are literally untouchable by the rest of the castes; these socially excluded people describe themselves as "Dalit" (Massey, 1997). For centuries, Dalits were not treated as part of the mainstream Indian Society and were traditionally assigned menial and degrading jobs. Gandhian liberals referred to them as Harijans (children of God) and the Government of India officially calls them "schedule castes." Indeed this was based on the British government notification whereby the Simon Commission drew up an official list of socially excluded caste and tribes in 1930 called the "Schedule Castes" (SC) and "Schedule Tribes" (ST). "Scheduled" means they are on a government schedule that entitles them to certain protections and affirmative actions. According to the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People of the UNHCR (2009), as of 2001 there are approximately 166.6 million Dalits, out of India's population of a billion. Reports estimated that some 16 million Dalits are Christians. The Schedule Tribes or Adivasi (Indigenous people) constitute 84 million of the Indian population. Among then two million belong to a Schedule Tribe or are Adivasi Christians (UNHCR: 2009).

In addition to this complex composition of the so called Hindu majority, India has its share of minorities— generally defined in religious terms—though the Constitution does acknowledge the existence of linguistic

minorities (Joseph, 2009). Indeed the Constitution of India has copied the identification of Indian minorities from the report prepared by the Advisory Committee on minorities submitted to the Constituent Assembly in August 1947 (Raj, 1988). As the report records, till this stage, the seven minority communities officially accepted were (1) Anglo-Indian; (2) Parsees; (3) Plain tribesman in Assam; (4) Indian Christians; (5) Sikhs; (6) Muslims; (7) Scheduled Caste. While the Constituent Assembly was in the process of "practically unanimously" accepting the Report, an ardent Brahmin leader, K.M. Munshi, asked for a seemingly innocent amendment: to (a) delete the Scheduled Castes from the list of minorities, (b) include the following addition, "I-A: The section of the Hindu Community referred to as Scheduled Castes as defined one of the Government of India Act 1935, shall have the same rights and benefits, which are herein provided for minorities specified in the Schedule to para 1." (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1947). This amendment was "constitutional fraud," (Rajsekar, 1983) and was fatal to the Schedule Caste who became Christians as they were denied the same privileges enjoyed by the Schedule Caste who are not Christians, which is one of the issues raised in this paper. Thus five religious groups are currently recognized by the Indian constitution as religious minorities: Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs and Parsis.

INDIAN CHRISTIAN MINORITY

As per the 2001 census, there are about 24 million Christians in India (nearly equal to the population of Canada), and among them 18 million are Catholics. Christianity (2.3% of the total Indian population) is India's largest religion after Hinduism (80% of the population) and Islam (13.4%) (Nasiruddin, 2007). The Christian population is concentrated in three major areas: South India, on the Konkan Coast, and among the Tribal people of Jharkhand State and the seven states of the North East. In South India the major Christian centres of Christianity are Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (Ooman, 2000). The majority of the Christians in Kerala, constituting about 19% of the population of the state, trace the origin of their faith to the 1st century missionary activities of Thomas, the disciple of Christ. While the Portuguese Mission tried to bring them under the Latin rite, many continued to adhere to their traditional rites, some under the Catholic Church and others outside. The Tamil Church is overladen with layers of traditions, from St. Thomas to the Portuguese and beyond, including the great wave of conversion from the 18th to the 19th century. Other centres of Christianity are Goa (where the Portuguese set up the seat of the Church), Mangalore and Bombay. Among the tribal people, the Catholic Church has a pronounced presence in the state

of Jharkhand and in the seven small states of Northeast India. In opposition to the widespread perception of Christians as a privileged group, linked to the association of Christianity with the British colonial power, it is important to stress that the majority of Christians in India belong to the Schedule Caste (16 million) and Schedule Tribes (2 million) categories. Together they constitute some 18 million Christians (more that 70% or 75% of the community), which is substantial (Nasiruddin: 2007; Catholic Bishop's Conference of India: 2011).

ISSUES OF EQUITY, IDENTITY AND EMPOWERMENT

The Indian Constitution recognises the Christian minority and the rites that have been described above. Yet there is discrimination in the form of inequity relating to identity and empowerment. Main issues for concerns are related to a restrictive interpretation of constitutional protections, the limits imposed to conversion as well as the persistence and even increase of violence against the community.

The first issue can be clearly linked to the historical factors alluded to before. Indeed, in August 1950 the Dalit or Schedule Cast Christians encountered major discrimination when the President of India issued an order through the Ministry of Law which states: "Notwith standing anything contained in paragraph two no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu or the Sikh religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Casted." (Raj, 1988) Christian organizations like the National Christian Council, the Catholic Bishop Council and the Catholic Regional Committee of Nagpur all sought for the removal of this discriminative order but without success. In 1984 and 1985, two petitions of Christian Dalits were presented before the Supreme Court, seeking removal of their discriminative content. In its judgment the Court affirmed not only that the Constitution enjoins upon the President also to specify which Castes or which parts of those castes are to be considered Scheduled Castes and that only the Parliament can overturn the President's decision, but that the caste system is a phenomenon peculiar to Hindu (not Indian) society. Since the President knew that Hindu and Sikh Dalits suffered from serious disabilities and backwardness, he could limit constitutional protection to them (Webster, 2009).

Thus religion was used as criterion in 1950 to define the Schedule Caste and according to it only those backward castes (socially, educationally, economically) who professed Hindu religion should be considered in the category of Schedule Caste. On the basis of this criterion all other people professing Islam, Christianity and Buddhism were left out. However, in 1990 the third paragraph of the

Presidential Order 1950 as amended by the Parliament extended constitutional benefits to Dalit Buddhist, along with Dalit Hindus. In 1990 in Parliament, while stating the object and reason for proposing to include Buddhists of Schedule Caste origin in the list of Scheduled Castes, Sri Ram Vilas Paswan (who was then the Union Minister of Welfare and Labour) made clear the criterion saying:

Neo-Buddhists are a religious group which has come into existence in 1956 as a result of a wave of conversion of the Schedule Caste under the leadership of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. Upon conversion to Buddhism they became ineligible for statutory concession and facilities available to the Schedule Castes to them also, on the grounds that change of religion has not altered their social and economic conditions… they objectively deserve to be treated as the Scheduled Castes… (Raj, 1988).

The important point in Paswan's statement is that this amendment of 1990 to the Presidential Order of 1950 has changed the criterion about religion, by clearly stating: "that the change of religion" does not alter "social and economic condition." This truth had been accepted and approved by the Parliament of India at the time of the Second amendment of the Presidential Order of 1950. This position, however, is not extended to Christians. In a report of March 2011, it was revealed that the centre seem tilted against the inclusion of "Dalit" Christians and Muslims in the Schedule Caste list, arguing the need for evidence to show that converts continued to face discrimination of the same degree as before their exit from the Hindu fold (NCCI Newsletter, 2012).

Thus because of this distinction Dalit Christians do not have the same empowering opportunities as non-Christian Dalits such as reserved seats and special support (violation of the Articles 15, 29 and 47) in government jobs (Violation of Article 16), and in the Parliament and State legislatures, Municipality and Panchayats (violation Articles 330 and 332). Moreover there is usually a less generous interpretation of the provision of Article 26 regarding the right of minorities to manage their own educational institutions when the latter are linked to the Christian minority.

A second issue is the limit imposed on conversion. The States of Arunachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Tamil Nadu have passed laws restricting or prohibiting conversion. In 1977, the Supreme Court of India ruled in the case Rev. Stansilaus VS Madhya Pradesh that the right to propagate religion did not include the right to convert others to one's own religion. In other words, Article 25(1) granted the right

to evangelize, but not to proselytize. In 2003, ruling on certain provisions of the Orissa Freedom of Religious Act (1967), the Supreme Court observed: "What Article 25(1) grants is not the exposition of its tenets." (Webster, 2009). But then, what is the freedom to practice and propagate with restrictions—how does one spread his religion if not through conversion?

Finally the Churches in India have released documents indicating that violence against Christians has increased since 1998 more than between1950 to 1997. In the states of Gujarat, Orissa, Punjab, Karnataka Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, violence against the Christians has increased. The conspiracy begins by fanning hatred, creating Mythology of Hate through disinformation and by repeating falsehood. The conspiracy is to brand the Christian community as aliens. By propounding a thesis "One people, One Nation and One Culture," the efforts of this group tend to denounce the pluralistic traditions of Indian culture, the richness of its diversity and the spiritual contribution of its varied faiths. Anyone who is different is branded as an enemy, and attacked, coerced and assaulted. The attacks and violence on the Christian community are well planned. Firstly, the attack is on the physical symbols of the Church, especially on personnel involved in grass roots empowerment including priests and nuns. The attempt is to scare, coerce, humiliate and threaten life. The second pressure is on the institutions, again with the apparent objective to ensure that the Christian community social outreach is curtailed, its contribution to nation building minimized (Molishree, 2006). The final attack is on Christian witnesses. It is designed not just to break the spirit but to weaken Christian faith.

Foreign Christian missionaries have also been the targets of attacks. In a well-publicized case, Graham Staines, an Australian Missionary working among lepers, was burnt to death while he was sleeping with his two small sons in his station wagon in Orissa village in January 1999. Such violence on foreign missionary continues in other parts of India too. In its annual human rights report for 1999, the United States Department of State criticized India for "increasing societal violence against Christians."(Nahan, 2006). The report listed over 90 incidents of anti-Christian violence, ranging from damage of religious property to attacks against Christian pilgrims. Between July 2000 and December 2007, there have been more than violent attacks committed against Christians in Orissa, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh (Minority Christian, 2010). In some of these cases, the acts of violence include forcible re-conversion back to Hinduism of converted Christians, distribution of threatening literature and destruction of Christian cemeteries.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The situation of the Christian minority in India clearly demonstrates that even if India defines itself as a secular and pluralist country, cultural prejudices and discrimination toward pursuing a Christian way of life and managing empowering institutions run high at the individual, group and state level. India while evolving into a modern state needs to address and be sensitive to multicultural ideas of equality of cultures and of religious communities in the public domain. Discrimination is still widespread and in the case of Christians is closely entangled with deeply entrenched historical factors which probably make it more difficult to address than in immigrant receiving societies, where diversity is a more recent phenomenon. Nevertheless there could be some benefits to increased comparative studies of problems and solutions in Canada and India in this regard.

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LA MINORITÉ CHRÉTIENNE DANS LA DIVERSITÉ INDIENNE: ENJEUX D'ÉQUITÉ, D'IDENTITÉ ET D'HABILITATION

Il existe de grandes divergences entre les approches indiennes entourant la diversité et le libéralisme multiculturel des sociétés occidentales. Dans sa constitution, l'Inde ne se déclare pas multiculturelle, et l'identité indienne demeure fortement associée à la culture hindoue majoritaire. Les communautés qui ne se conforment pas à ce modèle dominant sont considérées comme des minorités, et leurs droits sont garantis par la constitution. La discrimination cependant persiste, du même coup que l'idée selon laquelle il existe des différences irréconciliables entre la majorité et les diverses minorités.

Majorité et minorités:
des concepts complexes et contestés

La majorité hindoue elle-même est très loin de représenter un segment homogène de la population, puisqu'elle est sous-divisée en quatre castes hiérar-chiques et des milliers de sous-castes. Au fil du temps, le système des castes s'est vu cristallisé en 4 classes distinctes (*varnas*): les Brahmans, qui s'occupent des affaires intellectuelles et religieuses; les *Kshatriyas*, guerriers et administrateurs; les Vaisyas, les artisans; et finalement les Sudras (caste arriérée), les paysans et fermiers.

Il existe un cinquième groupe, qui n'est pas inclut dans le système des castes indien. Les individus de ce groupe sont littéralement «intouchables» par les membres des autres castes. Ces individus s'identifient comme Dalits. Pendant des siècles, ils ont existé en marge de la société indienne, et se voyaient assigner des basses tâches, voire des tâches dégradantes. Le gouvernement indien les désigne sous le nom de castes répertoriées. Répertoriées signifie qu'ils sont identifiés comme tels dans la constitution et qu'ils reçoivent ainsi certaine protections. Ils bénéficient aussi de mesures d'actions positives. Il y aurait 170 millions de Dalits en Inde, sur une population d'à peu près un milliard. 16 millions d'entre eux sont Chrétiens.

De plus, l'Inde compte un bon nombre de minorités, définies généralement sur des bases religieuses. Cinq groupes religieux sont présentement reconnus comme minorités religieuses par la constitution indienne: les Musulmans, les Chrétiens, les Bouddhistes, les Sikhs et les Parsis. Cela signifie que les Dalits chrétiens sont reconnus comme minorité religieuse, mais qu'ils ne profitent des mêmes mesures affirmatives que les Dalits non-Chrétiens.

LA MINORITÉ CHRÉTIENNE EN INDE

Selon le recensement de 2001, il y aurait 27 millions de chrétiens en Inde, dont 1,8 millions de catholiques. Le christianisme est la troisième religion la plus répandue, après l'hindouisme (80 %) et l'islam (15 %). La population chrétienne se concentre majoritairement dans le sud de l'Inde, sur la côte du Konkan, et parmi les populations tribales du Jharkhand et des états du Nord-est. Dans le sud de l'Inde, les chrétiens vivent surtout au Kerala, au Tamil Nadu, en Andhra Pradesh, à Goa, à Mangalore et à Mumbaï. Contrairement à la perception très répandue que les chrétiens forment un groupe financièrement privilégiée, il est important de noter que la majorité des chrétiens appartiennent à la catégorie des castes et des tribus répertoriées. Il s'agit du cas de près de 24 millions de chrétiens, soit 85 % de la communauté.

DES PROBLÈMES D'ÉQUITÉ

La constitution indienne reconnait les minorités chrétiennes. Mais il y a encore discrimination. Parmi les problèmes on note une interprétation restrictive des protections constitutionnelles, les limites imposées aux possibles conversions, et la violence persistante contre la communauté.

Les protections accordées par la constitution aux minorités sont parfois inégalement réparties ou restrictives. La religion fut l'un des critères utilisés dans les années 1950 pour définir ceux appartenant à des castes répertoriées, et seule une caste arriérée se déclarant comme Hindoue pouvait être enregistrée comme caste répertoriée. Cela n'incluait donc pas les musulmans, les chrétiens et les bouddhistes. Cependant, en 1990, le troisième paragraphe de l'ordre présidentiel de 1950 fut modifié par le parlement, afin d'étendre les bénéfices des castes répertoriées aux Dalits bouddhistes. Cela fut fait, selon Sri Ram Vilas Paswan (à ce moment-là ministre du travail), car la conversion ne modifie pas la condition économique et sociale. Bien que cette vérité ait été acceptée par le parlement indien, le statut des Dalits chrétiens et autre convertis n'a pas été modifié. Dans un rapport de mars 2011, il fut révélé que le centre était réticent à l'idée d'inclure les Dalits chrétiens et les musulmans dans la liste des castes répertoriées, demandant des preuves que les convertis continuaient à subir la même discrimination qu'avant leur conversion et leur renonciation à l'hindouisme. Les Dalits chrétiens, donc, ne jouissent pas des mêmes opportunités que les Dalits non-chrétiens, comme par exemples des places réservées dans la fonction publique et du support éducatif.

Un deuxième problème émerge des limites imposées aux possibilités de conversion. L'Arunachal Pradesh, le Rajasthan, le Madhya Pradesh, l'Himachal Pradesh, le Jharkhand, l'Orissa et le Tamil Nadu pose des restrictions ou interdisent tout bonnement la conversion. En 1977, la court suprême indienne promulgua que le droit de propager sa religion n'incluait pas le droit de convertir d'autres personnes.

Finalement, les églises indiennes ont fait circuler des documents qui semblent indiquer que la violence contre les chrétiens a augmenté plus vite depuis 1998 qu'entre 1950 et 1997. Dans les états du Gujarat, d'Orissa, du Punjab, du Karnataka, du Rajasthan, de l'Uttar Pradesh, du Tamil Nadu et de l'Andhra Pradesh, la violence contre les chrétiens auraient augmentée.

CONCLUSION

La situation de la minorité chrétienne en Inde démontre clairement que même si l'Inde se définit comme un pays séculier et pluraliste, les préjugés culturels continuent d'influencer les individus, les groupes et les états. La discrimination est encore très répandue, et dans le cas des chrétiens, est influencée par des facteurs historiques qui rendent sa gestion plus difficile que dans les sociétés d'immigration, où la diversité est un phénomène plus récent. Malgré ces différences, davantage d'études comparatives examinant les problèmes et les solutions à cet égard dans les sociétés indienne et canadienne seraient bénéfiques.

REINTERPRETING THE FAST FOR THE LONGEVITY OF THE HUSBAND: A CASE STUDY OF WOMEN'S AGENCY IN A HINDU TEMPLE IN MONTREAL

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INTRODUCTION

This essay deals with Indian women's agency towards the Hindu faith as practiced in Montreal and the role of Hindu women in Quebec. As suggested by Butler (1997), women's agency, which is the cornerstone of this essay, assumes "reflexivity" towards religious and patriarchal institutions to redefine one's self-identity. While focussing on the practice of fasting for the longevity of the husband, I intend to present how first-generation immigrant Hindu women transmit their traditional ideal of the exemplary wife (*pativrata*) to their daughters. The question I will be addressing is: by means of this fast, do Hindu immigrant women reproduce and transmit the ideology of the *pativrata* to their daughters or do they re-interpret this very ideology on more liberal grounds?

The results of my study rely on qualitative data obtained from a five-year participant observation and forty semi-structured interviews conducted with first and second-generation Hindu women from various regional backgrounds: Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and South India (Betbeder, 2012). In my sample, the proportion of respondents from Uttar Pradesh (20), Gujarat (10) and South India (10) roughly reflects that of the *Hindu Mandir*. More specifically, this fieldwork was conducted in one of Montreal's Hindu public places of worship where one can find devotees from various regions (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Gujarat and South India) and sectarian affiliations or reform movements (Vaishnava, Shaiva and Arya Samaj). I will here assess how their participation within a selected diasporic temple may impact their self-identification and alter the way this fast is conducted.

According to Pearson (1996), this fast was imposed on women by the caste of the priesthood (*Brahmin*), for they wished to relegate female religious practices to the domestic sphere. The Brahmanic prescriptions are predominantly conservative. Surely, those Brahmanic prescriptions support the ideology of the *pativrata* as they prevent women from assigning an egalitarian meaning to this fast. Literally, the term *pativrata* means that a wife makes a vow of submission to her husband (*pati*) who must be treated as a god and whose salvation depends on the sincerity of this vow (*vrata*). In the Indian state of Maharashtra, McGee (1992) reveals how educated women not only question but also express in a variety of ways the meanings that they assign to this fast. Far from restricting my analysis to these meanings, I also intend to study the places of observance, the choice of the officiant, the deities worshipped, the texts and languages used, the socialization patterns they generate and the relationship with food. As observed by Mackenzie (1996), fast rituals can be conducted by women or priests. Fast rituals vary from one family to another since different deities can be praised.

THE PUBLIC PLACE OF WORSHIP: UNVEILING WOMEN'S AGENCY

At the public place of worship, the 2008 ceremony for the longevity of the husband, also named *Karva Chauth*, was conducted by a female devotee from Uttar Pradesh and gathered approximately a hundred women originally from Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. As women are not allowed to enter the main shrine (*garbha griha*), the female devotee responsible for the ceremony improvised an altar at the center of the prayer hall with a pictorial representation of the goddess *Durga*. In sum, she managed to invest the "public sphere" of the temple by selecting her story of the fast and the presiding deity as it was customary in her family (Rayaprol, 1997). The concept of the "public sphere" of the public temple is used by Rayaprol (1997), a notion that I will transpose to the domestic sphere and thus to private altars. She also addresses the question of "private tasks" conducted by women in the public temple as an extension of their home, which I will refer to as the "private sphere"

of the public temple to echo her first notion of "public sphere." Moreover, the place of celebration addresses the Brahmanic prescriptions under which this fast became the only domestic religious practice in which women could indulge since the Brahmanic period (Mackenzie, 1996).

In this regard, it is important to note it is not a priest who officiated at the ceremony, but a respondent from Uttar Pradesh who was responsible for preparing the sacred plates (*thalis*) and reading the *Karva Chauth* story in Hindi. In many ways, the selection of both the oral tradition and the use of Hindi as a vernacular language reflect a distance from the Brahmanic tradition. The "great tradition" or the tradition of Hinduism which has been maintained by the Brahmin, values the use of the Vedic texts and Sanskrit, whereas the "little tradition" of Hinduism resorts to folk texts and vernacular languages. Nevertheless, this respondent was unaware of this particularity and was mostly interested in socializing with her female friends in the absence of an extended family. My respondents of first generation immigrants from Uttar Pradesh were on average 22 years old at the time of migration which explains their poor exposure to the notions of the "great" and "little" traditions of Hinduism. In this specific case, women's agency can be viewed as an analytical tool since the subject is not always fully aware that her choices may lead to social or symbolic changes. Once the story was completed, the gifts that they placed on the sacred plates were exchanged not with their mothers-in-law but with their female friends to celebrate the unity of a reconstituted sorority.

As this female devotee proceeded to the public reading of the *Karva Chauth* story, she provided her own egalitarian interpretation of its meaning by concluding with a sentence which emphasized the importance of assuring the longevity of both spouses. This egalitarian re-interpretation of the ideology of the *pativrata* occurred within the "public sphere" of this temple which publically questions the "polysemy" of this mythical story. According to Levi Strauss (1983), it is precisely when an individual takes a stand on a given symbolic structure that various interpretations can emerge, hence the term "polysemy."

In 2010, this same respondent inquired to the priest if he could perform the ritual, for it would allow her to express her egalitarian concerns by reciting *Karva Chauth* songs in vernacular Hindi. These field data challenge Robinson's (1985) study in which some of her female respondents from West Bengal voluntarily resorted to the services of a priest to compensate for their Brahmanic ignorance. It is interesting to indicate that this domestic practice which was once imposed on Hindu women is now partly relegated to the priest so that they can voice their egalitarian claims. As a matter of fact, the songs pertaining to this fast stipulate that married women are not allowed to do any housework on that occasion. Likewise, using

multiple vernacular languages that are Hindi and Punjabi along with the content of their songs attests of the pan-Indian and egalitarian claims of my respondents.

In Montreal, Ghosh (1981) found that marital relationships within the South Asian community are not fully egalitarian since women remain mainly in charge of the housework. Given the situation, one can easily understand the relevance of the egalitarian claims made by my respondents as they sing for a fair distribution of household chores while targeting the private sphere. At this public place of worship, female devotees are also exempted from engaging in domestic chores, since a meal is served to them by volunteer men and women in order to break the fast. Overall, investing the "public sphere" of this public place of worship allows them to by-pass their social prescriptions, make egalitarian claims and redefine the meaning of this practice.

Even though Hindu women were not allowed to conduct domestic rituals for their own salvation as of the Brahmanic period, McGee (1992) reminds us to be mindful of the multiple meanings that contemporary Indian women assign to the fasting. Indeed, the majority of my respondents consider that the observance of *Karva Chauth* has for primary objective the well-being of the whole family and not just that of the husband, while a minority of them also assign mental and physical benefits to it. Overall, these multiple reinterpretations validate Butler's theory (2005) on gender which argues that even though women initially reproduce pre-established social norms, they are free to question them later on in their lives.

FOOD RESTRICTIONS:
THE TRANSMISSION OF A MODERATE DIET

According to my interviews, the liberal interpretation attributed to *Karva Chauth* appears to have a significant repercussion on the dietary restrictions of my respondents from Uttar Pradesh. Considering that the public celebration of *Karva Chauth* reflects a regional normativity from Uttar Pradesh, this sub-section focuses on my sub-sample of married women from Uttar Pradesh. Such is the case of one respondent from Uttar Pradesh whose diet has evolved through her acculturation process as she started to question the androcentric meaning of this fast. Eventually, she renegotiated the purpose of her fast in egalitarian terms and adopted a moderate diet that she proudly passed on to her daughter. Therefore, one can argue that the observance of this fast is constantly evolving and can be placed on an analytical continuum ranging from the complete deprivation of food to its unrestricted consumption. This example illustrates my sub-sample composed of first generations from Uttar Pradesh who unanimously observe *Karva Chauth* with great freedom, while their daughters remain free to follow such a practice and adapt their diets.

Among the second-generations from Uttar Pradesh who are married, it is interesting to note that they predominantly retain the practice of *Karva Chauth* and join in half of the cases their mothers-in-law at the public place of worship. In other words, this strengthens the bonds they have established with their mothers-in-law and helps them build the foundations of an "extended family" whose unity is celebrated through this ritual. Furthermore, a significant number of them make sure they conduct this fast also as a couple in the private sphere, by observing a moderate diet and exchanging gifts as a sign of mutual respect.

In fact, one first-generation respondent from Uttar Pradesh stated that what genuinely matters is not to restrain from food, but to take the time to ponder over the significance of this fast. As suggested by Vatz Laaroussi (2007), immigrants generally readjust their family practices through their process of acculturation and this "flexibility" fosters the integration of the second generations for they can adapt their own beliefs to a constantly changing double symbolic referent. In concrete terms, such "flexibility" enabled the married second-generations from Uttar Pradesh to deliberately accommodate their food restrictions since most of them eat a vegetarian meal that merely excludes meat.

THE HOME SHRINE:
A SOURCE OF RE-INTERPRETATION

At the expense of the public temple, two-thirds of the first generations from Uttar Pradesh prefer to carry out this fast within their domestic spheres. As reported by Michaelson (1987), they not only invest the "private sphere" of their home shrines by conducting religious ceremonies, but also its "public sphere" by inviting their friends to participate in them. One respondent from Uttar Pradesh argues that home shrines allow for a pan-Indian claim as the region-based stories that were initially read on *Karva Chauth* were specific to their regions of origin: Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. As a result, home shrines gather the members of a reconstituted "extended family" whose regional traditions constitute a "flexible" experiential framework, for it shows how to negotiate regional diversity.

Over the years, this domestic practice has evolved, since they now retain only one regional-based story of *Karva Chauth* and allow more time for their egalitarian aspirations by reciting songs in vernacular languages. So in a way, they challenge the Brahmanic prescriptions of the "great tradition" of Hinduism as they resort to its "little tradition" and claim for an equal share of the domestic chores. Although the public temple supports all the chores, some respondents prefer to observe this ritual in their private sphere for it gathers a less inclusive reconstituted "extended family." In other words, this reconstituted "extended family" is less inclusive as it is limited to their close-knitted network of friends that was formed upon their arrival in Quebec.

From an intergenerational perspective, it appears that two-thirds of the second generations from Uttar Pradesh who are married observe this fast, which takes place, according to their availability, either at the public temple or in their domestic spheres. This being said, one of them underlines the importance of the domestic sphere as it becomes a place where both spouses can exchange gifts and jointly conduct this ritual for a mutual longevity. Unlike their parents, the observance of *Karva Chauth* does not show a desire to connect with a reconstituted "extended family," but to celebrate the union of the couple in an egalitarian way. So to speak, they appear to easily merge their family traditions with the values of the host society which is more concerned with the notion of the couple than it is with the family unit.

Half of my sub-sample of first generations from Gujarat and South India do not conduct this fast either by family tradition, egalitarian conviction or for medical reasons. To illustrate this point, here is the example of one female devotee from Gujarat who considers herself and her husband to be equally part of a transcendental God (*Brahman*). It is clear that she has been inspired by the Vedanta school of thought since she believes that regardless of one's gender each individual soul (*Atman*) is part of a transcendental God (*Brahman*). As she evokes the immortality of her soul and that of her husband, she challenges the androcentric meaning of this fast which suggests that the salvation of a wife is less important than that of a husband.

By contrast, the other half of this sub-sample unanimously observes this fast within the private sphere, considering that the ceremony which takes place at the public temple celebrates a regional normatively from Uttar Pradesh. As stated by one respondent from South India, it is with great pleasure that she visits her friend's house to celebrate this fast as it gathers a reconstituted sorority from South India. They mutually tie a bracelet around their wrists like a reconstituted sorority which reaffirms its intra-group unity since the custom requires that they tie this bracelet around the wrist of their husbands.

In regard to the meaning assigned to this fast, the first generations from South India and Uttar Pradesh mostly declare to wish for the "well-being" of their husbands, their children, their parents and their own. Although those from Gujarat and to a lesser extent from South India are struggling with an egalitarian practice in their relationship, such a liberal reinterpretation allows a subjectively experienced agency. This is the case of one respondent from Gujarat who expressly mentioned that she keeps on fasting

against the advice of her husband as she wishes for her own longevity. Finally, none of the married second-generations from my sub-samples of South India and Gujarat seem to observe this fast as it is foreign to their family traditions.

CONCLUSION

This essay unveils the agency of my respondents in the public and private spheres as they challenge the androcentric content of this fast to redefine their religious identity on egalitarian grounds. At the public temple, women are unquestionably the ones conducting the fast celebration while configuring their own altar and singing egalitarian songs from the "little tradition." In the private sphere, those songs which claim for an equal share of the domestic chores can be recited in various vernacular languages, which attest for egalitarian and pan-Indian claims. Even though the second generations are equally willing to celebrate this fast in the domestic sphere or at the public temple, their elders like to socialize with the members of a reconstituted "extended family" in the public temple. Finally, it seems that both first and second generations re-interpret the meaning of this fast on egalitarian grounds that are for the well-being of the family and adopt a "flexible" diet.

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REINTERPRETER LE JEUNE POUR LA LONGEVITE DU MARI: L'AGENTIVITE DES FEMMES DANS UN TEMPLE HINDOU À MONTRÉAL

Cet article porte sur l'agentivité féminine hindoue à l'égard du religieux et de la conception du rôle de la femme d'origine indienne en contexte migratoire, c'est-à-dire à Montréal. J'entends analyser si les femmes immigrantes hindoues de première génération transmettent à leurs filles l'idéal du rôle traditionnel de l'épouse exemplaire (*pativrata*) par la pratique du jeûne pour la longévité du mari, que ce soit au sein des temples publics ou privés. Le lien entre la représentation de la femme hindoue projetée dans le rituel et l'évolution de cette même représentation retiennent donc mon attention, et ce, dans une visée intergénérationnelle. À ce titre, ma question de recherche se pose en ces termes: est-ce que les femmes hindoues de première génération reproduisent l'idéologie de l'épouse exemplaire ou introduisent-elles une réinterprétation de cette même idéologie selon des valeurs plus libérales, incluant l'égalité des femmes et des hommes ?

D'un point de vue méthodologique, les résultats de cette étude portent sur une observation participante dont la durée est de cinq années, et la réalisation de quarante entrevues semi-directives avec des répondantes de première et de deuxième génération aux origines (Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat et sud de l'Inde) et sectes variées. Je tiens à préciser que ce travail de terrain a eu lieu dans l'enceinte d'un temple hindou montréalais qui a pour particularité de recevoir des fidèles aux appartenances régionales (Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat et sud de l'Inde) et aux affiliations sectaires variées. Néanmoins, les fidèles en provenance de l'Uttar Pradesh sont majoritaires dans ce lieu de culte et la cérémonie du jeûne qui y est officiée relève d'une normativité régionale de l'Uttar Pradesh appelée *Karva Chauth*.

Plusieurs auteurs se sont posé la question de savoir si l'observance de ces jeûnes vise une reproduction stricte ou une réinterprétation des préceptes brahmaniques de manière égalitariste. Pour certains auteurs, les femmes hindoues sont libres de questionner la visée matérielle des jeûnes qu'elles observent en vue d'atteindre, par exemple, l'état de libération spirituelle (*moksha*). Pour d'autres ayant travaillé sur le terrain, la pratique des jeûnes par les répondantes offrirait une panoplie de significations qui se situent sur un continuum allant de la reproduction matérielle à la libération spirituelle, quoique cette dernière intention soit largement minoritaire.

À la lumière de ces données, il convient de se demander si l'observance des jeûnes offrirait la possibilité d'une réinterprétation religieuse en termes égalitaristes comme en témoigne l'état de libération spirituelle. L'agentivité féminine qui est le concept théorique angulaire de cet article suppose une « réflexivité » du sujet femme vis-à-vis des traditions patriarcales en vue de redéfinir son identité. Loin de me limiter à l'analyse de la visée du jeûne pour la longévité de l'époux, j'entends m'attarder aux lieux de leur déroulement, aux divinités vénérées, aux textes et langues utilisés, aux choix des officiants, aux modes de socialisation qu'ils entraînent et au rapport à l'alimentation.

Concrètement, cet article met en exergue l'agentivité dont font preuve mes répondantes de première et de seconde générations lors du jeûne pour la longévité de l'époux tant dans les sphères publique que domestique. Dans le lieu de culte observé, il leur revient d'officier la cérémonie du jeûne en improvisant leur propre autel et de réinterpréter ouvertement sa visée en stipulant que leur longévité doit être assurée au même titre que celle de leurs époux. Le choix du lieu de célébration et la réinterprétation de la visée matérielle de ce jeûne viennent contrer les prescriptions brahmaniques, selon lesquelles les femmes doivent observer cette pratique domestique afin de répondre à l'idéologie de l'épouse exemplaire.

Au Canada, certains auteurs ont constaté que les rapports conjugaux au sein de la communauté indienne ne sauraient être pleinement équitables, ce qui légitime la nature égalitariste des revendications émises par mes répondantes. La preuve étant, les chants dévotionnels qu'elles récitent au temple public ont une teneur égalitariste en ce sens où elles font vœu d'une répartition équitable des tâches ménagères au sein de la sphère domestique. De plus, le recours à la « petite tradition » de l'hindouisme par l'entremise de chants dévotionnels récités en langues vernaculaires fait montre d'une revendication féminine pan-indienne qui souhaite s'affranchir des prescriptions brahmaniques présentes dans la « grande tradition ».

Bien que ce soit principalement les répondantes originaires de l'Uttar Pradesh et du Penjab qui assistent à cette cérémonie publique, leurs consœurs du Gujarat et du sud de l'Inde perpétuent cette pratique dans leurs logis. Au sein de la sphère domestique, une même tendance est observée étant donné que ces dernières officient elles-mêmes la célébration du jeûne et récitent des chants dévotionnels aux tenants égalitaristes, dans une ou plusieurs langues vernaculaires. Tant dans les temples publics que privés, cette cérémonie sert de prétexte à la socialisation intra-féminine et vient pallier à l'absence d'une famille élargie puisqu'elles échangent des cadeaux qui, traditionnellement, devraient être offerts à leurs belles-mères respectives.

Finalement, il apparaît que la visée égalitariste accordée au jeûne pour la longévité du mari semble avoir des répercussions à l'égard des restrictions alimentaires adoptées par les premières générations qui ont une démarche modérée. Pour ainsi dire, celles-ci s'accordent à véhiculer une pratique libérale de ce jeûne ; leurs filles ne sont pas forcées d'y adhérer une fois mariées et peuvent librement adapter leurs régimes alimentaires. Une telle « flexibilité » en matière de transmission intergénérationnelle permettrait aux secondes générations de rendre intelligibles leurs pratiques familiales et de les adapter à leur propre système de valeurs. Une double tendance est donc observable chez les secondes générations qui accompagnent leurs belles-mères au temple public dans l'optique de construire les fondations d'une famille élargie ou retrouvent leurs maris dans la sphère privée pour y échanger des cadeaux en signe de respect mutuel.

STUDYING TRADITIONAL HEALING AMONG RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN INDIA: THE PERSPECTIVE OF A GRADUATE STUDENT FROM QUEBEC

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INTRODUCTION

If we were to circle the globe to study and identify every cultural practice related to health and diseases, we would find an indefinite number of them. But in given groups, these practices may form a coherent whole, that we would call a *medical system.* Even people connected closely by geography, culture or history can boast quite different medical systems. Certain of these systems are categorized as traditional, generally meaning that they are based on local knowledge and practices and are outside the boundaries of biomedicine.

We must point out here that *traditional* is a contentious term. Like Kirmayer (2009) explains: *"It is important to recognize that tradition itself is both received and invented: built in equal measure of wisdom transmitted across the generations and of creative visions of how the many strands of knowledge available today from diverse cultures of the world can be woven together in new patterns."* Human creativity is expressed in the reconstruction of the past and the present, and only such a fact would be enough to understand why: *"...notions of whole and pure traditions have not had much credibility for some time..."* (Ghassem-Fachandi 2011). The concept of tradition can then be manipulated both by the bearers of these traditions and by the subjugating powers in place, and must then be treated carefully.

Healing is also a controversial term. Suffice to say that for the present article healing will be considered as a holistic process, which may include physical, mental and spiritual elements. Traditional healing is then a controversial topic in itself, but is a useful category for apprehending differences between the world of local healing and the world of globalized/homogenized biomedical healing.

In the following pages, we will look briefly at the landscape of healing and especially traditional healing in India, before exploring the notion of boundaries in the Indian religious diversity and its different aspects of traditional healing. Finally, we will explain why, for a Quebec graduate student, it is quite interesting to study traditional medicine in India in general and more specifically among minorities.

HEALING IN INDIA

In Indian society, healing takes many shapes and colors. In comparison to biomedical practices, traditional Indian practices are deeply infused with holistic and spiritual elements. What is exceptional in India is the institutionalisation and government support to what can be considered widespread traditional medicines, such as ayurveda, unani medicine, and siddha medicine. *"The three Indian systems of medicine—Ayurveda, Unani, and Siddha—have, since India's Independence (1947), been receiving considerable encouragement by both the central and state governments"* (Dawar 2008).

If traditional healing among religious or ethnic majorities in India is going strong, evolving in parallel and even competing with biomedicine, fewer enquiries have been made about the state of traditional healing among marginalized people in India. We could start by asking: is there such a thing as traditional healing among tribal people of India? First, we must understand who the tribal people of India are. For Chaube: *"Tribals in India, as elsewhere, are not a homogeneous group. The 'tribe' in fact, is not even defined properly. In India they are an administrative category. The British, until March 31ˢᵗ, 1937, categorised them as 'backward classes'. It was under the Government of India Act, 1935, that they were first scheduled as tribes, a practice that was retained in independent India"* (Chaube 1999).

Langford (Langford 2003), while doing fieldwork among the Jaunty tribe of a central India state, demonstrated that healers themselves didn't categorize

their healing techniques as traditional and as an identity marker. Faced with religious and therapeutic bricolage, she reconsiders the existence of the concept of traditional medicine and folk medicine by using an emic perspective (meaning she is trying to see this situation through the eyes of her informant). This emic perspective allows us to put in perspective what has sometimes been perceived as two fixed categories, modernity and tradition. This shows the creativity of humans, and how categories and boundaries are fluid and sometimes even non-existent. In this perspective, we can agree with Langford that in the studied context the category of traditional healing may not be used by anthropologists, because it does not reflect the reality of the people studied. But since we acknowledge the links between spirituality and healing in many indigenous communities, denying the existence of traditional healing practices among these cultures would be denying their spiritual ways. This is particularly worrisome in parts of India where indigenous animistic people are cornered into conversion by Christian missionaries and Hindu nationalistic elements. But other studies also revealed the powerful link between Christianity and the awakening of indigenous identity quest, particularly in the North-east of India. *"The British conquered the Naga Hills, and for the first time introduced modern administrative and political institutions, a modern system of education, and Christianity. The emergence of a common Naga identity was largely an unintended consequence of these measures"* (Pandey 2011). Christianity, instead of becoming the culprit of the loss of identity, becomes an identification factor for most Naga communities and a boundary-maker between the Hindu majority of India and Nagaland.

However, other reactions are also possible. In Arunachal Pradesh, conversion pressures were also behind a resurgence of the traditional. Many tribes of the Adi language group share some loosely connected beliefs about Donyi-Polo (moon and sun), a dual god. In the seventies, missionary activities were considered dangerous to the cultural survival of the tribal people of the state. One of the initiatives to counter the spread of Christianity was to erect the Donyi-Polo traditions as an organized religion. Temples were built, where people could go to worship. Sacred books were written and printed. Organizations were founded. It is unclear in the literature currently available if this was a really successful endeavour.

The effects of spirituality and religion on healing among tribal and minority people in India is quite clear. Joshi (2008) clearly demonstrates that among the Naga, despite their mass conversion to Christianity, the therapeutic quest includes Christianized steps (meeting with priests, church meetings) but also traditional steps (exorcisms).

BOUNDARIES IN RELIGION, BOUNDARIES IN HEALING

Barth defines boundaries as: *"a particular conceptual construct that people sometimes impress on the world"* (Barth 2000). Since traditional healing in India is closely linked to spirituality, we can start by looking at religious boundaries in this country. This is a life-time subject to study, since boundaries are not fixed and are constantly renegotiated through space and time. But we can look briefly at the evolution of the religious boundaries in India from colonial times until now, so from the start of the British colonial period in India to the present.

For many, boundaries between religious communities in India are a colonial product. For many authors, British colonisation had for effect to favour the rise of a communal identity among groups that didn't identify themselves as Hindus or Muslims before. For Khan (Khan 2004): *"Whenever alliances were considered to be profitable, as for the example in the case of Rajputs and Mughals, inter-caste marriages were not banned. [...] Actually Rajput rulers considered that they belonged to the same Jati as the Mughal."*

According to Khan (2004), many religious masters of the 17th and 18th century were both Muslims and Hindus in their approach and: *"Foreigners were the first to use the word Hindu."* Others attribute this fencing of religious identities in India to the first census accomplish by the British in India, in 1871. By trying to categorize people according to European conceptions of religion and race, the British colonial helped in shaping the idea of Muslims and Hindus as constituting two separate communities. This was also accompanied by an uplifting of the moral behaviors between the natives and the colonizers. For centuries, mixing between the two populations gave rise to a number of Anglo Indians that form the elite of the Indian society of that time. *"16-17th century colonialists were less prone than their 19th century counterpart to draw cultural boundaries"* (Caplan 1995). So at the same time those religious boundaries were strengthened between groups, ethnic boundaries were also erected. This is not to say that communal identities are only a product of the colonial era, but that it did play a role in the emergence of strong ethnic and religious affiliations in India. Colonial rule was also influential in the rise of reformist movements among both Hindus and Muslims.

The Arya Samaj, a reformist movement planning to raise the status of Hinduism in the eyes of foreigners by making it more European-like, was the precursor movement to the Hindu nationalist movement. But still, and interestingly enough, religious boundaries may not be as solid as they may seem. Bellamy (Bellamy 2011) studied a Muslim shrine in Kerala where liminal and changing

identities were strongly expressed by some women; they would still consider themselves as Hindus, but would either study Arabic or wear the Muslim headscarf to better fit among the mass of pelerines. Healing places, such as the Muslim shrines in that last case, are a meeting place for the various religious traditions of South east India. Muslims, Hindus and Christians visit these shrines in search of physical, mental or spiritual healing. For some, this is the proof that religions in India are syncretic, meaning they absorb elements from each other. They also argue that religions in India are less syncretic and tolerant that they used to be. *"The rise of fundamentalism in recent years in India has obliterated the deep rooted syncretism in Indian culture"* (Burman 1996). In fact, what are often perceived as manifestations of syncretism and tolerance are two important facts of Indian religious life: pilgrimages and festivals. These Muslim shrines are often also pilgrimage destinations, where Muslims and Hindus go.

Even if we have to be mindful of the multiplicity of factors behind the building of boundaries, we can then conclude that religious boundaries are in fact in part a historical and social construction. But even in times of communal tension they are not as solid as they seem. They may seem solid in the eyes of religious authorities and bystanders, but at the popular level, pragmatism still wins the day.

BOUNDARIES AND TRADITIONAL HEALING

Traditional healing among scheduled tribes in India, particularly in the Northeast region, has been the object of ethno-botanic and folkloric studies, but very little of anthropological studies. So we know very little about tribal healing traditions outside the botanical aspects in this part of the country. What about boundaries between religious and healing worlds of tribal minorities and those of the other groups in India? Like we have seen before, traditions may be in part a social construction, but in fact have the potential to become powerful identity symbols. In that sense, traditional healing can be used as an identity valorisation tool. But the introduction of biomedical clinics and products may threaten traditional healing techniques, not only by providing other options for cure seekers, but also by cutting the ties between the spiritual and the healing worlds. In that respect, cultural changes brought about by conversion and education may promote re-invented cultural idioms that have very little to do with the past.

STUDYING TRADITIONAL HEALING IN INDIA

Studying traditional healing in India for a Quebec graduate student is quite interesting for many reasons. As I have shown, the traditional healing systems in India are complex and fascinating. Even if we have only skimmed the surface of this vast topic, we can see that this universe is extremely rich, both in the number of health alternatives available (due to fluid healing boundaries) and by the remarkable number of choices that people make in a period of crisis.

Traditional medicine exists both in India and in Quebec. In Quebec, traditional medicine can be classified in three categories: the traditions of the First Nations, the traditions imported by the first Europeans on the continent, and the recently introduced traditional medicines from other parts of the world. The traditions of the First Nations are currently going through a re-awakening phase, with many communities finding their way back to shamanistic practices. The popularity of these traditions is also on the rise among the Quebecers of European descent. Traditions from Asia, like Reiki and Acupuncture, are also surfing on a wave of popularity. But the future of the healing traditions that were imported during the European colonisation (such as bonesetting and herbal healing) is not that certain. In fact, the major difference between the two contexts is the place traditional healing techniques occupies in people's therapeutic choices. As shown by many authors, traditional healing in India is still a viable option for many. People will go from one therapeutic solution to another, until their problem is fixed or they found solace to their suffering. In Quebec, traditional healing has been losing ground for centuries, and what remains of it is mainly hidden from general media and scholarly attention.

However, during fieldwork in Saguenay Lac-St-Jean, a northern region of Quebec, we discovered that it is still widely present but remains quietly in the shadows in order to avoid any confrontation with the Quebec medical board. Indian and Quebec traditional healers and their patients have then a very different experience with modernity. Modernity in India has allowed a continuum between the past and the present. There appears to be almost a syncretism between what has been brought with modernity and the Indian traditions. Generally in the province of Quebec, traditional healers seem to have gone underground and for the most part are considered as frauds. This said, traditional healing in regions like the Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean still subsists.

Due to lack of information, we don't know if traditional healing among tribal minorities in India's North East is as alive as Unani and Ayurvedic healing. Having already studied healing at the margins in Quebec, it will be quite interesting to see how traditional healing is both practiced and used in another minority setting. Of course, French-speaking Quebecers are not a minority in their own province. But these traditions, of French origin, are certainly unique in North America, as are those of tribal people in India.

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LA GUÉRISON TRADITIONNELLE CHEZ LES MINORITÉS RELIGIEUSES EN INDE: LA PERSPECTIVE D'UNE ÉTUDIANTE QUÉBÉCOISE

Si nous devions faire le tour du monde pour étudier et identifier toutes les pratiques culturelles liées à la santé et aux maladies, on trouverait un nombre infini de possibilités. Mais dans des groupes donnés, ces pratiques peuvent constituer un ensemble cohérent, que l'on pourrait appeler un système médical. Certains de ces systèmes sont classés comme traditionnels, ce qui signifie généralement qu'ils sont basés sur la connaissance et les pratiques locales et sont en dehors des limites de la biomédecine. La guérison traditionnelle est un sujet controversé en soi, mais c'est une catégorie utile pour appréhender les différences entre le monde de la guérison locale et le monde globalisé/homogénéisé de la guérison biomédicale.

Dans la société indienne, la guérison est diverse et colorée. Les pratiques traditionnelles indiennes sont profondément imprégnées d'éléments holistiques et spirituels. Ce qui est exceptionnel en Inde est l'institutionnalisation et le soutien du gouvernement aux médecines traditionnelles, telles que l'ayurveda, l'Unani, et la médecine siddha. Si la guérison traditionnelle chez les majorités ethniques ou religieuses en Inde est en plein essor, évoluant en parallèle et même en concurrence avec la biomédecine, moins de recherches ont été faites sur l'état de la guérison traditionnelle chez les minorités tribales. Nous pourrions commencer par demander: y a-t-il une telle chose comme la guérison traditionnelle parmi les populations tribales de l'Inde? Langford (2003), lors de son travail de terrain au sein de la tribu Jaunty d'un état de l'Inde centrale, a démontré que les guérisseurs eux-mêmes ne classent pas leurs techniques de guérison dans les catégories divergentes de traditionnelles et modernes. Le traditionnel n'est pas un marqueur identitaire et donc l'existence même d'une guérison traditionnelle authentique parmi les tribus indiennes est remise en question.

Mais puisque nous reconnaissons les liens entre la spiritualité et la guérison dans de nombreuses communautés autochtones, nier l'existence de pratiques de guérison traditionnelles au sein de ces cultures serait nié l'existence de leur spécificité spirituelle. Cela est particulièrement inquiétant dans certaines régions de l'Inde où les animistes sont coincés entre les pressions des missionnaires chrétiens et les éléments nationalistes, hindous ou autres. Mais d'autres études ont également révélé le lien puissant entre le christianisme et l'éveil de l'identité autochtone, en particulier dans le Nord-est de l'Inde. Les Britanniques ont conquis les collines Naga, et

pour la première fois introduit de modernes institutions administratives et politiques, un système d'éducation moderne et le christianisme. L'émergence d'une identité commune Naga était en grande partie une conséquence involontaire de ces mesures. Le christianisme n'est donc pas dans ce contexte considéré comme responsable de la perte identitaire, mais devient plutôt un facteur identitaire et un point de ralliement pour la plupart des communautés Naga.

La médecine traditionnelle existe à la fois en Inde et au Québec. Au Québec, la médecine traditionnelle peut être classée en trois catégories: les traditions des Premières nations, les traditions importées par les premiers Européens sur le continent, et les médecines récemment introduites et provenant d'autres parties du monde. Les traditions des Premières nations sont actuellement dans une phase de réveil. La popularité de ces traditions est également à la hausse chez les Québécois d'origine européenne. Les traditions asiatiques, comme le Reiki et l'acupuncture, connaissent aussi une vague de popularité. Mais l'avenir des traditions de guérison importées au cours de la colonisation européenne (par exemple, le bonesetting et l'herboristerie) est incertain. En fait, la différence majeure entre les deux contextes (Inde et au Québec) est la place qu'occupe la guérison traditionnelle dans les choix thérapeutiques des gens. Comme l'ont montré de nombreux auteurs, la médecine traditionnelle en Inde est toujours une option viable pour beaucoup de gens. Les gens se promènent d'une solution thérapeutique à l'autre, jusqu'à ce que leur problème soit résolu ou qu'ils aient trouvé un réconfort à leurs souffrances. Au Québec, la médecine traditionnelle a perdu du terrain depuis des siècles, et ce qu'il en reste est principalement caché des médias et de l'attention scientifique.

Le Québec et l'Inde ont en commun cependant la conquête et la colonisation par l'Empire britannique. Cette colonisation a rapidement mis un terme à la pratique libre des ramancheurs (*bonesetters*) et des sages-femmes. Les ramancheurs sont ceux qui furent les plus ciblés par les mesures visant à restreindre la pratique de la médecine à des professionnels certifiés par le collège des Médecins. Ainsi, depuis le milieu du 20e siècle, les ramancheurs, qui sont fortement présents dans les études folkloriques, ont disparu de la vue du public.

Cependant, au cours d'une recherche au Saguenay Lac-St-Jean, une région du nord du Québec, nous avons découvert qu'ils sont encore largement présents, mais restent tranquillement dans l'ombre, afin d'éviter toute confrontation avec le Collège des médecins du Québec. Les guérisseurs traditionnels indiens et ceux du Québec et leurs patients ont alors une expérience très différente de la modernité. La modernité en Inde a permis un continuum entre le passé et le présent. Il semble y avoir eu un syncrétisme entre ce qui a été apporté à la modernité et les traditions. En général, au Québec, les guérisseurs traditionnels semblent avoir disparus de la vie publique. Cela dit, la guérison traditionnelle subsiste encore au Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean.

En raison du manque d'information, nous ne savons pas si la guérison traditionnelle chez les minorités tribales de l'Inde du Nord-est est aussi vivante que les autres médecines traditionnelles, telles que l'Unani et l'Âyurveda. Ayant déjà étudié la guérison alternative au Québec, il sera très intéressant d'étudier comment la guérison traditionnelle est à la fois pratiquée et utilisée dans un autre contexte minoritaire. Bien sûr, les Québécois de langue française ne sont pas une minorité dans leur propre province. Mais ces traditions, d'origine française, sont certainement uniques en Amérique du Nord, comme le sont celles des populations tribales en Inde.

PART 3

The role of education and of the media
in building an inclusive society

BALANCING DIVERSITY AND COMMON SOCIALIZATION: COMPARING EDUCATIONAL DEBATES IN INDIA AND QUEBEC

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INTRODUCTION

Given its intensity and universality, schooling plays a major role in the production and the redefinition of ethnic boundaries and cultural markers. In this regard, there are many tensions between and within two central mandates carried out by school systems in modern pluralistic societies: the linguistic and cultural reproduction of majority and minority communities, and the common but pluralistic socialization of all students. Thus, everywhere debates thrive on the curriculum and structural arrangements most susceptible to producing the kind of citizens – and citizenship – deemed favourable by different segments of society (Mc Andrew, 2003).

In this article we compare three controversies that have touched India and Quebec in the past ten years regarding the teaching of history, values and religious education, and the legitimacy of separate minority institutions. Our objective is to explore the lessons that both societies can learn from one another on the management of diversity in education.

HISTORY TEACHING: WHOSE MEMORY? FOR WHICH PURPOSE?

In both societies, the most visible debate focused on the teaching of history in secondary schools, with regard to the definition of what should be taught as "national history" and the purposes of such a curriculum in a pluralistic country. Traditionally, in India, textbooks have been influenced by successive Congress Party governments which put forward a non-communal, multicultural, although rather vague view of national history. However, from 2000 to 2005, with the rise to power of the BJP and the later return of the Congress, students were exposed to three successive, largely "single narrative" curricula where the centrality of majority community components and the place of minorities in national identity varied greatly. The same was true for the more or less nationalistic interpretation of various historical events (NCERT 2005). At the same time, experts accused each other of the worst sins in national newspapers, as well as on many other forums. These spectacular swings were often done with little regard for teachers and students, who were largely expected to passively adapt to these contradictions without much questioning.

More recently, a greater sensibility to that issue among curriculum developers has brought about the introduction of a multi-perspective and more active approach to history teaching through the exposure of students to documents reflecting competing visions (NCERT, 2005). But this evolution has also generated some resistance, especially around historical political cartoons deemed offensive by various groups (Roy, 2012).

In Quebec, ever since education reforms at the end of the 1990s, constructivism stressing the development of skills and critical thinking, as well as the active involvement of students in the learning process, has been the dominant paradigm in the whole program (MEQ, 1997). But when these principles were applied to Quebec's high school history curriculum in 2005, a major controversy erupted (Mc Andrew, 2012). A perceived obliteration of the traditional Francophone "resistance" narrative, a greater space devoted to native and immigrant contributions, and an emphasis put on the mastery of historical methods by students were denounced by many nationalist intellectuals and spokespersons as a "multicultural plot." The association of history teaching with citizenship education also raised concerns that formerly contentious issues would be downplayed for the sake of promoting the harmony of current inter-

group relations. Opposition was intense enough to prompt a partial retreat on the part of the Department of Education, which produced in 2006 a revised version of the curriculum, that remained pluralistic and disciplinary, but put more weight on political history and traditional elements of French Canadian collective memory.

Without dwelling here on specific contents or events, an analysis of arguments brought forward by opposing (Mc Andrew, 2009) sides shows that many theoretical, ethical and curricular issues raised in one society have a clear resonance in the other. Common controversial questions include:

- When does "genuine" Indian or Quebec history begin and when does it end?
- What criteria should be used to determine the respective weight of various historical periods in the curriculum?
- To what extent should the core group at the center of the nation (*i.e.* respectively Hindus and French Canadians) *own* history and decide who should be included or not in the common narrative?
- How long does it take for groups who could be considered as *former colonizers* (*i.e.* Muslims in India or Anglophones in Quebec) to belong?
- Should minority groups develop their own curriculum? If not, what control should they exercise on what is said about them in common textbooks?

What is also striking in both debates is the extent to which many citizens still hold a positivist conception of "historical truths" and a generally limited interest for pedagogical issues. Moreover, while in Quebec this element is discussed more often, until recently in India little attention has been paid to the opportunity that competing historical narratives represent for the building of historical skills among students. The necessity to balance the two competing goals of history teaching, an instrument of nation-building and an opportunity to develop critical thinking among students, has also been more widely addressed, if not resolved, in Quebec.

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: WHAT ROLE IS THERE FOR RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL VALUES?

The relevance of two new courses developed largely in response to concerns about the loss of the sense of duty and responsibility, as well as the lack of religious culture among youth has also been the focus of an important social debate in both societies. In India, *Value Education* was introduced in a largely secular school system by the BJP as a compulsory subject in 2000, prompting the development of a wide variety of curriculum and pedagogical material reflecting the cultural, religious and

ethical heritage of India, especially its Hindu components (NRCVE 2004). Proponents of this movement argued that the mere teaching of constitutional principles was not enough to insure a sense of belonging and a commitment to national identity among students. They also denounced as a western conception of social cohesion strict secularism and the limits it sets on the transmission of religious values. Meanwhile, opponents saw this *Saffronization of education* as an undue attempt to impose Hindu values on religious minorities and as a withering of the commitment of the Indian State to foster the transmission of common secular values to all students. Over the five years of its implementation, the *Value Education* course evolved significantly from *saffron to rainbow*, with the development of more multi-denominational perspectives and teaching materials. Nevertheless, positions were so entrenched that almost nothing of the approach survived the coming back to power of the Congress Party, and the Department of Education is now developing a new citizenship education program.

The origins of Quebec's *Religious Ethics and Culture Program*, introduced in 2007, are quite opposite (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008). It was one of the main tools to ease the transition from a denominational school system (Catholic and Protestant) to a secular one, more adapted to the growing multi-religious and non-religious sectors of Quebec society. Instead of teaching *a single* specific religion, schools would now teach *about* all religions, even if a larger place would be devoted to native spirituality and Judeo-Christian beliefs. This choice was justified by the stronger historical impact and present sociological role of these faiths in Quebec, which echoes some of the "reality check" arguments of the supporters of *Value Education* in India. This compromise is considered by many to be a promising avenue between denominational education, strict secularism (which precludes any teaching of religion) and pure multiculturalism (which advocates treating religious traditions on an equal footing regardless of their centrality in a given society). Nevertheless, the program is at the centre of an ideological war. The main theme among traditional nationalists is identity loss linked to the lessening of religious practice and the consequent expectation that schools act as counter balancing forces in this regard (or at least do not, for example by teaching that all religions are of equal value, interfere with the religious influences of parents). Resistance also stems from proponents of a strict secular perspective who want teachings to be limited to ethics. Thus, the future of the program is uncertain within the current context of political transition in Quebec.

While circumstances are quite different, debates in India and Quebec clearly address similar questions regarding the legitimacy of firm values that reflect a specific

historical trajectory to be transmitted by schools in a multicultural and multi-religious society (Bourgeault *et al.*, 2002). Extreme answers are either unrealistic (*i.e.* a neutral school that equally reflects all cultures and religions, and transmits only civic values) or are ethically unacceptable (*i.e.* a school subjected to the reproduction of the majority community, at the expense of individual rights and those of minority groups). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in both contexts, programs seeking to strike an appropriate balance in this regard are still very much *works in progress*.

MINORITY INSTITUTIONS: ASSETS OR OBSTACLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLURALIST SOCIETY?

A last issue reflecting the tensions between cultural reproduction and common forms of socialization shared by India and Quebec is the legitimacy of state-funded minority institutions in a pluralist society. India's Constitution clearly supports the right of religious minorities (mostly Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs) to create and manage their own institutions. That position is linked to a strong normative commitment, but also to the specific socio-political situation that existed at the time of Independence. Moreover, some safeguards with regard to respect for the common curriculum and access by students and teachers of various backgrounds to such institutions have minimized potential contradictions with the larger goal of nation-building through common and pluralistic socialization (Government of India, 2006). Nevertheless, minority institutions are criticized by various sectors of society. Some minority spokespersons argue that this apparently successful compromise has actually been achieved at the expense of their institutional completeness and their capacity to control the very development of their schools.

At the other end of the ideological spectrum, nationalist leaders have denounced the fact that the right to set up religious institutions is limited to minorities and that this involves unfair treatment of the Hindu majority. Finally, secular media and public opinion have sometimes expressed fears that religious institutions are used to spread fundamentalism, a claim largely unsubstantiated by research. Furthermore, India's record for ensuring the compatibility of structural pluralism with equality of opportunity has not been impressive, especially with regard to the plight of underprivileged minorities, such as the Muslims. However, on that front, minority-controlled institutions are not doing worse than mainstream schools, and interesting programs to maximize their positive impact have been implemented. These include the scheme for the modernization of madrasah and better mechanisms to recognize the equivalence of qualifications received by their students (Akhtar and Narula, 2010).

Quebec stands out among Canadian provinces for its rather generous funding of religious schools, catering to the needs of families from the dominant Catholic and Protestant communities, as well as from minority groups (Jewish, Greek orthodox, Armenian and Muslim). Quebec inter-culturalism should actually incline it to be less lenient on that front than its multiculturalists' counterparts. Nevertheless, this choice was motivated by historical and political factors, such as the need to pacify private Catholic schools in the 1960s, when the Quebec State took over the responsibility of secondary education. Other factors included the desire to increase education in French within some religious communities, as well as the absence of a genuinely secular school system until the end of the 1990s (Proulx, 1999). The choice is also associated with clear requirements that such institutions follow the mainstream curriculum and teach cultural and religious content only as supplementary activities. Although the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows minority institutions to select students and teachers on the basis of a specific religious affiliation, most of them hire a substantive number of teachers who do not belong to the religious community, and would be willing to admit students from other groups if such request was made.

Nevertheless, the legitimacy of separate schooling for religious minorities is a recurrent debate, centered around Jewish schools who represent half of such institutions catering for a large proportion of Jewish children (unlike the fewer Islamic schools attended by a small proportion of Muslim students). Both nationalists and leftist opponents voice concerns regarding the religious *brainwashing* of students attending religious schools, a claim that is also largely not confirmed by research findings. The most convincing argument in this respect is the lack of common socialization between children of different backgrounds—or at least between majority and minority children, as these institutions are often multicultural—and its consequences on the social integration of religious minorities. The newly elected Parti Québécois proposed in its platform the abolition of public funding for such schools, rendering their future uncertain.

Although there are common elements in the debate surrounding separate minority institutions in India and Quebec, differences on this last issue appear greater than with other topics discussed in this article. First, an overall assessment of religious institutions and attitudes toward such institutions is much more positive in India, which reflects a stronger commitment to religious pluralism, but also puts less emphasis on a united school space in this emerging multicultural country. In that country, such schools also play a role in providing access to education and fighting educational inequalities among

disenfranchised sectors of society, contributing to their higher legitimacy than in Quebec, where they are often seen as pursuing only a mandate for the reproduction of cultural and religious identities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As can be seen by this comparison of debates regarding the balancing of diversity and common socialization in Indian and Quebec educational contexts, collaboration could prove very fruitful both at the policy and research levels. In both contexts, issues at stake, policies and programs put forward, as well as strengths and weaknesses exhibit enough common trends and specificities to warrant increased exchanges.

It would first appear that Indian educational decision-makers and program developers could benefit from curricular expertise from Quebec with regard to handling the teaching of a contested national history, especially the use of that complexity as an asset in the development of critical thinking and citizenship skills among students. The two societies may also come to a better understanding of their respective attempts to develop moral and ethical education programs, where the religious component of their historical trajectory and their current pluralistic situation are equally taken into account, including the origins of resistance to such an endeavour. Finally, the openness of Indian society to minority institutions, as well as their generally favourable impact on the preservation of minority cultures and on the sense of allegiance to Indian society should also be studied with greater depth in Quebec, where attitudes in this regard are generally more negative. Increased exchange would favour, on both sides, the development of a more critical perspective on the shortcomings of one's society and schools, as well as a renewed questioning of dominant national assumptions regarding ethno-cultural diversity and education.

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L'ÉQUILIBRE ENTRE LA DIVERSITÉ ET LA SOCIALISATION COMMUNE: UNE COMPARAISON DES DÉBATS ÉDUCATIFS EN INDE ET AU QUÉBEC

L'enseignement de l'histoire, quelles mémoires? À quelles fins?

Dans cet article, nous comparons trois controverses qui ont touché l'Inde et le Québec ces dix dernières années concernant l'enseignement de l'histoire, l'éducation aux valeurs et à la culture religieuse ainsi que la pertinence d'institutions contrôlées par les minorités. Dans les deux sociétés, le débat le plus visible a concerné l'enseignement de l'histoire dans les écoles secondaires, tant en ce qui concerne la définition de ce qui doit être enseigné comme «histoire nationale» que les objectifs d'un tel enseignement dans une société pluraliste. En Inde, de 2000 à 2005, les étudiants ont été soumis à trois curriculums successifs présentant une vision unifiée de l'histoire où la centralité de la majorité hindoue dans l'identité nationale était à l'opposé et où prévalait une interprétation plus ou moins nationaliste de différents événements historiques. Au Québec, à la suite du développement d'un nouveau programme d'Histoire nationale au secondaire en 2005, plusieurs ont dénoncé l'affaiblissement du récit traditionnel de résistance des francophones, l'espace plus grand accordé aux minorités immigrantes et nationales ainsi que l'accent mis sur les perspectives multiples comme un complot multiculturel. Ces deux controverses ont soulevé plusieurs questions communes telles les critères qui devraient être utilisés pour statuer sur le poids respectif de différentes périodes dans le curriculum, le degré où le groupe majoritaire doit contrôler le récit et décider qui peut y être inclus ou non et enfin, le rôle que devrait jouer les représentants des groupes minoritaires dans le traitement qui est fait de leur communauté au sein des manuels scolaires. Cependant, de façon générale, on peut noter que l'expérience québécoise, tout particulièrement sur le plan du curriculum, est davantage marquée par une utilisation originale des tensions mêmes de l'enseignement d'une histoire controversée et de sa complexité dans le développement des compétences citoyennes des élèves.

L'enseignement moral et éthique: quel rôle pour les valeurs et les cultures religieuses?

En Inde, l'éducation aux valeurs a été introduite en 2000 au sein d'un système scolaire très largement laïque par le parti nationaliste hindou, ce qui a généré le développement d'une grande variété de matériel pédagogique reflétant le patrimoine culturel, religieux et éthique de l'Inde, mais tout spécialement sa composante hindoue. Les partisans de cette *safranisation de l'éducation* dénonçaient en effet la laïcité traditionnelle indienne ainsi que les limites qu'elle fixe à la transmission de valeurs substantives et religieuses comme l'imposition d'une conception occidentale. Mais ses opposants la voyaient plutôt comme une tentative d'imposer les valeurs hindoues aux minorités religieuses et une atteinte à la transmission des valeurs séculières communes à tous les élèves. Quant au programme d'Éthique et de Culture religieuse québécois introduit en 2007, il visait à faciliter la transition d'un système traditionnellement confessionnel vers un système laïque plus adapté à la présence croissante des minorités religieuses et des personnes non pratiquantes. Les écoles enseignent donc désormais toutes les religions, même si on continue à attribuer une plus grande place à la spiritualité autochtone ainsi qu'aux croyances judéo-chrétiennes, étant donné leur impact historique. Ce compromis est considéré par plusieurs comme une troisième avenue prometteuse entre l'éducation confessionnelle, la laïcité rigide et le multiculturalisme «pur». Cependant, le programme a généré une guerre idéologique importante portée, entre autres, par les nationalistes traditionnels qui mettent de l'avant la perte d'identité liée à l'abandon des appartenances religieuses et voudraient que les écoles jouent à cet égard un rôle réactif.

Même si les contextes sont fort différents, les débats indien et québécois adressent clairement des questions très proches sur la légitimité que des valeurs substantives liées à la trajectoire historique spécifique de la majorité soient transmises par les écoles dans une société multiculturelle et multi religieuse.

Les institutions minoritaires: atout ou obstacle dans le développement d'une société pluraliste?

La constitution indienne supporte fortement le droit des minorités religieuses à créer et à gérer leurs propres institutions, ce qui reflète un engagement normatif significatif, mais aussi la situation sociopolitique qui existait au moment de l'indépendance. De plus, plusieurs balises assurent le respect du curriculum commun et la présence dans de telles institutions d'élèves et d'enseignants d'origines diverses, ce qui a minimisé leur contradiction potentielle avec l'objectif plus large de construction de la nation. Cependant certains médias du camp laïque ont exprimé des craintes que les institutions religieuses ne soutiennent

le développement du fondamentalisme Les liens entre le pluralisme structurel et l'égalité des chances sont aussi problématiques, tout particulièrement pour les minorités défavorisées comme les Musulmans. Mais des développements intéressants pour maximiser l'impact positif des écoles musulmanes sont à signaler. Quant au Québec, il se distingue parmi les provinces canadiennes par son financement généreux des écoles spécifiques associées tant à la majorité qu'aux minorités religieuses. Ce soutien, qui résulte de multiples facteurs historiques et politiques, est balisé par des exigences claires que ces institutions suivent le curriculum commun et n'enseignent le contenu religieux et culturel que comme une activité complémentaire. Cependant, la légitimité d'une scolarisation séparée pour les minorités religieuses génère des débats animés et récurrents au Québec, tout particulièrement autour des écoles juives. Bien que les préoccupations d'endoctrinement religieux soient parfois exprimées, le principal argument des opposants est le manque de socialisation commune entre les élèves d'origines diverses et ses conséquences sur l'intégration sociale des minorités religieuses.

Bien que les débats indien et québécois présentent des éléments communs, l'évaluation globale des institutions ethnoreligieuses est beaucoup plus positive en Inde, ce qui reflète un engagement plus marqué en faveur du pluralisme religieux, mais également la moindre importance attribuée à l'existence d'un espace scolaire unifié dans un pays où l'accès à l'éducation pour tous est loin d'être encore assurée.

Conclusion

Une collaboration accrue sur la gestion de la diversité en éducation en Inde et au Québec pourrait s'avérer bénéfique tant pour le développement des politiques que de la recherche. En effet, dans les deux contextes, les enjeux soulevés, les politiques et les programmes mis de l'avant ainsi que les forces et les faiblesses présentent à la fois suffisamment d'éléments communs et de spécificités pour justifier l'intensification des échanges.

STUDY TOURS IN INDIA: A TOOL IN THE INTERCULTURAL TRAINING OF TEACHERS

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INTRODUCTION

I will present here some explanations regarding my interest in Indian culture, politics and social life which has led me to organize study tours in India for teachers. I will also indicate how these study tours were integrated in the in-service training program for intercultural education I have developed at University of Sherbrooke.

When I obtained my Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion at McGill University in 1970, Quebec society was very different from the one in which I was born in 1941. It was in the process of becoming a modern society, where religion would play only a minor role. Without realizing it, I was personally affected by these transformations. After finishing the eight years of B.A., I studied theology for five years, but I was more and more dissatisfied with Roman Catholic theology since I felt it did not deliver satisfying answers to fundamental questions about the nature of religion. The program of Philosophy of Religions at McGill University made it possible to approach religion in a broader perspective. It also included seminars on Hinduism, which were my first contact with this religious tradition.

After the completion of my Ph.D., I was hired at the Faculté de théologie of Sherbrooke University where a graduate program in social sciences and religion (Sciences humaines des religions) had just been created. I was asked to develop courses on Hinduism and Buddhism. During my first years of teaching, a program of "Culture religieuse" had been experimented in some schools of Quebec. This program was offered in the last three years of high school, as an alternative to the course of religious education. The teachers involved in this experimentation needed training in sociology of religion and world religions, so a professional "module" was added to the program of "Sciences humaines des religions" in order to fill that need. That professional "module" was structured around three main components:

1. *Theory.* The teachers had to become aware of the possibility of studying religion in a non-confessional way and they had to learn how to use the methodology of the social sciences.
2. *Experience.* The teachers had to select a religious tradition and to study in depth its complexity and diversity. They were invited to exchange with followers of that tradition.

3. *Experimentation.* The teachers had to create for their students pedagogical material reflecting the insights gained during their involvement in the training program.

It is within the framework of the second component of the training program that I organized four study tours in India for teachers of "culture religieuse" at the high school level. Each of these tours was prepared by intensive sessions on Indian culture, social life, politics and religions. Most of the courses in these intensive sessions were given by André Couture, an eminent specialist of Sanskrit from Laval University in Quebec City. The teachers who participated in these sessions were working full time and they did not spend much time at the university. A textbook containing articles on various aspects of Indian life and a selective bibliography was prepared for them so that they could complete their training at home. They were also invited to select a specific aspect of Indian life and religion that they could discuss with Indian correspondents during the trip in India. Colleagues from Indian universities helped in organizing those exchanges.

However, after some ten years of experimentation, the Quebec Department of Education decided to abolish the program of "culture religieuse." The program was re-established in a new form in 2004 when the Ministry of Education created a new program: *Ethics and religious culture.* For details about this program, see Ouellet (2005) and also Mc Andrew and Akhtar in this volume.

This led me to reorient the professional "module" I had created in order to satisfy the needs of teachers in the Roman Catholic network in Quebec. After the adoption of Bill 101, in 1976, all immigrants in Quebec had to send their children to the French schools. *"Bill 101 [...] made French the official language of the state and of the courts in the province of Quebec, as well as making it the normal and habitual language of the workplace, of instruction, of communications, of commerce and of business. Education in French became compulsory for immigrants, even those from other Canadian provinces, unless a 'reciprocal agreement' existed between Quebec and that province (the so-called Quebec clause)"* (Hudon, 2012). This created a new situation for the teachers in the French Catholic network

who had to teach to students from multiple cultures. This new situation generated many initiatives by teachers to deal with the new challenges and these initiatives gave birth to a new education field: intercultural/multicultural education. However, the initiatives of teachers had very often "perverse effects" (Ouellet, 1992) despite their good intentions. I have identified in the relevant literature seven "perverse effects" of initiatives focussing too much on cultural particularities:

- Confinement of individuals in a permanent and immutable cultural identity which deprive them of their freedom to choose their "cultural formula" (Camilleri, 1988/1990).
- Hardening of the boundaries between groups and accentuation of the risks of intolerance and rejection (Steele, 1990).
- Accentuation of the difficulties for immigrants and members of minority groups to have access to equality of opportunities (Steele, 1990).
- The paralysing perplexity of the relativistic master who does not know what to teach if he wants to show respect for the culture of minority students (Camilleri, 1988, 90).
- Stigmatisation and marginalisation of minority students to whom a socially depreciated identity is attributed (Nicolet, 1987).
- Reification and "folklorisation" of culture which is no more a living reality providing guidance in life for individuals (J. J., in Ouellet 1991).
- Fragmentation of curriculum as a result of particularistic demands (Ravitch, 1990).

INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION PROGRAM:

In the last 25 years of my career at the University of Sherbrooke, I have been in charge of a graduate program of intercultural training for teachers. This program was designed to equip teachers with the conceptual tools and the pedagogical strategies they needed in order to avoid these "perverse effects." I have been influenced by the double strategy proposed by Bernard Loreytte (1982) to shun these pitfalls: a "pedagogy of identity deconstruction," where the homogeneity postulated for "us" and for "others" is systematically deconstructed, and a "pedagogy of situation," where, in a given historic and social context, intercultural relations are analyzed in the concrete situation of contacts between individuals and groups. This approach is still very relevant and underlies the "roundabout strategy" that I have put forward (Ouellet, 1994). Rather than trying to respond directly to the expectations of teachers, the intercultural education program takes them in a triple "roundabout":

- The study of the main theoretical questions raised by any attempt to hold together three preoccupations/ values: the acceptation of cultural diversity, the search for social cohesion in a common space of deliberation and the struggle against discrimination and inequalities;
- The exploration of some aspects of the socio-economic and political situation in a chosen foreign country and of the dynamics of the culture of its citizens who have immigrated to Quebec;
- The elaboration of a plan of intervention which could contribute to the quality of education offered to all students. The teachers involved in the program were invited to adopt the form of cooperative learning developed by Elizabeth Cohen (1994), in light of the new perspectives opened by the exploration of theoretical questions relevant to the three preoccupations/values mentioned before, and of a greater sensibility to the diverse experiences of minority cultural groups with whom they had interactions during the exploration of a foreign society.

Intercultural education is a controversial concept. In order to be able to take into account the cultural and religious differences which are more and more a reality in society and in the classroom, teachers need the intellectual tools which can help them understand the causes and the consequences of this situation. The program I have designed includes courses on some important theoretical issues related to cultural and religious diversity, social cohesion and equality. Table 1 provides a synthetic presentation of these theoretical issues.

Table 1: Intercultural Education/Citizenship Education

PREOCCUPATIONS/ VALUES	CONCEPTS/THEMES
Acceptation of diversity	Culture, ethnicity and identity in the context of modernity.
	Cultural relativism and the necessity to go beyond it.
	Obstacles to intercultural relations: - "ethnicisation" of cultural differences; - prejudice, discrimination, heterophobia, racism; - antiracism and its problems.
Social cohesion (Search for a "principle of collective belonging")	Nation, community, state.
	Nationalism, liberalism, pluralistic democracy, citizenship.
	Civic education, education for democracy.
Equality and equity	Equality of opportunity, exclusion and marginalization.
	The vicious circle of guilt-victim.
	Affirmative action and its perverse effects.
Critical participation to democratic life and democratic deliberation	Deliberative democracy and pluralism of values.
	Consensus VS modus vivendi.
	Politics of identit.

But the importance of the second component of the "roundabout strategy," the exploration of a foreign society, is much less evident. This component might be considered as a luxury for teachers facing urgent problems in their classrooms. I believe, however, that teachers need an opportunity to distance themselves from the climate of urgency and of tension which are all too often characteristic of intercultural relations. The exploration of some aspects of a foreign society's socio-economic and political context, particularly if it is connected to an eventual visit to the chosen country, introduces an element of pleasure to the program. The discovery of a new cultural world can be a very gratifying experience if it implies an initiation to a foreign literature, and to the religion, music, arts and culinary delights of a foreign country. Some teachers might even start learning the language of that country.

Another reason to include the exploration of a foreign culture as a component of intercultural education is that it provides teachers with an opportunity to test the validity and the relevance of some of the theoretical notions which have been under study in the first part of the programme. It also gives them a point of comparison which helps them better understand their own society. When they try to analyze the cultural and religious traditions of this country in the light of these theoretical notions, they learn how to comprehend cultural particularities in a broader socio-political framework. They are, then, better prepared to avoid the numerous "perverse effects" which can be produced by activities focussing on the discovery of other cultures. Last but not least, this multidimensional exploration of a foreign society gives teachers the opportunity to interact with citizens who have recently emigrated from their country and to develop with them relationships under a model of mutual discovery and enrichment rather than misunderstanding and confrontation.

All these reasons lead me to persist in my conviction that the exploration of a foreign culture in intercultural formation is far from being a luxury in a context of a global economy and of a widening gap between the life conditions in industrialized and those in poor countries. This component of the "roundabout strategy" might very well make an essential contribution to the development of a planetary vision which is required to face the new problems emerging in all countries today.

SECOND COMPONENT: STUDYING THE HOST COUNTRY

In this second component of the program, the teachers are invited to explore some aspects of the cultural model which is dominant in the country they would like to visit and to study the relations between majority and minority groups in that country. They must write a short monograph in which they give a synthetic presentation of some of the following points:

- Religious traditions and their contemporary transformations;
- Family and education of children;
- Education system;
- Tensions between tradition and modernity;
- Relations between cultural and religious groups and state policies in this area.

Teachers must consult scholars who can suggest relevant books and articles on the religious, cultural, social and political background of the country they want to study. They are also invited to evaluate with educated immigrants coming from that country the findings of their research, the transformation of their culture in the context of immigration, and the difficulties they have experienced in their integration to the new country.

The nature of this activity requires that teachers be free to select for themselves the country they will explore. When the teachers do not have any clear preference, they can be helped to select a country of origin of immigrants whose integration raises some difficulties. Some teachers eager to discover India joined the seven groups who traveled to India with me between 1984 and 2006, but their working conditions made it difficult for them to participate in great number. I organized ten study tours in India between 1977 and 2008 and approximately 120 persons participated in those trips. Less than 40 of them were teachers. But some of the participants have developed a great interest in India and have managed to visit this country by themselves. Some of those who had invested less time and energy in the preparation of the trip have experienced a "cultural shock." They were unable to see anything beyond overpopulation, poverty and dirt and they were eager to return to the comfort of "civilization."

READING: ANOTHER LEARNING TOOL

The study tours I organized have had a limited impact on the intercultural training of teachers. Fortunately, good novels and short stories by Indian authors are a more accessible mean to comprehend the complexity of Indian life and cultural and religious traditions. I have tried to make a small contribution to the discovery of Indian literature by French speaking readers by translating the main works of a giant of Hindi literature, Munshi Premchand. I have had the privilege of being assisted in this difficult endeavor by three colleagues whose expertise has been invaluable: Kiran Chaudhry, a specialist of French and literary translation from JNU, André Couture, a specialist of Sanskrit at Laval University in Quebec city and Richard Giguère, a specialist of literary translation at University of Sherbrooke. Three collections of short stories of Premchand, published in 1996, 2000, 2009, and two

major novels, published in 2006 and 2012, have already been published. A third novel is in the process of final revision and a first draft of the translation of two volumes of Premchand's writing has just been completed. Two more collections of Premchand's short stories will be translated hopefully in the next two years.

CONCLUSION

Training teachers for intercultural education is not an easy task. The "roundabout strategy" I have briefly described here might be helpful to overcome some of the problems faced by those who offer training in this field. Some initiation to the human and social sciences should certainly be an essential element of any training program. The exploration of the culture of a foreign country with the analytical tools of social and human sciences and an initiation to the literature of that country could also be an important component of this training program.

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LES VOYAGES D'ÉTUDE EN INDE: UN OUTIL POUR LA FORMATION INTERCULTURELLE DES ENSEIGNANTS

Je présente ici quelques explications concernant mon intérêt pour la vie culturelle, politique et sociale indienne, qui m'ont conduit à organiser des voyages d'études en Inde pour les enseignants. Je démontre aussi comment ces voyages d'étude s'intégraient dans le programme de perfectionnement en éducation interculturelle développé par l'Université de Sherbrooke.

Lorsque j'ai obtenu mon Ph.D. en Philosophie des religions à l'Université McGill, en 1970, la société québécoise était très différente de celle où j'étais né en 1941. Sans trop m'en apercevoir, j'étais personnellement marqué par ces transformations. Après avoir complété mon cours classique, j'ai étudié la théologie pendant cinq ans. Toutefois, la théologie catholique ne fournissait pas de réponses satisfaisantes aux questions fondamentales que je me posais sur la nature de la religion. Le programme de Philosophie des religions offert par l'Université McGill me permis d'aborder l'étude de la religion dans une perspective plus large et d'avoir un premier contact avec les traditions religieuses de l'Inde.

Ayant obtenu un poste à la Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Sherbrooke en 1970, je me suis intéressé au programme de «culture religieuse» introduit quelques années plus tôt dans quelques écoles secondaires du Québec. Les enseignants engagés dans ce nouveau programme avaient besoin d'une formation en histoire des religions et en sociologie des religions. Pour répondre à ce besoin, un volet professionnel fut introduit dans le programme de Maîtrise en sciences humaines des religions de l'Université de Sherbrooke. Ce volet professionnel était structuré autour de trois composantes:

1. Théorie. Les enseignants devaient apprendre à aborder les phénomènes religieux selon les perspectives des sciences humaines et sociales.
2. Expérience. Les enseignants devaient choisir une tradition religieuse, l'étudier dans sa complexité et sa diversité et avoir des échanges avec des personnes appartenant à cette tradition.
3. Expérimentation. Les enseignants devaient créer pour leurs élèves du matériel pédagogique reflétant ce qu'ils avaient appris dans les deux premiers volets du programme.

C'est dans le cadre de la seconde composante du programme que j'ai organisé des voyages d'études en Inde pour les enseignants en «culture religieuse». Chacun de ces voyages était préparé par des sessions intensives d'été et un programme de lectures dirigées sur différents aspects de la culture indienne, de la vie sociale et politique en Inde et des religions de l'Inde. L'abolition du programme de «culture religieuse» à la fin des années 1970 m'a forcé à réorienter le volet professionnel du programme que je dirigeais et d'y inclure un volet de formation interculturelle. Ce volet professionnel ne cherchait pas à répondre directement aux attentes des enseignants confrontés aux défis du pluralisme ethnoculturel dans leurs salles de classes. Il les invitait plutôt à un triple détour:

1. Détour par la théorie. Étude des principales questions théoriques que soulève toute initiative visant à maintenir ensemble les préoccupations/ valeurs d'acceptation de la diversité culturelle, de maintien de la cohésion sociale dans un espace commun de délibération et de lutte contre la discrimination et les inégalités.
2. Détour par l'exploration d'une tradition culturelle étrangère. Étude de certains aspects de la situation socio-économique et politique d'un pays étranger et de la dynamique de la culture d'immigrants québécois qui viennent de ce pays.
3. Détour par la pédagogie. Élaboration d'un projet d'intervention susceptible de contribuer à améliorer la qualité de l'enseignement grâce aux apprentissages effectués dans le cadre des deux premières composantes du programme. Les enseignants étaient encouragés à intégrer les stratégies de l'«instruction complexe» développées par E. Cohen (1994).

L'importance du second élément de la stratégie du détour mise en œuvre dans ce programme est moins évidente. J'estime pour ma part que les enseignants ont besoin de prendre un certain recul par rapport au climat d'urgence et de tension qui caractérise souvent les relations interculturelles. L'exploration de la situation sociale, économique et politique d'un pays étranger, surtout si elle est liée à un projet éventuel de voyage dans le pays étudié, permet d'introduire un élément de plaisir dans la démarche de formation.

L'exploration de la dynamique socioculturelle du pays choisi constituait également une excellente occasion de tester la validité de plusieurs des notions théoriques analysées dans le premier bloc d'activités du programme. Elle permettait de voir concrètement comment la culture et l'ethnicité se combinent à divers facteurs sociaux et politiques dans une autre société et d'avoir des points de comparaison pour mieux comprendre comment les mêmes mécanismes sont à l'œuvre dans son propre univers culturel. Les enseignants pouvaient ainsi éviter les nombreux «effets pervers» qui guettent toute activité de formation centrée sur la découverte de la culture de l'Autre.

Cette démarche d'exploration d'un univers culturel étranger fournissait aux enseignants inscrits au programme l'occasion d'entrer en contact avec des immigrants et d'avoir avec eux des interactions qui pourront être vécues sous le mode de la découverte et de l'enrichissement mutuel et non sous celui de l'incompréhension et de la confrontation, comme c'est trop souvent le cas.

Toutes ces raisons m'amènent à persister dans ma conviction que le détour par l'exploration d'une culture étrangère n'est pas un luxe pour une formation interculturelle dans un contexte de mondialisation. Loin d'être un luxe, ce détour peut contribuer d'une manière significative au développement de la vision planétaire dont nous aurons besoin pour faire face aux défis nouveaux qui confrontent aujourd'hui toutes les sociétés. J'ai organisé dix voyages d'étude en Inde dans le cadre du programme de formation interculturelle et une centaine de personnes y ont participé. Le coût de ces voyages et le temps exigé pour la préparation ont empêché plusieurs enseignants d'y participer. Moins de la moitié des participants aux voyages étaient des enseignants. Heureusement, les romans et les nouvelles par des écrivains indiens constituent un moyen plus largement accessible pour mieux comprendre la richesse et la complexité de la vie et de la culture de l'Inde. J'ai tenté d'apporter une petite contribution à la découverte de la littérature indienne en traduisant les œuvres principales d'un géant de la littérature hindi, Munshi Premchand. Trois recueils de ses nouvelles et deux romans ont déjà été publiés. Un autre roman est presque prêt pour la publication et deux collections de ses écrits divers sont en préparation. J'espère également pouvoir, d'ici deux ans, publier deux autres recueils de nouvelles de cet auteur.

CASTING THE "OTHER": THE TREATMENT OF MUSLIMS IN QUEBEC AND INDIAN TEXTBOOKS

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CONTEXT

This article focuses on the treatment of Muslims in two pluralistic societies, India and Quebec, where the integration of this community is still a challenge even if the historical and socio-political contexts are different. The post 9/11 international geopolitical context, with its ensuing Islamophobia and racism resulting from the increasing Muslim immigration and cultural visibility in Canada and the province of Quebec, and the western coverage of terrorism and conflicts involving Muslims all over the Muslim World, justify our interest in studying the representation of Islam, the Muslim World and Muslims living in both Quebec and India. Furthermore, on the educational level, several studies have demonstrated the existence of biases and stereotype regarding Islam and Muslims, and the treatment is clearly marked by more factual errors and ethnocentric biases than that of other religions, civilizations or ethnic groups.

Textbooks represent the curriculum and are very important tools through which knowledge is transmitted to students. While textbooks have sometimes been at the center of controversy it is the history textbooks that seem to have attracted the most attention. This is not surprising since history textbooks are regarded as the state's instrument to transmit narratives defining the national culture. Both in Canada and in India, the State suggests textbooks to be used in schools. While education is a provincial responsibility in Canada, in India education is a concurrent subject list in the constitution. This means that state governments (and the union territories) as well as the central government are responsible for education. In the province of Quebec the *Education Act* defines the rights and responsibilities regarding instructional materials. But it is ultimately the Principals and teachers who are responsible for it and this is why a variety of materials exist. Similarly, in India the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), has the mandate to produce textbooks for national use but their acceptance throughout the country remains small. Even when formally accepting NCERT books, schools run by community groups and political parties in different states in India use a variety of supplementary books in multiple languages. So a major problem of analyzing history textbooks in both Quebec and India is the variety of textbooks in use.

Around 14% of Indians are Muslims (over 138 million according to the 2001 census). Islam came to India when the religion spread in the 7th century and Muslims are a part of India's religious and cultural heritage. Not only has there been a significant integration of Hindus and Muslims but Muslims have also been prominent in the historical, cultural and economic development of the country. The presence of Muslims in Canada became significant from the mid-1960s, following a non-discriminatory immigration policy that allowed many migrants from the Third World to reach the country (Abu-Laban 1980, 1997). In 2001, the Muslim community represented 2% of the total Canadian population; 60.8% of Muslims lived in Ontario, 18.7% in Quebec and 20.4% in the other provinces (Census, 2001). Muslim immigration is increasing, making Islam the fastest growing religion in Canada and in Quebec (Statistics Canada, 2001, 2011).

MUSLIMS IN FRENCH-QUEBEC TEXTBOOKS

This section introduces some results of a larger research on *The Treatment of Islam, the Muslim World and Muslims in the French-Quebec Textbooks*. Studies on ethnocentrism (Mc Andrew, 1986; Blondin; 1990; Mc Andrew, Oueslati, Helly, 2009, 2011) have shown that the treatment of Islam and Muslim in Quebec textbooks has been characterized by errors, omissions and the representation of often-negative

stereotypes. New textbooks that have been approved and used in the context of the last Quebec school reform (1999-2010) have been improved with regard to the treatment of Islam and Muslims in Quebec and Canada, even if some stereotypes and bias still exist.

Qualitatively speaking, these recent textbooks are characterized by more depth and objectivity. A change is clearly noticeable from openly negative views and attitudes in the 1980s and a less negative but very superficial and biased coverage full of errors in the 1990s (Oueslati, Mc Andrew, Helly, 2009, 2011), to a more complex, precise and balanced coverage in the new textbooks. While Muslims are absent from textbooks in the 1980s, they are much more present in the 1990s, possibly because of their low number in the 1980s and early 1990s. They are more present as foreigners than as citizens living in Quebec and Canada.

More explicit instructions in the new curriculum guidelines and many controversies that have targeted the Muslim community in the last 30 years in Quebec may also have constrained authors to deal more carefully with the topic of Islam and Muslims in textbooks. In the first analysis (2005-2006) linked to the research cited above, very few excerpts (19 out of 190) deal with Muslims living in Quebec, which gives the impression that this is a phenomenon outside the host society, especially if we take into account the number of excerpts relating to Muslims living abroad, particularly in the Muslim world.

From this global quantitative assessment, one can see that Muslims are overwhelmingly present as an alien reality in Quebec and Canada. The treatment of the Muslim community in French-Quebec history textbooks concerns mainly Muslim newcomers (immigrants, refugees, foreign students). Muslims as long-standing Quebecois or Canadians are discussed in very few excerpts. The excerpts are divided between positive treatment (interreligious dialogue, integration successful), and neutral (nutritional aspects) or negative (among others, around the place of religion in the public sphere). In the excerpts that focus on the latter issue, Muslims are not presented as citizens who contribute positively to Quebec society. Rather, they are constructed as a threat to the ongoing secularization of Quebec society, broadly conceived as the elimination of religion from the public sphere.

Excerpts from high school history textbooks depict the veiling of Muslim women as running counter to the process of secularization of the public sphere in Quebec and to certain fundamental rights of the individual, such as gender equality. In one of these excerpts, an explicit opposition is established between, on the one hand, the veil, the subjugation of women, fundamentalism and

Sharia, and on the other hand, the Western values of freedom and equality among human beings. Even if they are at the center of these non-consensual issues, textbooks never give Muslims the floor to defend their choices or to present their views.

In a more recent content analysis (2011-2012) of secondary-level (high school) ERC textbooks, 144 excerpts included in the three sections addressed in ERC (ethics, religious culture and dialogue) relate to Muslims and Islam in general and in 52 of those, Muslims and Islam of Quebec in particular are the focus. In the only section "Religious culture," 37 excerpts cover Muslims in the Quebec context. ERC is thus by far the discipline that gives the best qualitative and quantitative treatment of Islam and Muslims. In the part relating to "Quebec's religious heritage" (34 excerpts), we identified three themes that reflect the Muslim presence in Quebec. The first, on the material expressions of religion, is the one that contains the most excerpts (15). They consist mostly of descriptions of Muslim places of worship in Quebec, such as the Saint-Laurent mosque (1965). The second theme concerns the facts relating to the Muslim community in Quebec (9 of 34 excerpts). Most of the nine excerpts have headings that indicate the role of Islam in the evolution and diversification of the religious landscape in Quebec in recent decades: "The Changing Face of Quebec," "A religious heritage in progress," "Muslims' Immigration to Quebec." The third theme relates to the impact of Islamic customs on Quebec values and norms (10 quotes). Five excerpts contain several biases and stereotypes about the inclusion of religious diversity; they describe accommodation confined to three religious groups: the Jewish, Muslim and Sikh communities.

The second part, "Fundamental elements of religious traditions," focuses on sacred stories, rites and rules in Islam. One excerpt on stories depicting supernatural beings is linked to the Quebec context. When addressing the rites and rules, the authors miss the opportunity to link specific practices of Islam to the Quebec context, such as funeral rites and the presence of Muslim cemeteries in Quebec, such as the Laval cemetery.

Two excerpts on the Muslim community in Quebec are included in the third part, "Representations of the divine and mythical and supernatural beings." They are listed under "Images of God from elsewhere" and talk about Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. The first shows on the same page one of the symbols of several religions. One could see calligraphy of the word "Allah." A question aimed to students, asks: "What kinds of behaviours are adopted within people with representations of life or of the divine which are different from ours?" One can see an "us/them" dichotomy clearly stated in the questions.

MUSLIMS IN INDIAN TEXTBOOKS

The British historiography of India had been largely dominated by a religious interpretation reflecting a communal periodization of Indian history in pre-colonial times. NECRT textbooks have not been able to make a qualitative breakthrough from that tradition of Ancient, Medieval and Modern periods being identified with Hindu, Muslim and British rule. However, NCERT books emphasized a harmonious relationship between Hindus and Muslims.

A move by political parties and Hindu nationalists to socialize children into a non-secular view of history started in the 1950s that glorified ancient India and Hinduism during the pre-Muslim period as being the pure and true India. The Moghul period was depicted in terms of Muslim oppression in which Hindus suffered, Muslims who stressed "religious sanction" rather than rationalism drew attention to the development of an Islamic revivalist movement. The first War of Independence (1857), also known as the Sepoy Mutiny, had shown how dangerous the unity of Hindus and Muslims could be to the political authority of the British. The Government of India Act the very next year (1858) brought an end to the East India Company's rule and placed India directly under the British Crown. Then began the policy of divide and rule, especially among Hindus and Muslims. Some books reject a crude "divide and rule" analysis in favour of British attempts to attract Muslims to their rule and the simultaneous development of a Muslim political identity. The emergence of a Muslim political identity was also influenced by the Hindu revival and social reform movement, which developed to confront colonial rule and challenge the imposition of Western knowledge at the expense of indigenous culture and knowledge.

The identification of Hindus and Muslims as separate communities came during the British period when the first census took place in India in 1872. With religious identity becoming the political identity, the creation of the communal problem through various means such as creation of separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims was greatly to the advantage of the colonizers. The inception of modernity and colonialism in India coincides with the birth of nationalism and the creation of "minorities" (others). Despite the common "othering" of the British by initially unified Hindus and Muslims, ultimately the colonizer's idea of two irreconcilable "nations" of Hindus and Muslims became real at the end of British rule in 1947, with the birth of Pakistan as an Islamic State. India became a secular Republic. The nationalist government recognized the urgent need to decolonize the educational system, and the NCERT was set up with the mandate that history textbooks promote the ideological agenda of national integration based on equality and secularism. The

authors of history textbooks generally promoted this view, but communal forces threatening this vision bring about the controversies over textbooks in India. Communalism invokes history to gain the legitimacy for constructing India as a Hindu nation and to create a religious identity and cast the "outsider" as enemy. Although ethnic/religious movements emerged in various parts of the country they were not given any mention in textbooks. The National Policy on Education (NPE) was announced in 1986 to introduce a common framework to safeguard the values of secularism, socialism and equality.

The main focus of the controversy in history textbooks is on communal distortions and interpretations through secular and communal perspectives of different political parties. Hindu fundamentalist forces alleged factual inaccuracies and biased interpretation of the initial history texts despite their academic quality. The first textbook controversy in India occurred in 1977 when the Janata Party was in power: a suggestion was made in Parliament for the withdrawal of certain history textbooks which were said to be too sympathetic to Muslim Rulers in the medieval period while neglecting to glorify the Hindu heritage, thereby giving a prejudiced view of Indian history. Secondly, there was objection to the manner in which Hindu nationalist leaders such as Tilak and Aurobindo Ghosh were portrayed, thus attacking the secular and scientific writing of some of the best historians in the country. During the two years that the Janata Party was in power in a coalition with the Hindu communal Jana Sangh party, attempts were made to ban, delete and rewrite sections of school history textbooks. But the attempt to ban the existing textbooks failed partly because NCERT resisted this, but largely because of a nationwide protest against this move.

A smaller second controversy took place in 1992 with the Congress Party in power, when an announcement was made in Parliament that a group of eminent historians had been approached to write the history of post-independent India to be included in the school syllabus by 1997. While this was a move by the more secular Congress party to curtail any ideological perspectives by the Hindu parties, it was seen as an attempt by the ruling Congress party to put forward their version of contemporary India.

The third recent Hindu fundamentalist attempts to transform history as a narrative of Hindu religious nationalism casting the "outsider" as enemy came with the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP is a Hindu nationalist party) to power (1998-2004). In 2000, NCERT was asked to develop a National Curriculum framework for Education with an aim to instil an Indian national identity in schools as well as for post-secondary students. It was the revision of the entire school curriculum by NCERT

(under the direction of a BJP appointed Director) that created a huge controversy all over India. Historians were appointed from the right-wing Hindu parties (RSS, BJP) to rewrite history textbooks because the existing textbooks were alleged to have factual inaccuracies and biased interpretation.

The BJP party lost the elections in 2004 and the new Congress coalition in power has moved swiftly to replace history textbooks along with references to forms of "safronization" of the curriculum. Nevertheless, the fundamentalist forces have attempted to transform history as a narrative of Hindu religious nationalism whenever it has been possible.

CONCLUSION

Both in India and in the province of Quebec, despite government jurisdiction over education, a variety of textbooks are in use. In India, since independence and the creation of a national institute of education and research (NCERT), history textbooks have attempted to focus on secularism, socialism and equality given a country which is not only very diverse but also very unequal. But several textbook controversies have revolved around differences in communal and secular perspectives. In Quebec, until the recent school reforms, Muslims and Islam have been treated negatively in general. Although they are still treated as "aliens" who are a threat to secularization, there is a change from openly negative treatment to a more balanced view.

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L'AUTRE ET SA REPRÉSENTATION: LE TRAITEMENT DES MUSULMANS DANS LES MANUELS SCOLAIRES AU QUÉBEC ET EN INDE

Le présent article porte sur le traitement des musulmans dans les manuels scolaires du secondaire au Québec et en Inde. Contrairement au Québec, les musulmans de l'Inde font partie intégrante de l'histoire séculaire de ce pays. Très peu présents au Québec avant les années 1960, les musulmans deviennent de plus en plus nombreux si bien que de nos jours, ils forment la communauté religieuse non chrétienne la plus importante de la province. En outre, mentionnons un autre contraste important: le gouvernement du Québec est responsable des programmes scolaires dans la province alors qu'en Inde, les manuels peuvent être prescrits par les États ou par le gouvernement central. Les écoles peuvent utiliser l'un ou l'autre type de manuel ou encore les deux.

Au Québec, les nouveaux programmes d'Histoire et éducation à la citoyenneté (HEC) et d'Éthique et culture religieuse (ECR) du niveau secondaire, qui relèvent tous deux le défi du vivre-ensemble dans une société pluraliste, sont ceux qui traitent le plus des musulmans, tant au Québec qu'au plan international. En Inde, les manuels d'histoire du secondaire se concentrent plutôt sur l'analyse des forces socio-politiques en présence et la recherche d'unification entre musulmans et hindous tout en focalisant sur un certain nationalisme, lequel a représenté le courant le plus important après l'Indépendance.

Dans cette première partie réservée aux manuels québécois, nous présentons la synthèse des résultats de l'analyse d'environ 70 extraits tirés de cinq manuels (dix volumes) d'HEC et de quatre manuels d'ECR (six volumes) qui portent sur la communauté musulmane du Québec. Les manuels

d'HEC abordent principalement les musulmans dans le chapitre réservé à la «Christianisation de l'Occident» en secondaire 2. Faisant l'objet de peu d'extraits, contrairement aux musulmans d'ailleurs, les musulmans québécois sont présentés comme des immigrants récemment arrivés, attachés à des valeurs et à des coutumes religieuses allant souvent à l'encontre des valeurs québécoises sécularisées. Alimentées par les controverses autour de l'islam et des musulmans survenues au cours des trois dernières décennies au Québec, les perceptions négatives à l'endroit de la communauté musulmane se reflètent dans le traitement de ces enjeux dans le curriculum prescrit. Les musulmans sont ainsi perçus comme une menace pour la laïcisation en cours de la société québécoise, largement interprétée comme un processus d'élimination du religieux de la sphère publique. Pour ne citer que quelques exemples de contenus didactiques, lorsque les valeurs religieuses et laïques sont mises en opposition, ce sont les signes ostentatoires islamiques qui sont cités en exemple; les photographies de femmes musulmanes illustrant certains extraits montrent exclusivement des femmes voilées; les extraits donnent rarement la parole aux musulmans pour défendre leurs points de vue religieux, coutumiers ou laïques.

C'est dans le volet «Culture religieuse» des manuels d'ECR, qui porte un regard privilégié sur le patrimoine religieux de la société québécoise, que la communauté musulmane du Québec occupe la place la plus importante. Ces manuels sont les seuls à présenter une histoire de l'immigration des communautés provenant de pays musulmans. Ils en font un traitement plutôt positif, voire neutre, des musulmans. On peut y constater également un choix varié de sujets traités: l'énumération de mosquées réputées sur l'Île de Montréal, la présentation de personnages musulmans pouvant servir de modèles à de jeunes musulmans québécois, l'énumération des interdits alimentaires de l'islam comparés à ceux d'autres religions, etc. Cependant, les occasions manquées de relier les musulmans du Québec au contexte culturel québécois sont nombreuses. De plus, la communauté musulmane, pourtant très variée culturellement, est décrite de manière monolithique. Elle est évoquée presque exclusivement à travers sa pratique religieuse et son organisation autour des édifices religieux (mosquée, école musulmane, boucherie ou épicerie halal…), ce qui l'enferme dans une image de repli communautaire.

Dans cette seconde partie réservée aux manuels d'histoire indiens, les références aux musulmans se font en termes généraux, ce qui contraste avec la spécificité du traitement réservé aux musulmans dans les manuels scolaires du Québec. Grâce à une analyse critique du discours qu'entretiennent en général les manuels d'histoire du secondaire, il s'agira pour nous de donner un bref aperçu de la place qu'occupent les musulmans en Inde pour enfin mieux les situer dans un contexte plus large.

Un problème majeur de l'analyse des manuels d'histoire de l'Inde est la diversité des manuels en usage. En outre, rappelons que l'éducation est à la fois le domaine des États fédérés, des territoires fédéraux de l'Union et du gouvernement central. Ainsi, bien que le Conseil national de recherche en éducation et formation (NCERT), créé en 1961, ait lancé la production de manuels scolaires laïques à usage national en mettant l'accent sur un passé et un patrimoine communs ainsi que sur les luttes collectives, leur acceptation demeure inégale à travers le pays.

Les musulmans ont joué un rôle prédominant dans le développement historique, culturel et économique de l'Inde depuis le VIIe siècle et forment aujourd'hui environ 14% de la population totale. L'avènement de la modernité et du colonialisme en Inde coïncide avec la naissance du nationalisme et l'émergence de «minorités» (les autres). Qu'il s'agisse de la politique britannique de «diviser pour mieux régner», de leurs tentatives de dominer les musulmans ou de la renaissance hindoue et du mouvement de réforme sociale, l'émergence d'une identité politique musulmane à l'époque coloniale a bel et bien pris place. L'établissement d'une Inde composée d'une importante minorité musulmane et d'une majorité hindoue a forcé la formidable diversité des idées, des philosophies, des sectes et des divinités à se fondre sous une seule appellation: l'«hindouisme». Alors que, durant le colonialisme, l'identification religieuse des Indiens n'avait jamais été bien établie jusque-là, les livres d'histoire séculière soulignent que, pendant le mouvement de l'Indépendance, tous les Indiens étaient unis contre «l'Autre», le colonisateur. Dans l'Inde indépendante, sur la scène politique, les groupes régionaux et les partis politiques doivent leur identité à leur appartenance ethnique et religieuse. Pourtant, dans les manuels d'histoire, on ne fait aucune mention de mouvements ethno-religieux. Conformément au cadre national des programmes, les manuels mettent l'accent sur un programme commun pour sauvegarder le nationalisme et les valeurs de laïcité, de socialisme et d'égalité.

THE SCHOOL INTEGRATION OF SOUTH ASIAN YOUTH IN A FRANCOPHONE SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

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INTRODUCTION

The history of South Asian immigration to Quebec began around 1960 (Buchignani, Indra and Srivastiva, 1985). Commonly referred to as South Asians, this population is principally composed of immigrants whose ultimate roots are in the cultures of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In the 2006 census, 76,990 individuals in Quebec declared themselves as South Asian. Among them, 81.1% were born outside of Canada, out of which two thirds have arrived in the province over the last 15 years: 19.0% arrived from 1991 to 1995, 20.3% in 1996-2000, and 27.1% during the most recent census period, from 2001 to 2006 (MICC, 2010). Statistics Canada (2010) predicts that this population will double from 2006 to 2031 in Montreal. Consequently, issues of immigration and integration form an important part of the experience of the majority of South Asians in Quebec.

This paper examines the integration of South Asian youth in French-language secondary schools in Quebec. The study of the integration of these students in French schools is especially important because the Quebec Charter of the French Language makes it compulsory for them – as for all students of immigrant origin – to attend French schools, even though South Asians mostly use English as their second language. Since their mother tongue is of South Asian origin, French would then be their third language. By highlighting certain findings of a very recent qualitative research project (Bakhshaei, Mc Andrew and Georgiou, 2012), the present article will first discuss the state of the school integration of these youth, and will secondly consider the role of the educational system in this regard. Before presenting the results of the study, based on two quantitative research projects conducted under the Canada Research Chair on Education and Ethnic Relations (Mc Andrew *et al.*, 2010; Bakhshaei, 2010), an image of different characteristics and the overall school achievement of these students will be presented. This portrait will show in fact the relevance of investigating the

quality of school integration of South Asian students in the French school system. In conclusion, we will discuss some systemic practices which may improve the integration of these students in French schools in Quebec.

WHO ARE THE STUDENTS OF SOUTH ASIAN ORIGIN IN FRENCH SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN QUEBEC?

According to Bakhshaei (2010), in French-speaking high schools in Quebec, the large majority of South Asian origin students are born outside of Canada, and their mother tongue as well as the language spoken at home is different from their language of instruction. Moreover, the majority of their families are over-represented among the population with a low socio-economic status. Half of them arrived in the Quebec school system at the high school level, more than half entered high school with at least one year of delay, and 54.6% require or required French support services in high school. Moreover, one third of these students are identified as suffering from handicaps, social maladjustments and learning difficulties (HSMLD), "at risk students." All of these characteristics differentiate these students from the general population of immigrant origin and native-born who, on the whole, have more positive portraits. The majority enrols in schools, and mainly in those located in under-privileged and high multi-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Therefore, most of these characteristics appear to exert an important effect on the educational performance of these students. Indeed, compared to other students in the French sector, those originating from South Asia (including both those born in Canada and outside of Canada) have the highest dropout rate, even when we take into account their rate of graduation in a more generous time frame (four years later than expected). They also indicate a significant rate of departure from the province before graduation, and their rate of enrolment is greater in the adult education sector (Mc Andrew *et al.*, 2010).

However, important variations emerge when looking at the different geographical sub-groups of these students.

For instance, students originating from India tend to have a more positive profile than those originating from Bangladesh and Pakistan. This trend is observed when considering a number of variables, such as the family socio-economic status, the level of entry into the Quebec school system, the age upon which students enter secondary school, the need for support services in French in secondary studies, the rate of identification as at-risk students, the type of public school attended, and the rate of on-time graduation. However, despite these disparities between South Asian sub-groups, there is no lasting difference between their net dropout rates.

STUDY OVERVIEW

The viewpoint that school integration is shaped not only by individual, family, and community characteristics, but also by the school environment, informs the conceptual framework of this paper. The concept of school integration refers not only to school trajectory and performance, but also to participation in social life at school.

The data presented in this article was collected through 15 interviews with 22 respondents (school principal(s), teachers, non-teaching staff, and students of South Asian origin) in the two secondary schools of the Montreal school board with the highest number of these students. In the sample, there are students from different South Asian countries, both females and males, born in Canada and outside of Canada. The students were all in the last two years of their secondary studies at the time of the interviews. Members of four community organizations were also interviewed, either because of their direct links to targeted schools, or because of the services they provided to a larger South Asian population. While the two selected schools share similarities, they differ in some aspects. Both are considered socio-economically under-privileged, but one more than the other. Regarding ethnic composition, the more under-privileged school was slightly less multi-cultural, but more students born outside Canada attended that school. As for the population of South Asian origin, it was larger in the more under-privileged school. In that school, the sub-group from Pakistan and India was dominant, while in the other, the students from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka made up the majority of South Asians.

FINDINGS

Academic Trajectory

According to the data collected from our respondents, it is difficult to describe a typical school trajectory for Quebecer high school students of South Asian origin. However, some shared characteristics were uncovered. For example, given the recent establishment of the community in Quebec, an important proportion of these students enter the Quebec school system in secondary 1 (the equivalent of Junior High School) or later in high school. Furthermore, according to their pathways in elementary school, the socio-economic environment of their family, and their age when entering high school, several differences emerge when examining the level of entry into the secondary system. Indeed, with the exception of students who have partly or completely attended primary school in Quebec, a large number of students of South Asian origin are identified as "under-educated" (experiencing three or more years of delay compared to the Quebec standard), at the time of their arrival in secondary schools in the province.

This is mostly the case in the more under-privileged schools – with the exception of whether they are 12 or 13 years old. The latter group of students are divided into "educated" and "under-educated," which largely correlates to the socio-economic status of their family and to whether they attended private or public schools in their country of origin. With regard to the "educated" students, after a maximum period of a year and a half in welcoming classes, they are able to attend regular or mainstream classes in secondary 1 or 2. It is noteworthy that, according to teachers of welcoming classes, despite being "educated," these students remain a bit longer in these sheltered second language classes than do students whose mother tongue has Latin roots. Students identified as "under-educated" spend an average of two years in welcoming classes. They generally continue their studies in programs which are geared towards vocational training or employment instead of college or university programs. When South Asian students arrive in Quebec secondary schools at 16-17 years, according to our respondents, it is less common for them to achieve fluency in the French language. After one or two years in welcoming classes, they usually either continue their studies in English in the adult education sector, or completely abandon school.

Most of the school representatives agree that South Asian females succeed better than their male counterparts. Respondents identified cultural expectations placed on males to contribute to the economic well-being of their families as being linked to their higher dropout rate.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION AT SCHOOL

In general, the picture that emerges of the social integration of students of South Asian origin in French schools differs according to the respondents. For example, school and community representatives systematically held more pessimistic views than the students themselves. They unanimously agreed that students of South Asian origin socialize a lot among themselves. Furthermore, they stated that most speak mainly in their mother tongue, and then in decreasing order of importance, in English and in French.

This was especially the case in the less under-privileged school. All the school respondents insisted that there is a difference between the social integration of girls and boys of South Asian origin. The male students were viewed as being culturally freer than their female peers, and as such were perceived to have a greater chance of integration into Quebec society.

The community respondents also believed that students educated in Quebec from the onset of their educational trajectory, for example in the early years of primary school, achieve better social integration than those who arrive in Quebec in their teenage years and begin their educational trajectory in the province in high school. As for the students interviewed, they held positive views of the schools that they attend, but recalled some problems faced by their peers in welcoming classes. In particular, they perceived these students as being isolated in sheltered classes. Furthermore, most of the South Asian Quebecers interviewed in the less under-privileged school showed some resistance towards the Charter of French language, and they voice the wish of being granted the choice to attend Quebec English schools.

THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

According to our respondents, challenges to the integration of students of South Asian origin in French schools in Quebec appear to be linked to three main factors: the generally weak socio-economic status of their families, their late arrival to the Quebec school system, and their poor knowledge of French. However, our findings suggest that some systemic factors may also impact the school integration of these students.

One of the first explanations concerns relationships between the school and South Asian families. While all the respondents reported helpful, understanding, and trusting relationships among students and school staff, teachers often complained about the poor quantity and quality of their relationships with South Asian parents. They reported two main barriers to this relationship: communication difficulties related to the parents' lack of competency in French, and socio-economic challenges of South Asian parent (especially the newly-arrived ones). Teachers also reported that tight budgets prevented these schools from taking up activities geared towards building closer relationships with families. Moreover, there is no organization in the South Asian community which works in the educational domain, or focuses on family-school relationships.

Another explanation for the poor performance of South Asian students in French schools in Quebec is related to grading and evaluation practices performed by certain school boards. Some teachers reported the existence of ethno-linguistic biases in some school boards, which may lead to the over-identification of certain groups of immigrant origin students (including those of South Asian origin) as "under-educated" at the time of their initial registration in Quebec schools. By contrast, other teachers mentioned that school boards are often reluctant to identify at-risk students, which may also lead to a high level of heterogeneity among the students grouped together in the welcoming classes. As we mentioned earlier, according to Bakhshaei and Mc Andrew (Forthcoming), there is a considerable number of at-risk students among the South Asian population in Quebec. This challenge is likely even more significant in public schools located in under-privileged environments that also suffer from a lack of funding required to improve their programs and services.

Finally, we were relieved to uncover the perception that students of South Asian origin are not subject to discrimination or to prejudice in the Quebec school system. In general, the respondents portrayed a positive image of this group of students. However, community stakeholders believe that some of these students experience situations where they may be excluded or rejected in Quebec schools. These difficulties appear to be linked not to their ethnicity, but to their religion. For example, veiled Muslim girls have been mentioned in this regard.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The poor relations of Quebec schools with South Asian parents and community organizations have led, to some extent, to the teachers and school staff having very little knowledge of the South Asian population. South Asian students in Quebec schools are often overlooked or mistaken as belonging to groups from other regions (e.g. Southeast Asia), or are not well distinguished on the basis of their particular ethnic group. Therefore, it seems that teachers and school staff in Quebec require more information, not only about South Asian cultures, but also about the living situation in these countries and the family migration process, in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses within the community, as well as challenges experienced by some of these students. More activities designed to build relationships between home, school and community organizations may help school staff to overcome this obstacle. Regarding the language barrier, the use of documents in several languages, as well as the use of interpreters may be helpful.

Furthermore, while the Ministry of Education in Quebec and the local school boards have developed many instruments aiming to educate parents about the Quebec school system, lack of knowledge in this regard remains a significant obstacle to full participation by South Asian parents, as is the case with most immigrant parents. In

this case, as in that of many other Allophones and/or disadvantaged communities, developing instruments that rely less on textbooks and more on images and sound (e.g. video clips) is recommended. It should be considered by school systems.

Some thirty years after the establishment of the Charter of French Language, it is perhaps a naïve assumption that all children of immigrants enrolled in French-language schools fully understand the origin of this language policy. In this regard, initiatives aimed towards increasing the positive image of the French language among the South Asian community may be beneficial, as this community has traditionally been inclined towards developing English as a second language. More educational initiatives based on the concept of additive bilingualism, or on how the mother tongue and the official language do not have to be viewed as being in conflict, but rather as part of the linguistic repertoire of immigrant students, should be considered.

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L'INTÉGRATION SCOLAIRE DES JEUNES SUD-ASIATIQUES DANS UNE SOCIÉTÉ FRANCOPHONE: LE ROLE DU SYSTÈME D'ÉDUCATION

Selon le recensement canadien de 2006, 76 990 Québécois se sont déclarés «sud-asiatiques» (Inde, Pakistan, Bangladesh et Sri Lanka). Parmi eux, 81,1% sont nés hors du Canada, dont les deux tiers sont arrivés au Québec au cours des quinze dernières années. Ainsi, l'immigration et l'intégration font partie intégrante de l'expérience de la majorité des Sud-asiatiques au Québec.

Cet article s'intéresse à l'intégration des jeunes d'origine sud-asiatique à l'école secondaire de langue française au Québec. Deux raisons motivent ce choix: premièrement, selon Mc Andrew, Ledent et Murdoch (2010), au secondaire francophone, ces élèves présentent un taux de diplomation très faible comparativement aux autres élèves. Deuxièmement, selon la Charte québécoise de la langue française, ces élèves doivent – comme tous les enfants d'origine immigrée – fréquenter l'école francophone, tandis qu'ils proviennent d'une communauté anglophile. Le présent article, présentant certains résultats d'une recherche qualitative récente discutera de certains aspects de l'état de l'intégration de ces élèves et le rôle du système scolaire à cet égard. Les données ont été recueillies par l'entremise de 15 entrevues avec 22 répondants (directeurs d'école, enseignants, personnel non enseignant et élèves d'origine sud-asiatique) dans deux écoles secondaires montréalaises, caractérisées par une concentration importante d'élèves d'origine sud-asiatique. Quatre organismes communautaires ont été également interrogés, soit en raison de leurs liens avec les écoles ciblées, ou des services qu'ils offrent à la communauté sud-asiatique.

Aux dires des intervenants scolaires interrogés, une proportion importante de leurs élèves d'origine sud-asiatique ont intégré le système scolaire québécois au secondaire. Cependant, leur niveau à l'entrée au secondaire varie beaucoup. En effet, à l'exception des élèves qui ont fait, totalement ou en partie, leur primaire au Québec, la grande majorité des élèves sud-asiatiques, au moment de leur arrivée au secondaire, sont identifiés comme sous-scolarisés, donc comme accusant trois ans de retard ou plus par rapport à la norme québécoise. Cela ne s'applique pas à ceux de 12 ou 13 ans qui se partagent entre les «sous-scolarisés»

et les scolarisés, principalement selon leur fréquentation d'une école publique ou privée dans leur pays d'origine. Les élèves scolarisés, normalement après un an et demi en classe d'accueil, intègrent le régulier. Quant aux élèves sous-scolarisés, ils restent généralement deux ans en accueil. Ces derniers poursuivent majoritairement en formations visant l'insertion professionnelle. Quand les élèves d'origine sud-asiatique arrivent à 16-17 ans, selon les enseignants, ils apprennent moins fréquemment le français et, après un an ou deux dans les classes d'accueil, ils préfèrent continuer leurs études au secteur des adultes en anglais ou abandonner leurs études.

L'intégration sociale à l'école

À cet égard, les intervenants scolaires et communautaires ont une vision plus négative que les élèves. Ainsi, ils affirment unanimement que les élèves sud-asiatiques ont tendance à se regrouper entre eux. D'après eux, ceux-ci se parlent principalement dans leur langue maternelle et par ordre d'importance décroissant, en anglais et en français. Ils pensent également que les élèves scolarisés au Québec dès le primaire s'intègrent socialement mieux que ceux arrivés au secondaire. Les élèves interviewés aiment tous leur école et évoquent plutôt les problèmes de leurs pairs en classes d'accueil, qui sont isolés et peu encadrés. Certains élèves interviewés préféreraient avoir le choix de l'école anglophone.

Le rôle du système scolaire

L'explication systémique la plus probable concernant l'intégration problématique des élèves québécois d'origine sud-asiatique à l'école de langue française concerne la quantité insuffisante et la qualité médiocre des relations de l'école avec leurs parents. Selon les enseignants, ceci est lié à la méconnaissance du français par les parents, à leurs défis socio-économiques, ainsi qu'au manque de budget scolaire pour entreprendre des activités de rapprochement. Par ailleurs, il n'existe aucun organisme communautaire sud-asiatique qui se concentre sur les relations famille-école.

Une autre explication systémique envisageable concerne le classement des élèves au moment de leur arrivée dans le système scolaire québécois. Certains enseignants croient qu'il existe des préjugés basés sur l'origine ethnique ou la langue maternelle des élèves nouvellement arrivés, ce qui mène à une sur-identification des élèves sud-asiatiques comme sous-scolarisés. À l'inverse, certains mentionnent que l'on hésite souvent à identifier comme handicapés ou en difficulté d'adaptation ou d'apprentissage certains élèves nouveaux arrivants qui ont des troubles d'apprentissage, ce qui génère une hétérogénéité dans les classes d'accueil. Cependant, on peut se réjouir de la perception très largement partagée par nos répondants voulant que les élèves sud-asiatiques ne font pas l'objet de discrimination dans les relations quotidiennes à l'école.

Conclusion

La faible relation des parents sud-asiatiques avec l'école influence le fait que la clientèle sud-asiatique à l'école québécoise reste souvent invisible, confondue parfois avec celle d'autres régions ou non distinguée selon ses pays d'origine. Des informations sur la situation prévalant dans le pays d'origine, ainsi que sur le processus migratoire des familles, contribueraient à une meilleure compréhension des forces et des faiblesses au sein de cette communauté ainsi que des problèmes vécus par certains de ces élèves. Davantage d'activités conçues pour renforcer les relations école-famille-communauté aideraient le personnel scolaire à surmonter cet obstacle. À cet égard, l'utilisation de documents en langues sud-asiatiques, ainsi que le recours à des interprètes s'avèrent des pistes nécessaires pour contrer les barrières linguistiques. Par ailleurs, le manque de connaissances du système scolaire québécois demeure un obstacle non-négligeable à la pleine participation des parents sud-asiatiques. Dans ce cas, comme dans celui de nombreuses autres communautés allophones et/ou défavorisées, il faudrait envisager de développer des instruments moins livresques et plus dynamiques (capsules vidéo).

Par ailleurs, après quelque trente ans de mise en œuvre de la Charte de la langue française, peut-être assume-t-on de manière trop optimiste que tous les élèves d'origine immigrante scolarisés dans les écoles de langue française comprennent pleinement les raisons derrière la politique linguistique. À cet égard, les initiatives visant à valoriser le français, particulièrement auprès des élèves des communautés anglophones, peuvent être bénéfiques. Cependant, celles-ci devraient reposer sur la complémentarité et non l'opposition des langues.

ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG MARGINALIZED GROUPS IN INDIA: OBSTACLES AND PROMISING AVENUES

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Attaining higher education remains a challenge in the developing countries. In India, the recent Twelfth Five-Year-Plan (2012-2017) places a great emphasis on achieving higher enrolment rate in higher education and the target set by the government of India is of attaining about 18% Gross Enrolment Ratio before 2017. The recent Yashpal Committee Report on renovation and rejuvenation of higher education and the National Knowledge Commission reports gave strong recommendations for enormous increase in Higher Education Institutions countrywide in order to face the challenge of expected higher enrolments in the higher education and for reaching the less accessible groups of the population. Accordingly the Eleventh Five-Year-Plan has witnessed the creation of a number of central and state universities and other institutions in order to push more youth into enrolling into higher education.

AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD

Higher Education in India has experienced a quantum jump in the recent years, with a phenomenal increase in the number of institutions, such as universities and colleges. There is as well as an increase in the enrol-ment of students. This expansion has resulted in India having nearly 611 universities and over 31,324 colleges, with an enrolment of 12.9 million students. Similarly, the participation of private institutions witnessed a quantum leap, contributing to 63% of the total higher education institutions.

The enrolment also increased as systems of distance education witnessed positive and higher growth. The number of Distance Education institutions increased from a mere 10 establishments in 1975-76 to 144 institutions in 2007-2008, with an increase of student enrolment from 2.3% in 1975-76 to 22% in 2002-2003 at the higher education level. The conventional universities and Employers recognize the degrees awarded by distance education institutions. This resulted in a surge in higher education enrolment rate. A comparative study shows that enrolment of students in higher education in India in 2007 is 12.85% while it is 25% in China. This is cause for concern and demands urgent action.

Table 1: Student Enrolment (2007)

COUNTRY	ENROLMENT IN (MILLIONS)
India	12.85
USA	17.6
China	25.35
Russia	9.37
Brazil	4.57

However, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) which is at about 12% remained a major concern for India and the GERs of women and backward classes remained much lower than the national average. Therefore special cells are established in Universities/colleges to keep the institution aware of imbalances in opportunities for marginalized group and need for timely affirmative action.

THE ROAD BLOCKS

In spite of the increase in number, many higher education institutions are crippled by either the lack of adequately trained and experienced faculty or the lack of adequate infrastructure. This is impeding the growth of higher education in the country. There is a need for systemic changes and for hurdle-free governance in order to face the challenges of reaching the majority of the students requiring higher education.

The Government of India made sincere efforts in order to improve the access to higher education but there are issues of quality and equity which still need to be addressed. Studies show that higher education rates are assumed to be highest among the BRIC countries with all the other countries having lower numbers of student teacher ratios (Brazil 13.6; Russia 11.0; China 13.5 during the year 2000). However, the majority of Indian institutions are suffering from a lack of adequate teaching staff in various categories as most of these institutions have large numbers of vacant teaching posts: 45% of professor positions, 51% of associate professor postings, and 53% among the assistant professor jobs. The shortage of teachers in India clearly affects the quality of education. Studies also reveal that the majority of the higher educational institutions are facing severe infrastructure deficiency with 48.76% universities and 68.58% of colleges falling into this category (AICTE 2003).

The few very well funded and world renowned institutions such as the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and the Indian Institute of Management (IIM) do not fulfil the demands and dreams of students in the country as their selection procedures are very stringent and their intake is very low. This results in the loss of talented youth to foreign universities. These few "elite" professional institutions are also not very sensitive to the needs of the rural population and more particularly to the population who belongs to the lower socio-economic strata of the country and minorities.

THE MARGINALIZED GROUPS

For some sections of the society, the rate of access to higher education is extraordinarily low. The biggest minority population (18%) – the Muslims—are the most educationally backward Minority in India. Only 3.6% of Muslims enrol in Higher education institutions, and only 0.4% get a diploma/certificate with technical qualifications. In premier colleges the Muslims represent only 2% of the admissions in the post graduate group. In *Institutes of National Repute* (IIT/IIM) the number of Muslims is very low, representing between 1.3—1.7% of the student population. It is essential to ensure the educational development of the country on the world map that the big chunk of this minority population is taken along on the ladder of Education—to avoid the continued educational backwardness of the country.

Another educationally disadvantaged group is the Scheduled Caste (SC) and the *Scheduled* Tribes (ST) for whom, despite the constitutional reservation policy, not much has been achieved since the independence of India.

Table 2: Enrolment and GER (18-22 years)

	NSS 61st ROUND (2004-05)		NSS 64th ROUND (2007-08)	
a) General and Reserved Categories				
Groups	**Enrolment (000)**	**GER (%)**	**Enrolment (000)**	**GER (%)**
SC	1,898.5	8.72%	2,485.5	11.54%
ST	767	8.44%	652	7.67%
OBC	5,027.4	11.48%	6,599.6	14.72%
Others	7,787.2	22.52%	86.6	26.64%
Total	**15,480.1**	**14.19%**	**18,623.7**	**17.21%**
b) General and Minorities				
Muslims	1,308.8	8.5%	1,521.4	9.51%
Non-Muslims	14,170.9	15.1%	17,102.4	18.54%
Total	**15,479.7**	**14.19%**	**18,623.8**	**17.21%**

Source: NSS 61st and 64th Round.

VOCATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The changing nature of employability all over the world has necessitated the need for higher education programs able to generate employment. Vocational education and training is the need of the hour. A positive aspect regarding this need can be found in the demography of India. The young age of the Indian population, between the age groups of 15-64 years, results in a low dependency ratio and a substantial working population in comparison to other countries. But this potential must be used by ensuring that these age groups attain adequate education and appropriate skills in order to get employment. The majority of these belong to SC/ST / Muslim Minority and also to low socio-economic groups.

There is an effort being made to generate educational opportunities in higher education and more particularly in the vocational training programs for this energetic young population. This is done through short and medium-term training programs in order to achieve a enrolment rate of 50% in the vocational education sector of higher education. This is essential because even after achieving a hypothetical GER of 30%, there would be 150 million or more youth in India who would require vocational education. If trained adequately they could fulfill the needs of countries burdened by elderly populations like Brazil, Australia, Europe, USA, UK and others. The skilled population will be the biggest asset and the chief source of foreign funds flowing into India.

The most popular vocational training centres known as the Industrial training Institute (ITI) and polytechnics have been opened at sub district levels and in the past two decades they have grown seven fold in number from

1,080 institutions in 1982 to about 6,906 institutions in 2009. The ITIs represent 43% of the total capacity in vocational and training institutes in India and are easily accessible for rural populations too.

More vocation based programs in higher education are being envisaged, based on the requirements of the industrial sectors such as manufacturing and production, medical, paramedical and diagnostic services, hospitality and tourism services, media, communication and ICT services etc. These programs have high quality and competency standards under the National Vocational Educational Qualification Framework (NVEQF). This ensures that their standards are equivalent to those established by other countries. Efforts are made to integrate these vocational courses as an add-on diploma to be done while studying for a full time graduate or post graduate diploma in a regular University or as vocational subjects to be taken as part of a degree course.

Through the distance education mode, vocational courses are already getting popular in India. The Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) and National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS) are offering a variety of Vocational education programs through its Distance Education Centres located across the country – mostly targeting the educationally backward blocks where minority population are located. The NIOS has a vocational course – HUNAR – for rural and economically backward Muslim girls where various skills are imparted by involving the community. This is taking place in the provinces of Bihar and Delhi. The skill based programmes of the National Open Schools are designed to enable the learners to pursue and complete their education and join the Higher Education thereafter.

HIGHER EDUCATION – CHALLENGES AHEAD

Looking at the priorities of the country and demand for higher education, in the twelfth Five-Year-Plan period, efforts should be made for proper planning and implementation of higher education of India. Multi-modes of removing the economic divide should be made as the poorer sections of the society have much lower GER compared to others. Also the same kind of division exists among rural and urban groups. The coming years of 2013-2020 are very crucial for the country to equip its manpower with good quality higher education and with need based vocational courses.

Raising the GER in India would entail an additional enrolment of over 26 million in higher education insti-tutions, and the hiring of one million teachers by 2020. A concerted strategy to retain the best talents for faculty positions and preparing secondary teachers needs to be formulated. It would also require changes in the strategies relating to open learning and technology enabled learning.

For increasing and enhancing access to Higher education, a national program *"Rashtriya Uchch Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA)"* is planned that will strive to achieve 25% national level GER during the Twelfth Five-Year-Plan. However, it is up to the government to urgently plan strategies for higher education and implement them effectively without loosing time. While planning such programs, the demographic conditions and socio-economic status of the population, disadvantaged groups and minorities all need to be taken into account so that the programs can be well distributed among the people who need them the most. For instance if minorities are taken into account, the Muslims, who constitute one of the major minority groups within Jammu and Kashmir (67%); Assam (30.9%); West Bengal (25.2%); and Kerala (24.7%), need more access to such programs for their development.

The coordinated efforts by the higher education institutions established in the country and the institutions imparting distance education can bring about the desired change in the outlook of higher education in the coming years. This will enable the fulfillment of the objective of reaping the rich dividends of the demographic potential of India. With well planned vocational courses the skilled students will find more employment locally in order to fulfill the requirements of the industrial growth. This will in turn drive the growth of Indian economy forward and may result in attaining the much awaited double digit of economic growth. The skilled youth could get employment opportunities not only within India but in most of the countries abroad and thus it can meet the shortage of 56.5 million of man power due to the ageing of world economies. India and the world are eagerly awaiting the outcomes of the Twelfth Five-Year-Plan initiatives in Higher Education—which may put the country on the fast track of development.

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L'ACCÈS DES GROUPES MARGINALISÉS AUX ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES EN INDE: OBSTACLES ET VOIES D'AVENIR

L'enseignement supérieur en Inde a explosé au cours des dernières années, enregistrant une augmentation phénoménale du nombre d'universités et de collèges, ainsi que du nombre d'inscriptions. Ainsi, l'Inde compte maintenant près de 611 universités et plus de 31 324 collèges, et un effectif de 12,9 millions d'étudiants inscrits. Fait à noter, les établissements privés représentent maintenant près de 63 % du total des établissements d'enseignement supérieur. De plus, les inscriptions ont aussi augmenté dans le système d'enseignement à distance qui a connu une croissance phénoménale. Ceci s'explique en partie du fait que les universités traditionnelles et les employeurs reconnaissent maintenant les diplômes émis par ces types d'établissements.

Toutefois, le taux brut d'inscription (environ 12 %) demeure un sujet de préoccupation majeur en Inde. En effet, le taux brut d'inscription des femmes et des classes arriérées est resté nettement inférieur à la moyenne nationale. Par conséquent, des unités d'intervention ont été mises sur pied, afin que les universités/collèges restent conscients de l'inégalité des chances entre groupes majoritaires et minoritaires et de la nécessité d'une action positive en temps opportun.

Cependant, même s'ils ont augmenté en nombre, les établissements d'enseignement supérieur sont paralysés soit par le manque d'enseignants qualifiés et expérimentés, soit par le manque d'infrastructures adéquates. Cela entrave la croissance de l'enseignement supérieur dans le pays. Il faudrait instaurer des changements systémiques et ce, sans obstacle politique, pour arriver à rejoindre tous les étudiants qui souhaitent faire des études supérieures.

Bien que les diplômés des écoles secondaires seniors ne fassent pas tous des études supérieures, les membres de certaines minorités affichent un taux particulièrement faible d'inscriptions dans les établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Ainsi, les Musulmans, qui constituent la minorité la plus importante (18 % de la population indienne), enregistrent le retard scolaire le plus marqué, puisque seulement 3,6 % d'entre eux s'inscrivent aux études supérieures. Les Castes répertoriées (SC) et les tribus répertoriées (ST) sont d'autres groupes désavantagés car, en dépit de la politique de réservation constitutionnelle, elles n'ont pas réellement progressé au niveau scolaire depuis l'indépendance de l'Inde.

Il faut cependant noter que l'un des éléments positifs de la démographie indienne est le jeune âge de sa population. En effet, comparativement à d'autres pays, l'Inde bénéficie d'une importante population active, dont le taux de dépendance est faible. Mais pour profiter de ce potentiel, l'Inde doit veiller à éduquer adéquatement sa population et à l'aider à acquérir les compétences nécessaires pour accéder au marché du travail. Or, la majorité de ces jeunes appartiennent aux SC/ST, à la minorité musulmane ou à des groupes à statut socio-économique faible. Avec une formation adéquate, ils sauront satisfaire les besoins des pays vieillissants, comme le Brésil, l'Australie, l'Europe, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et autres. La population qualifiée sera le plus grand atout et la principale source de fonds de l'Inde.

Afin de répondre à ce besoin, des centres de formation professionnelle connus sous le nom de *Industrial training Institutes* (ITI) et des écoles polytechniques ont été ouverts au niveau des sous-districts. Très populaires, ces centres de formation sont maintenant sept fois plus nombreux qu'ils ne l'étaient il y a 20 ans. On prévoit d'autres programmes professionnels en enseignement supérieur répondant aux normes de compétence et de qualité du *National Vocational Educational Qualification Framework* (NVEQF), qui assure leur acceptabilité ou leur équivalence aux normes établies par d'autres pays. On tente d'intégrer cette formation professionnelle, donnant droit à un diplôme additionnel, à des études à temps plein au deuxième ou troisième cycle dans une université régulière. Cette formation peut aussi être suivie dans le cadre d'un

cheminement de premier cycle. Les cours de formation professionnelle sont déjà populaires grâce à l'éducation à distance. L'Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) et le National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS) offrent divers programmes professionnels grâce à leurs centres de formation à distance dispersés à travers le pays.

Les prochaines années (2013-2020) seront cruciales. En effet, le pays doit permettre à ses futurs travailleurs d'accéder à un enseignement supérieur de qualité ou à un programme de formation professionnelle. L'augmentation du taux brut d'inscription entraînerait une augmentation des effectifs de plus de 26 millions dans l'enseignement supérieur et de près d'un million d'enseignants d'ici 2020.

Pour accroître et améliorer l'accès à l'enseignement supérieur, un programme national, le « Rashtriya Uchch Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA) », a été mis sur pied afin d'atteindre un taux d'inscription de 25 % au niveau national au cours du 12e plan quinquennal. Les jeunes travailleurs qualifiés pourraient obtenir des possibilités d'emploi non seulement en Inde, mais également dans la plupart des pays étrangers qui devront répondre à une pénurie de 56,5 millions de travailleurs, en raison du vieillissement des populations. L'Inde et le monde attendent avec impatience les retombées des initiatives du 12e plan quinquennal en matière d'enseignement supérieur, qui pourraient bien placer le pays sur la voie du développement rapide.

PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION" CRISIS IN QUEBEC

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INTRODUCTION

In pluralist societies, the coverage of issues related to minorities and ethnic relations too often perpetuates certain bias that can fuel stereotypes, prejudices and "racist slips" in opinion discourses. Even with a great concern for objectivity, the media sometimes transforms public debates on ethnic or religious issues into "societal crises" that can contribute to a state of "moral panic" amongst the population. This might be described as what took place from 2006 to 2008 in the province of Quebec during what was widely and unduly referred to as the crisis over "reasonable accommodation," a legal Canadian concept defining the room for manoeuvre of public institutions faced with requests from religious and other minorities for adapting their norms and practices to their specificities (BouchardetTaylor 2008).

The escalation began in March 2006, after a decision from the Supreme Court of Canada (the Multani judgment) authorizing a baptized Sikh student to wear the Kirpan in a Quebec public school. In January 2007, the debate was transformed into a crisis. On February 8th, 2007, the Premier announced the creation of the *Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences* (Bouchard-Taylor Commission), amid an election campaign, a media tsunami and an increased number of racializing discourses.

What happened in Quebec in this debate on so-called "reasonable accommodations"? Did the media blow things way out of proportion or was it the citizens and politicians who did that? Does media coverage reflect the tensions and contradictions already present within a society or do they provoke them?

This article is based on the studies we both conducted during this period: an expert's report ordered by the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, on media treatment and opinion discourses on reasonable accommodation in 2006 and 2007 (Potvin, 2008, 2010), and many polls on the subject during this period (Jedwab, 2007, 2009). The first adopts a qualitative approach to analyze, day after day, the practices of the print media and the contents of 1,105 articles on event based coverage and 654 columns and letters published in five major Quebec daily newspapers, from March 1st, 2006, to April 30th, 2007. The second presents data from a survey conducted in August 2007 by Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies that offers general opinions of the media's treatment of the debate.

The aim of this comparative analysis is to highlight the differences and the complementarity of both approaches to the analysis of media coverage and opinion discourses in the context of a highly emotional debate.

THE QUALITATIVE STUDY ON MEDIA COVERAGE AND OPINION DISCOURSES

Factual treatment and media practices

The first part of the qualitative analysis demonstrates the centrality of the media's role in transforming the debate into a crisis. It reveals that this crisis was created by a series of processes (Agenda Setting, Framing and Priming) and commercial strategies of the major print media, that are far from simply playing the role of "providing a public space" for reasonable debate among citizens.

The study highlights the constant presence – artificially sustained – of the debate in the print media's daily coverage and the recurrence of "cases" (anecdotes revealed as "exclusive investigations") presented on front pages that provoked a crescendo effect and led to the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. More than 75% of the "cases" described by media as "reasonable accommodations" were in fact private agreements, hypothetical situations or anecdotes. Some newspapers went out of their way to break one story after another, thereby elevating a collection of anecdotal events to

the rank of a "societal crisis." Using a sweeping array of public opinion polls about "racism among Quebecers," daily spot polls and "exclusive news investigations," these newspapers began constructing issues, "storytelling," and "agenda setting" for public debate, forcing politicians and citizens alike to take a stand on these questions. Their over-the-top magnification of events had a huge influence on the political agenda during this period. The opinions expressed by columnists or readers were often founded on an impressionist vision of the reality.

The way journalists framed their stories and the importance they attributed to some points of view allowed them to influence the public's understanding of the issues. Two ways of framing were unmistakably used by them: a legal-juridical frame and a dramatic-conflictual frame. The first misled the public by erroneously associating private agreements with reasonable accommodations. Requests for accommodation were often presented from the angle of "privileges" or abuses rather than citizens' right to equality or negotiated agreements. The second frame was used in polarized interpretations of events. It intimated that some minorities enjoyed privileges and threatened common values, thereby engaging readers of the majority in a victimizing reading of events. It was associated with commercial competition between the large Quebec media companies, leading to a race for fresh content, a distortion of reality, an amplification of minor stories, and the use of recurring images of the most "visibles" within religious minorities (Hassidic Jews, niqab or burqua wearing Muslims).

Opinion discourses and discursive mechanisms

The second part of the qualitative study analyzed opinion discourses—editorials, columns, and letters to the editor—and revealed that half of the texts included explicitly or implicitly one of the following racist "discursive mechanisms" of our analytical framework (Potvin, 2008): 1) *negative dichotomization* between "us and them" (separating the true from the false ones, the good from the bad); 2) *generalization* of behaviors to all members of a minority group; 3) *inferiorization* ("they do not evolve, they are marginal, they live in the Middle Ages"); 4) *self-victimization*, the "us" being the "norm" compared to the deviance (they do not respect "our" standards, loss of power or identity of the majority because of "privileges" granted to minorities); 5) *catastrophism* (state of emergency, apocalyptic scenarios); 6) *demonization*, fear of being the target of violence, of a demonic conspiracy or perverse manipulation ("they are strange, unpredictable, worrying"); 7) *desire to expel* "them" ("go away"); and 8) *appeals to political legitimization*, which constitutes a higher level of

racism, in terms of institutionalization, or "crystallization" of racism in the public sphere (voting for a right wing party, calling upon the responsibility of the elected representatives to do whatever is needed or to "take a hard line"). Those eight discursive and "socio-cognitive" mechanisms, often unconscious, act as different "levels" of racism expressions, and often operate together to create a spiral effect. Where there is co-occurrence and a passage from one mechanism to another, the discourse is crystallized and hardens. We highlighted that 14% of the editorials/columns and 52% of the letters from readers of our corpus contained at least one of these following mechanisms. Among the discourses of editors, columnists, and intellectuals, these mechanisms were most often found in articles about Hassidic Jews. Negative dichotomization was used predominantly to oppose the values of the majority (defined as "people" or "society") to those of the minority, particularly on gender equality. Inferiorization inferred that they had not adapted to modern lifestyles. Many associated requests for accommodation with fundamentalism.

Many letters from readers slipped from one mechanism to another. *i.e.* from negative dichotomization imprinted with subordination ("Do we have to go back to the Middle Ages because one particular group wishes to?") to inferiorization, demonization and self-victimization: ("they come to us to impose their values," "they don't integrate," "they exploit their privileges," "they wish to bring us to our knees"), to the desire for expulsion ("The immigrants who want to live in Quebec must adapt to our way of life and not the opposite. If they do not accept this, they can go back home") and political legitimation (ex. the appeals from a small town to abolish the Charter municipal councillors and citizens). The racializing discourses went through various levels between 2006 and 2007, as if their trivialization in the media sphere had legitimized their progression and hardening.

THE SECOND STUDY:
MEASURING PUBLIC OPINION THROUGH SURVEYS

This section considers whether the public approved of the general approach adopted by the media. The public opinion survey employed here offers insight into the general impressions of the media's treatment of the debate. Conducted just prior to the Government announcing the creation of the reasonable accommodation commission, the survey revealed that 73% of Quebec Francophones agreed that their society has been strengthened by the diversity of cultural and religious groups. However, 59% of the Francophone population agreed that Quebec immigrants should give up their customs and traditions to become culturally closer to the majority of Quebecers.

Table 1 reveals that a majority of Quebecers believe that the media acted in an exaggerated way about the issues associated with reasonable accommodation, with 63% of persons under the age of 35 in agreement with that statement compared with 45% of those persons over the age of 55. Some 67% of those with a university degree believe that the media exaggerated, compared to a little bit less than 40% of persons with a high school degree or less.

Table 1: Minority cultural and religious practices have received considerable attention in Quebec recently. Do you think the following groups have exaggerated, reacted appropriately or did not take the matter seriously enough?

	REACTED IN AN EXAGGERATED WAY	REACTED APPROPRIATELY	DID NOT TAKE THE MATTER SERIOUSLY ENOUGH
News Media	55%	30%	12%
Quebec Minorities	45%	31%	17%
Quebec's Majority	26%	46%	24%

The survey points to a correlation between the percentage of those agreeing on the fact the media exaggerated and the extent to which individuals value the contribution of diverse cultural communities to Quebec society. As revealed below in Table 2, the survey data confirm that those Quebecers most likely to feel that the media exaggerated were most inclined to value the societal contribution of Quebec's diverse cultural groups.

TABLE 2 QUEBEC SOCIETY IS ENRICHED BY THE DIVERSITY OF CULTURAL GROUPS	THE MEDIA EXAGGERATED THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION			
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree	37.5%	19.7%	10.8%	9.7%
Somewhat Agree	42.6%	60.0%	43.6%	23.9%
Somewhat Disagree	13.0%	14.4%	36.0%	40.9%
Strongly Disagree	5.6%	4.5%	5.2%	23.3%

Yet further insight into the mind-set of Quebecers is offered in the correlation of the views around the perceived exaggeration of the media and the degree to which Quebecers felt that immigrants should give up their customs and traditions and become more like the majority. Those who were strongly or moderately in agreement that the media exaggerated the issues associated were least likely to agree that immigrants should give up their customs and traditions.

TABLE 3 QUEBEC IMMIGRANTS SHOULD GIVE UP THEIR CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS AND BECOME LIKE THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION	THE MEDIA EXAGGERATED THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION			
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree	15.3%	18.8%	24.8%	36.4%
Somewhat Agree	23.3%	27.2%	32.0%	36.9%
Somewhat Disagree	38.1%	39.3%	34.0%	21.6%
Strongly Disagree	22.8%	11.2%	6.8%	3.4%

Nearly seven in ten Quebec Francophones supported the idea that Muslim women should be allowed to wear the Hijab in public. As to the idea of Muslim women teaching in a public school wearing the Hijab some 33% of Francophones agreed with the idea and Muslim girls wearing hijabs in public schools is agreed upon by 36% of Francophones. There is also a variation in the views on accommodation issues relating to the Muslim population based on the degree to which the media is perceived to have exaggerated.

TABLE 4	THE MEDIA EXAGGERATED THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION			
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Muslim girls should be all allowed to wear the Hijab in public schools	54.6%	38.2%	30.5%	17.6%
Teachers wearing Hijabs should be allowed to teach in public schools	47.4%	36.0%	24.5%	12.5%

While a majority of those who felt that the media exaggerated agreed that Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the Hijab in public schools, that view is held by less than 20% of those who believe that the media coverage did not go far enough. Similarly those who feel the majority coverage went too far are split when it comes to whether teachers in public schools should be allowed to wear Hijabs.

CONCLUSION

Both studies demonstrate that there is a gap between inclusive and pluralistic "official discourse" on the one hand, and the persistence of public debates tinged with fears over identity and of racializing discourses on the other. In effect, they both illustrate that the media played an important role in the manner in which Quebec's public understood the debates about reasonable accommodation.

On one hand, the qualitative study identified the main strategies and practices of the print media in dealing with the highly emotional character of the debate and analyzed how the opinion discourses – expressed by editors, columnists, intellectuals and readers in their own texts and words – sometimes "slipped" and used "racializing mechanisms" in a time of crisis. The analysis of discursive practices by the actors in the debate through the examination of the terms they employ permits to define how elected officials, journalists and citizens defined the issues and influenced one another in the context of a social debate. These influences become more apparent in the analysis of daily media coverage.

On the other hand, the opinion surveys allow measurement of the influence of certain opinions and attitudes in the context of an intense social debate, but it would be difficult for surveys to identify the strategies and practices of the media on a daily basis that contributed to transforming a debate into a "national crisis." Opinion polls are increasingly used by the media to reflect the dominant social or political issue of the day and to offer empirical support for the opinion discourses issued by media outlets. Moreover, the survey data illustrated that the qualitative findings arising from a content analysis of opinion discourses from readers or columnists on the issue of reasonable accommodation reflected an important segment of public opinion. But, if it remains clear that the media and the views expressed directly or indirectly in "public opinion" often served to reinforce each other, the media was able to control the agenda on a daily basis with their selection of letters from the public, the placing of information at the top of the agenda and the ability to "frame" it for "sales objectives." If the media exaggerated during the crisis over reasonable accommodation, according to many citizens and journalists, it had less to do with the opinions of columnists or readers on that subject than with the media practices of "putting the subject on the front page" on a daily basis, of setting it to the agenda and of framing it under a sensationalist and controversial angle.

The relationship between the views expressed in "direct opinion discourses" and public opinion surveys is a fertile ground for further developments. The qualitative approach permits a better analysis of various discursive mechanisms leading to racialization of minorities and could inspire more sophisticated questions in surveys and polls Both approaches, but especially the qualitative one, need to take upon consideration the influences of context factors in the expressions of racism. A crisis context gives legitimacy to the expression of intolerance, but whether this phenomenon is generalized and persistent is better assessed by quantitative, after the fact, surveys. Thus, both approaches should be used in a complementary manner to assess the state of ethnic relations and intergroup perceptions, especially that of majority groups in crisis contexts.

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OPINION PUBLIQUE ET TRAITEMENT MÉDIATIQUE DE LA CRISE DES « ACCOMMODEMENTS RAISONNABLES »

La plupart des analystes des médias constatent que le traitement médiatique des événements liés aux minorités et aux rapports ethniques n'est pas entièrement exempt de biais pouvant alimenter les stéréotypes, les préjugés et les « dérapages ». Même avec le plus grand souci d'objectivité, il arrive que les médias transforment des débats publics en « crises sociales » et en état de « panique morale », comme ce fut le cas lors de la « crise des accommodements raisonnables » au Québec de 2006 à 2008.

Les médias ne font-ils que refléter les tensions et les contradictions présentes au sein d'une société ou les provoquent-ils ? Il est difficile de mesurer avec exactitude l'impact des médias sur l'opinion publique et de nombreux travaux depuis des décennies se sont penchés sur cette question. Commune dans le discours populaire et journalistique, cette image des médias

comme simple « reflet » de la société a été mise en cause de toutes parts.

Toutefois, le passage du « journalisme informatif », qui valorisait l'objectivité et l'impartialité, à l'ère du journalisme communicationnel (et aux médias sociaux), qui rend central le contact des médias avec le lecteur ou l'auditeur, ou qui place ce dernier au centre du discours médiatique, nous ramène encore plus à la question de la « relation dialectique » entre les médias et les publics.

Dans ce texte, nous illustrons d'abord les principales « stratégies » et pratiques des médias, avec l'exemple du débat sur lesdits « accommodements raisonnables » au Québec en 2006 et en 2007, et ensuite, les discours d'opinion « directs », c'est-à-dire ce que les gens ont dit eux-mêmes, dans leurs propres mots, en écrivant dans la presse écrite et les « blogues » au cours de ce débat (que ce soit des éditorialistes, chroniqueurs, intellectuels ou simples « lecteurs »), et les opinions dites « indirectes », soit les perceptions et attitudes des gens, mesurées par les sondages, à partir de questions construites par des firmes ou des chercheurs. Les sondages participent aussi, évidemment, des diverses « stratégies » et pratiques courantes des médias dans un contexte de convergence de plus en plus prononcé.

Dans un contexte de surenchère médiatique et de multiplication des discours racisants, le Premier ministre a créé le 8 février 2007, en début de campagne électorale, la Commission de consultation sur les pratiques reliées aux différences culturelles (ou Commission Bouchard-Taylor). La « crise des accommodements raisonnables » a constitué un débat médiatique intense et tendu sur les rapports ethniques, de 2006 à 2008. Il n'y a aucun doute que les medias ont joué un rôle capital dans le façonnement du débat sur l'accommodement des différences religieuses et culturelles. La cristallisation de ce débat dans les médias commence à partir de mars 2006 et se transforme en « crise » en janvier 2007.

Plusieurs journalistes ont contribué à nourrir la confusion, en amalgamant l'accommodement raisonnable, qui est une obligation et mesure réparatrice en raison d'une situation discriminatoire, avec l'ajustement volontaire ou les ententes privées, qui ne résultent pas de la violation d'une liberté fondamentale. Plus de 75 % des « affaires » rapportées par les médias comme des « accommodements raisonnables » entre mars 2006 et avril 2007 étaient des ententes privées ou des faits divers anecdotiques montés en épingle par des journalistes. La couverture a non seulement été disproportionnée par rapport aux cas réels d'accommodements, mais plusieurs journaux ont multiplié les affaires « dévoilées » dans une logique de concurrence, menant à une surenchère et à un emballement médiatique Les données des sondages d'opinion utilisées dans notre étude révèlent que les résultats qualitatifs reflètent un segment important de l'opinion publique. Pourtant, il n'est pas évident si les médias ont dirigé l'opinion populaire ou s'ils l'ont simplement suivie. Une conclusion plus précise serait que les médias et un segment important de l'opinion se sont renforcés mutuellement.

Les analyses des enquêtes d'opinion sur l'ensemble de la période commençant avec la création de la Commission jusqu'à son rapport final (2007-2008) montrent relativement peu de changements dans les points de vue tenus par les Québécois autour des questions dites de l'accommodement. Ceux qui ont été fortement ou modérément d'accord que les médias exagéraient les problèmes liés à l'accommodement étaient moins susceptibles de convenir que les immigrants doivent renoncer à leurs coutumes et traditions alors que ceux qui étaient plus favorables au traitement médiatique sont plus enclins à vouloir que les nouveaux arrivants renoncent à leurs coutumes et traditions.

Les écarts étaient considérables, avec 74 % de ceux moins portés à croire que les médias exagéraient et qui désirent que les immigrants renoncent à leurs coutumes et traditions contre 38 % en accord que les médias exagéraient et qui préfèrent que les immigrants renoncent à leurs coutumes et traditions. Ces résultats endossent la thèse selon laquelle les médias ont eu moins d'impact sur l'opinion publique que certains observateurs supposent. En fait il est possible que les québécois étaient plus concernés par le ton des médias que par le traitement de fond (c'est-à-dire les conclusions) des rapportages, même si nombreux québécois ont exprimé le sentiment que le traitement médiatique des débats sur l'accommodement était exagéré. Pour leur part, les commissaires ont évoqué plusieurs exemples où la couverture médiatique des questions de l'accommodement était erronée. La relation entre les opinions exprimées dans les reportages et les sondages d'opinion et le comportement de la population en matière d'accommodement est un terrain fertile pour la recherche future autour des débats entourant l'immigration, intégration et l'identité.

PART 4

Combating inequality
and insuring equity

EQUITY AND INEQUALITIES IN INDIA: MULTIPLE REALITIES AND INTERPRETATION

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INTRODUCTION

The main argument of this paper is that in order to have a successful strategy to fight poverty it is necessary to identify "who are the poor." Simply aiming at reducing the material poverty without taking into account the cultural and political rights of indigenous peoples/caste communities has proved to be insufficient. Numerous poverty alleviation programs put in place over the last few decades have generally failed to implement equality of access to resources—material or symbolic. These programs are often perceived as not taking into account the nature of aspirations for development present in a community, a process which would call for an opening to pluralism. One may wonder if the efficiency of laws against poverty could increase if, as a complement to equality, equity could be not only a directive principle but also a goal.

Despite its frequent use in policy and planning documents, there is no consensus on what equity means. Moreover, there are few conceptual analyses on the issue of equity in the related areas of education, sustainable development and poverty alleviation. The writings on the concept of equity were originally found in the legal literature in the fields of property, contracts and torts. The legal development of this concept explains in large part the reason why it is discussed in these contexts. It has become prominent in other fields such as economics and health. To better understand equity, we need to refer to what is generally included in the definition of equity. The Oxford English Dictionary provides two main definitions: (1) equity is the quality of being equal and fair; (2) equity refers to something that is fair and right.

The Latin æquitas was somewhat influenced in meaning by being adopted as the ordinary rendering of Greek epiky (πιείκεια (see epiky n)). It meant reasonableness and moderation in the exercise of one's rights, and the disposition to avoid insisting on them too rigorously. An approach to this sense is found in many of the earlier English examples.

Equity jurisprudence can be traced back soon after the Norman Conquest of the British island. Prior to the development of the common law courts in England, the king had the power to determine the outcome of all disputes, based on his own conscience. These decisions, or writs, later became the common law and provided a pattern for the courts to follow. As the common law courts and Parliament used the writs to determine law in England, the king's equitable jurisprudence narrowed, and the requirements to bring a case in the common law courts became more and more specific, limiting the possibility for the petitioners to seek the king's justice. That is why, towards the end of the 14th century, the chancellor (the king's primary adviser) began hearing disputes on behalf of the king, again making a decision based on equity. Among all classes, there was a belief that in the chancellor resided a general power to redress all wrongs if, for any reason, the person injured could not protect himself through the common law. Each case was determined independently and the outcomes were not based on precedent decisions. The goal of the chancellor—and later of the Court of Chancery—was to take all the facts into account and determine an outcome based on fairness.

The early uses of equity were to fill gaps when there were no remedies available under the common law or to reverse the rigidity of the legal system. In both scenarios, it was a call to fairness. However, it was originally based on the King or his representative's conscience. Yet, there was always a desire to consolidate or to solidify a body of knowledge which would not depend on one or few persons' consciousness in order to represent a larger consensus on fairness. Eventually, in contemporary state legal systems belonging to the common law family, courts of equity and common law courts were merged. That was also the case in India, where the principle of equity was "included" in the Specific Relief Act. The Specific Relief Act of 1963 was an Act to amend laws relating to specific kinds of relief. It could be granted for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing penal law. In other words, equity was integrated in the state legal system.

Then, one may wonder what is left of the early process of requesting equity from below. Within the contemporary process of defining what equitable distributions of material and symbolic resources are, the community perspectives on equity are seldom examined in the development literature in spite of the fact that equity is central to community-based development efforts. In their study of community-based rainwater harvesting in Rajasthan, Cochran and Isha (2009) clearly demonstrate that: "Equity persists as an ill-defined concept with its many, and contested meanings largely unexamined. Specifically, the motivations, and practices of different community members, and the roles they play in community-based conceptions of equity, are rarely considered in philosophical, or empirical scholarship on equity" (p. 435).

This leads us to acknowledge that an intercultural approach is necessary to grasp the subtleties of equity in various cultural contexts as a concept can never be considered without taking into account its cultural roots. In his book, *The Argumentative Indian*, Amartya Sen explains how the tradition of heterodoxy had a clear relevance for democracy and secularism in India. The interplay between heterodoxy and inclusiveness allowed the acceptance of different groups of persons as authentic members of the society throughout the history. Those groups had a right to follow their own customs and beliefs. The Sanskrit word for acceptance (*swikriti*) does not imply the idea of equality but rather that different groups are entitled to lead their own lives. This interplay between heterodoxy, inclusiveness and acceptance can help to reduce inequities in contemporary Indian society by easing the plurality of voices to be heard. Sen (2005) acknowledges that "voices of dissent—social as well as philosophical—have often come across barriers of caste, class and gender, and they have not been entirely ineffective" (p. 37).

In terms of the quest for justice and equity, he clarifies that: "The demands of justice in India are also demands for more use of voice in the pursuit of equity. The argumentative heritage may be an important asset, but its effectiveness depends on its use. Much would depend on the political deployment of the argumentative voice in opposition to societal inequity and asymmetry, and the actual use that is made of the opportunities of democratic articulation and of political engagement. Silence is a powerful enemy of social justice" (Sen, 2005).

The interrelationship between equity, diversity and dialogical tradition in India leads us to underline the subtleties of the concept of equality in the Indian context. According to Ambedkar, "What was at issue was not simply equality as a right available to all individuals but also equality as a policy aimed at bringing about certain changes in the structure of society." (Béteille, 1986). As André Béteille (1986) underlines, the Indian concept of equality does not have the same individualistic reasoning as the West, because individuals are conceived as being a part of a whole. Hence, the concept of individual rights also includes a notion of duty (p. 123).

In terms of poverty alleviation, what kind of access to resources and justice can be considered to be fair? The heterogeneity of answers to what should be considered as equitable does not only vary according to cultural and religious backgrounds. Moreover, multiple interpretations exist in every cultural identity. How is it possible then to ensure that the notion of equity, even when defined at a local level, reflects the empirical reality of diversity? Is it possible to define equity only through a process of dialogues which would be solely valid in a specific context?

GOVERNING THE "POOR" IN INDIA

The Constitution of India contains extensive provisions for its minorities, namely the scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes' (ST) right to development, and specifically mentions these two groups for affirmative state action. It is estimated that the tribal population of India is about 8.2% and the scheduled castes make up about 16.2% (2001 Census) of the total population, which by all accounts is a colossal number. Both these groups in India are at the bottom in terms of the human development index (HDI). Although there is a general lack of disaggregated data, per capita total expenditures among SC and ST households are generally lower than the average for all states in India.

While there are numerous articles that refer to both the social groups, two specific Schedules of the Constitution underline the principle of non-discrimination against scheduled tribes. Besides, for purposes of specific focus on the development of SC and ST, the government has adopted a package of programmes. Despite these constitutionally guaranteed entitlements and policy initiatives, the plight of the SC and ST remain high. This paper argues that this is mainly because the Indian state has failed to accept and apply the heterogeneity of the concept of equity and has not realized the importance of contextualizing its meaning within cultural contexts in order to deal with the challenges we have to face in using it to find empirical solutions to injustices.

The history and cultural experience of scheduled tribes and castes are different even though they both have been economically relegated to the same lower rungs of society. India's response to the needs of the SCs and ST is based on the welfare model of development which endeavours to empower both groups to benefit from modern development. It is felt that if tribal or scheduled castes have been marginalized they should be

compensated by welfare actions. This idea had evolved in the first Five-Year-Plan in the 1950s and was modified over time through welfare programmes by different government committees such as the Elwin Committee (1959), Scheduled Areas and Tribes Commission (1961).

In the 1980s and 1990s a new phase of development programmes called Poverty Alleviation Programmes (PAPs) were introduced. These can be broadly categorised into four categories such as employment generation schemes (Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP), Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana); area development (Drought Prone Area Programmes); social security; and other programmes such as housing (Indira Awas Yojana). These programmes sought to aim at certain "target groups" such as scheduled castes and tribes, apart from others like women. These schemes were meant to expose the communities to markets, and resulting products could receive monetary value leading to decline in poverty, unemployment and migration.

But while the rural areas did benefit, the tribal population without access to even land and hence agriculture and its allied economic activities, were not able to receive any benefit from these development programmes. These programmes were unsuitable for tribes. Added to that was the government failure to implement the programmes properly. Two kinds of tribal economies are identified in India: Hill or forest-dwelling economies which depend on shifting cultivation, hunting and food gathering (North East and areas in Orissa, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand); and plain or valley-dwelling economies which depend on settled cultivation, livestock, hunting and fishing. There could be a third kind of tribes, those depending on pastoral economy. However, all three are based on self-consumption. In contrast, the national economy is based on industrial capital with investments in industries and construction of dams, and distribution of loans and subsidies to tribals to aid them in self-employment. The aim is national development.

What is even more ironic is that there are important federal enactments already in place to help assist the tribal peoples in respect of their access to resources and any wrongful dispossession of land or interference with the enjoyment of rights over any land, premises or water. The government also made efforts to promote education and employment opportunities for the SCs/STs through protective discrimination policies as per the constitutional provisions and through scholarship facilities. Besides, in some areas, independent tribal authorities have important powers. At the local government level, *Panchayats*, in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, have increasing power over land acquisition since the *Panchayats* (Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, and in the

management of the food-based schemes. Despite these legal devices buttressed by welfare schemes, designed to check the marginalization of the tribal peoples and guarantee security of land tenures to tribal communities, current struggles of the tribal peoples have coalesced precisely around demands for autonomy, separate land legislation, and a different administrative system.

Given the notion of duty in the concept of rights, social justice and equity is a major discussion point in Indian polity. Recently, one of the main discussions has centred on revising the mechanisms to identify the "poor," in order to better target them. An Expert Group under the chairmanship of N.C. Saxena outlined the contours of the revised scheme in 2009 for identifying those eligible for social assistance (Government of India, 2011). This scheme was more sensitive to vulnerable households and favoured groups such as agricultural labourers, destitute households, mahadalit castes, women-headed households and those comprised entirely of seniors (Roy, 2011). The oppressed and downtrodden are commonly known as "Dalits," a term often used interchangeably with the scheduled castes in India. The new category of "mahadalits" would mean the super oppressed in society.

Scholarly analyses of the Report have pointed out that these methodologies treated the SC populations across states very differently but more to suit their inclinations and projected political benefits. In only two of the states (Bihar and West Bengal), was there any similarity in following the methodology – more SC households were classified as "poor" according to the 2009 methodology as compared to former estimates. That was the only similarity between the SCs in West Bengal and Bihar. The state government's introduction of the mahadalit category for the purpose of recensing the poor complicated the scenario. In Bihar, the SCs have been bifurcated by the order of the state government into scheduled castes/dalits and mahadalits in 2007, ostensibly to better target communities that were backward. Over the years all castes in Bihar have been categorised as mahadalit except the Dusadh caste, a typical surname of the caste being Paswan.

CONCLUSIONS

The main concern here is with equity. However, it is necessarily related to concepts and peculiarities of community development. Basic to any strategy that would ensure equity for all is a legal framework that takes into account all peoples' notions and indicators of poverty and their own strategies to development of the resources. The critiques by Amartya Sen on the question of development strategies and poverty alleviation do underline the need for such an approach or recourse. Understanding poverty in terms of development of capabilities and entitlements has

an advantage when dealing with different communities. He specifically focuses on legal issues of "entitlement" in the study of development (Sen, 1984; Sen, 1999).

Analysis of legal shifts with reference to natural resources ownership and control enable us to understand how, for instance, the decline in access to, and the degradation of common property resources can result in changes of ownership endowments, and consequent entitlement failures. Thus, Sen underlines the role of laws and legality both in bestowing and transferring endowments, and in providing an individual with entitlements to meet her/his needs.

Different communities in India, representing distinct cultures, have their own perceptions and indicators of poverty and well-being as well as their own ideas of strategies for poverty reduction and equity. Nonetheless, these diversified concepts of poverty are often not incorporated in national strategies, thereby reflecting their general political marginalization. Therefore, the challenge to development and equity is twofold: on the one hand, all peoples have the same right to development, resources and services as all other peoples; on the other, it must be recognized that the nature of the aspirations for development, resources and services of some (say the tribal communities) may be fundamentally different from those of others (scheduled castes). To answer to such imperatives of justice in a context of diversity and plural voices, the principle of equality should be balanced by taking into account the principle of equity. Henceforth, development strategies must thus be designed to overcome the marginalization and at the same time ensure the rights of all peoples.

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L'ÉQUITÉ ET LES INÉGALITÉS EN INDE: INTERPRÉTATIONS ET RÉALITÉS MULTIPLES

En Inde, la problématique de la lutte à la pauvreté est indissociable d'une prodigieuse diversité des contextes et des conditions. Aux écarts entre statuts socioéconomiques s'ajoutent les écarts entre statuts socioculturels, avec en trame de fond un foisonnement de castes, sous-castes, tribus, groupes religieux ou groupes linguistiques, sans oublier la variété des conditions géographiques et climatiques que renferme le sous-continent. Au centre de cette lutte, nous retrouvons les *scheduled castes* (SC) et les *scheduled tribes* (ST), groupes identifiés de façon juridique comme étant particulièrement vulnérables et, ce faisant, jugés en droit de recevoir quelque aide de la part du gouvernement – soit-elle matérielle ou d'ordre plus symbolique, à savoir, consacrée à l'amélioration de leur statut identitaire vis-à-vis d'autres groupes de la société. Les *dalits*, traditionnellement des castes intouchables, et les *mahadalits*, catégorie définie plus récemment et qui engloberait les castes « super-opprimées » de la population, sont aussi inclus dans cette liste de groupes qui bénéficient de leviers législatifs, politiques, et économiques visant à soutenir leur combat contre la pauvreté.

Nombre de politiques, programmes et législations participant à la lutte contre la pauvreté en Inde n'ont pas suffisamment pris en compte cette diversité. Une connaissance insuffisante des variations culturelles du concept d'*équité* est à la source d'échecs pratiques ou empiriques dans la lutte à la pauvreté. Il s'agit d'un problème à la fois théorique et juridique.

Dans son sens usuel, l'équité concerne la notion de justice, de modération raisonnable des principes, des lois, ou des jugements. Mais c'est surtout à sa connotation légale que le présent article fait référence. Dans le monde anglo-saxon, son origine juridique remonte aux temps précédant l'élaboration de la *Common Law*, où le Roi pouvait juger de certains dossiers de façon discrétionnaire et selon «sa propre conscience». Puis, avec l'évolution des cours de justice, les jugements d'équités furent exercés par des représentants du Roi dans ces domaines où la *Common Law* était jugée trop rigide ou sans application pragmatique. Dans l'État moderne occidental, les cours d'équité furent incorporés à même la *Common Law*; en Inde, c'est entre autre ce à quoi visait le *Specific Relief Act* de 1963.

Suivant cette dénomination légale, il s'agit alors d'un recours à l'équité venant «d'en bas», c'est-à-dire venant des communautés concernées par une législation donnée, et qui souhaiterait en façonner le contenu ou l'application pour mieux l'adapter à leur propre réalité. Pour ces communautés, l'équité constitue une opportunité de définir la pauvreté dans leurs propres termes, mais également de définir les *moyens* et *fins* dans leur lutte à la pauvreté. Pour Sen, la poursuite du pluralisme en Inde s'ancre à même une tradition nationale, méconnue par plusieurs, d'acceptation et d'inclusion des différences, une tradition d'ouverture et pour ainsi dire d'hétérodoxie. Sen rappelait que le mot sanskrit signifiant acceptation est «*swikriti*», et ne connote pas tant l'acceptation par tous d'un mode de vie uniforme et égalitaire, mais bien l'acceptation de la diversité et le droit de différents groupes de poursuivre leur propre trajectoire.

Force est toutefois de constater que la lutte à la pauvreté, en Inde, s'est souvent effectuée en dépit d'une reconnaissance de ces multiples trajectoires. Les *Poverty Alleviation Programmes* (PAPs) mis en place par le gouvernement indien durant les années 1980 et 1990 comptent parmi les exemples les plus probants de cette incompréhension de la pluralité du concept d'équité. Ces programmes visaient à redresser les statuts et conditions de vie des SC et ST, mais ne différenciaient pas suffisamment les moyens et les fins de la lutte à la pauvreté pour les communautés concernées. Plus concrètement, ces programmes visaient une exposition accrue des communautés au marché, puis aux valeurs monétaires, avec pour conséquence attendue un déclin de la pauvreté, du chômage et des migrations. Il était implicitement supposé que ce qui était efficace et souhaitable pour les SC, à peu de chose près, l'était également pour les ST.

Or, les conditions de vie, les pratiques économiques et culturelles des ST ne peuvent être assimilées à celles des SC, et ne peuvent donc se satisfaire de programmes identiques. Par exemple, plusieurs ST ne possèdent pas de terres agricoles, ou encore dédient une part importante de leur travail à des activités de pêche et de chasse (dans des forêts qu'elles possèdent de façon collective). Pour ces ST, par conséquent, une plus grande exposition aux marchés ne signifie pas pour autant un déclin de la pauvreté. Même qu'une introduction aux marchés pourrait aller contre les volontés, c'est-à-dire contre les *finalités*, que poursuivent les ST concernées. Plusieurs tribus participent à une production autosuffisante et non à une économie de consommation telle qu'induite par l'économie du marché et l'industrialisation.

En somme, si des différences tangibles peuvent être observées entre les deux catégories générales sur lesquelles étaient centrées les PAPs, soit les SC et les ST, que pourraient à présent nous révéler des comparaisons entre différentes communautés à l'intérieur ou entre ces deux catégories, sinon davantage de diversité? D'où la nécessité d'appuyer la lutte à la pauvreté en Inde sur les définitions, stratégies et aspirations des acteurs mêmes des communautés spécifiquement concernées par tel ou tel programme. Il s'agirait là d'un moyen de mieux respecter l'équité dans ses multiples variations culturelles, et conséquemment d'aller à l'encontre d'une conception monolithique de l'appareil législatif indien. C'est dire, en conclusion, qu'il faut donc miser en faveur d'une ouverture, d'un pluralisme de l'équité et de la loi en Inde.

ETHNICITY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES IN QUEBEC: AN OVERVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

Dealing with ethnic groups in Quebec is not a simple matter because of a lack of relevant data on such groups. The Statistics Canada website does include a huge data file drawn from the 2006 census that shows a large selection of demographic, cultural, labour force, educational and income characteristics for 101 ethnic groups. However, these groups represent a mixed bag of ethnic and cultural origins associated with the ancestors of census respondents and thus are very heterogeneous in nature. As a result, rather than looking at economic inequalities from a strictly ethnic standpoint, I approach this issue from a different angle, emphasizing two dimensions of immigrant background: (status/period of) immigration and visible minority (status/group). For each of these two dimensions, I will examine economic differences between relevant groups using i) labour market indicators such as participation and unemployment rates and ii) income indicators such as total income and prevalence of low income. In doing so, I will refer to the Census Metropolitan Area of Montreal (in short the Montreal CMA) rather than Quebec as a whole, since the Quebec population with an immigrant background is essentially concentrated in and around the city of Montreal. Indeed, according to the 2006 census, the Montreal CMA, which is home to 48% of the population aged 15 years and over living in Quebec, contains 88% of its immigrants and 91% of its visible minorities. Data from the 2006 census found on the Statistics Canada website are used exclusively for that purpose.

The paper has three sections. Section 1 addresses economic inequalities among the Montreal CMA population for the immigration dimension, whereas Section 2 pays attention to the same inequalities for the visible minority dimension. Section 3 examines further economic inequalities for both the immigration and visible minority dimensions—in particular, inequalities in the industry composition of the employed population. The paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the main results.

THE IMMIGRATION DIMENSION

Of a total of 2,967,700 persons of 15 years and over residing in the Montreal CMA, 693,400 are immigrants—that is, persons who have been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by the immigration authorities. In other words, slightly less than one person in four is an immigrant (23.7%). But, whereas one (big) half (55.4%) of all immigrants residing in the CMA in 2006 arrived in Canada before 1991, the other (small) half (44.6%) came in since, especially in the last quinquennial period (2001-2006), which saw the arrival of almost one in five immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2006).

Labour market

Panel A of Table 1, which is limited to the population 25-54 years old (reducing the population 15 years old and over to this subpopulation allows one to circumvent, to a large extent, the differences in age composition existing between the various subgroups related to the two immigrant background dimensions considered in this paper). It reveals that immigrants do not perform on the labour market as well as non-immigrants, especially females. For one thing, their participation rate is lower by 4% points for males and by as much as 12-13 points for females. Also, among those persons who participate in the labour market, immigrants are substantially more often unemployed than non-immigrants: twice as much for males (10.7% VS 4.8%) and even three times as much for females (12.2% VS 4.2%).

Moreover, for each gender the participation rate of immigrants tends to increase with duration of residence, although there appears to be a marginal decrease for males between the immigrant cohorts of the late and early nineties. In addition, the participation rate is quite low for the cohort of immigrants who arrived in the 2001-2006 period (about 8-9% points lower than for the previous quinquennial cohort), whereas immigrants who arrived before 1991, participate less (marginally for men) and are more often unemployed than non-immigrants.

STATUS/ PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION	MALES		FEMALES	
	Participation rate (%)	Unemployment rate (%)	Participation rate (%)	Unemployment rate (%)
Total	90.6%	6.2%	81.5%	6.0%
Non-immigrants	91.9%	4.8%	84.9%	4.2%
Immigrants	87.7%	10.7%	72.4%	12.2%
Before 1991	90.4%	6.8%	78.5%	7.8%
1991 to 1995	88.6%	8.8%	73.4%	11.5%
1996 to 2000	90.1%	10.4%	72.2%	12.8%
2001 to 2006	81.9%	18.6%	62.5%	20.9%
Non-permanent residents	73.7%	11.1%	58.9%	13.5%

b) Income indicators

STATUS/ PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION	TOTAL INCOME ($)		PREVALENCE OF LOW INCOME AFTER TAX IN 2005 (%)	
	Median value	Average value	Economic family members	Persons not in economic families
Total	25,161	34,196	11.7%	37.5%
Non-immigrants	27,782	36,204	8.8%	34.3%
Immigrants	19,414	28,269	21.3%	47.1%
Before 1991	22,388	32,981	10.3%	39.4%
1991 to 1995	17,554	23,996	22.1%	52.1%
1996 to 2000	18,119	24,195	25.1%	49.6%
2001 to 2006	13,178	18,715	43.2%	65.2%
Non-permanent residents	10,815	22,557	38.8%	76.5%

Income

As for income indicators, panel B of Table 1 paints a picture very similar to the one just described. First, for total income, median as well as average values are some $8,000 lower for immigrants than non-immigrants: $19,400 VS $27,800 for median values and $28,300 VS $36,200 for average values. Moreover, for immigrants, both values tend to increase with duration of residence, although those who arrived in the early nineties appear to do worse (slightly), not better than those who arrived in the late nineties. As for the values reached by the immigrants who arrived before 1991, they remain well below the corresponding values for non-immigrants. Finally, a direct comparison of median and average values of total income by status/period of immigration suggests that income is much less evenly distributed among immigrants than non-immigrants, as well as among immigrants arrived before 1991 than among those who arrived hereafter. In other words, there is a comparatively higher proportion of persons with high income among immigrants than non-immigrants, especially among those immigrants who arrived more than a quarter of a century ago.

These income inequalities appear again in the prevalence of low income. An economic family is a group of two or more persons who live in the same dwelling and are related to each other by blood, marriage, common-law or adoption. A couple may be of opposite or same sex. According to Statistics Canada, economic families (and thus their members) and persons not living in economic families, differentiated by size of family and area of residence, are said to have a low income if they spend 20% more than average of their after-tax income on food, shelter and clothing. First, far more immigrants than non-immigrants have low income: 21.3% VS 8.8% for economic family members and 47.1% VS 34.3% for persons not in economic families. Second, the longer the duration of residence, the less prevalent is low income, although the cohort of the early nineties fares slightly worse than the cohort of the late nineties, for persons not in economic families.

THE VISIBLE MINORITY DIMENSION

In the distant past, immigrants to Canada came mostly from Europe but, starting in the 1970s, the geographical origin of immigrants shifted to the rest of the world, where the population is predominantly non-white. Today, then, the majority of immigrants to Canada as well as Quebec belong to the visible minorities. According to the Employment Equity Act (1986), intended to underpin the federal government's employment equity programs, visible minorities are persons other than Aboriginal people who are non-Caucasian in race and non-white in skin colour. Such persons are classified in 10 categories (Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Korean and Japanese), but the relevant figures released by Statistics Canada also include an undefined category (visible minority *n.i.e.*). and a multiple category. For some time now, the Employment Equity Act has also been used to support programs that promote equal opportunity for everyone in the social, cultural and economic life of Canada. Statistics Canada also publishes some data with reference to population groups, which differ from visible minority groups to the extent that the individuals in the multiple category including a white response are allocated to one of the specific population groups (including one labelled as white).

Among the population 15 years and over residing in the Montreal CMA, 448,300 persons, or a 15.1% proportion, belong to the visible minorities. They are, however, unevenly distributed across the various visible minority groups, with size differences between groups reflecting

somewhat differences in the timing of arrival. Thus, Blacks (28%) come ahead of four groups with roughly similar numerical importance—Arabs (16%), Latin-Americans (13%), Chinese (13%) and South Asians (12%)—followed by three other groups with single-digit proportions—South East Asians (8%), Filipinos (4%) and West Asians (3%). The two remaining groups (Koreans and Japanese) each amount to less than 1%.

Labour market

According to Table 2, the differences in labour market performance for the visible minority dimension are akin to those according to the immigration dimension. Just like immigrants compared with non-immigrants, visible minorities compared with non-visible minorities participate less in the labour market and are more often unemployed. The differences observed are wider for males than females, with orders of magnitude similar to those observed earlier.

VISIBLE MINORITY STATUS/GROUP	MALES		FEMALES	
	Participation rate (%)	Unemployment rate (%)	Participation rate (%)	Unemployment rate (%)
Total	**90.6**	**6.2**	**81.5**	**6.0**
Visible minority population	85.4	12.0	70.6	13.4
Chinese	79.8	8.3	68.7	10.2
South Asian	84.2	12.8	57.8	18.4
Black	87.2	11.9	78.5	12.8
Filipino	88.8	4.5	84.6	5.1
Latin American	87.5	10.9	71.1	15.0
Southeast Asian	87.6	7.3	71.2	10.7
Arab	85.7	18.0	63.1	18.9
West Asian	81.5	10.4	61.3	18.6
Korean	76.4	8.9	65.9	9.4
Japanese	86.9	7.5	64.6	5.6
Visible minority, *n.i.e.*	89.4	13.3	72.6	12.3
Multiple visible minority	85.5	8.9	74.4	12.8
Not a visible minority	91.7	5.1	83.8	4.7

More interesting are the differences in the participation and unemployment rates observed among the eight main visible minority groups in the Montreal CMA. First, for males, the participation rate is around or slightly above the visible minority average for six of the eight groups but somewhat lower (by 4-5% points) for

the Chinese and West Asian groups. The unemployment rate, however, exhibits wide variations around the visible minority average (12.0%): it ranges from lower values for the Chinese (8.3%), Southeast Asian (7.3%) and especially Filipino (4.5%) groups to a higher value for the Arab group (18.0%). Thus, the Chinese group has both low participation and unemployment rates and the Arab group both high participation end unemployment rates, in contrast to the general pattern in which a high (low) unemployment rate coexists with a low (high) employment rate. This general pattern, however, is the norm for females with one exception. At one extreme is the Filipino group with a high participation rate (84.6%) and a low unemployment rate (5.1%). At the other extreme are the Arab, West Asian and South Asian groups which have a low participation rate (58-63%) and a high unemployment rate (18-19%), as opposed to visible minority averages of, respectively, 70.6% and 13.4%. The former observation is probably related to Citizenship and Immigration Canada's program for live-in caregivers (Guide 5290 – Live-in Caregivers, 2012), which more or less guarantees its beneficiaries a job for the first two years following their arrival in Canada. As for the latter observation, it has its source in the cultural and social traits of the geographic regions from which the three groups concerned originate (women with low education are often confined to household work). The one exception to the norm is the Black group with high participation and average unemployment.

Income

Visible minority status has a strong impact on total income: see Table 3. First, its median value is about $11,000 lower for the visible minority population than for the rest of the population ($16,400 VS $27,200), and its average value is more than $13,000 lower ($22,800 VS $36,100). Second, both the median and average values vary somewhat among the eight visible minority groups, but the intergroup differences observed for the two types of values bear no resemblance. On the one hand, the average values set the Southeast Asian group ($26,000) apart from the other groups, which are similar (varying from $20,200 for the West Asian group to $23,100 for the Chinese and Filipino groups). On the other hand, the median values suggest a wider variation among the eight visible minority groups, from the West Asian group ($12,900) to the Filipino group ($19,500), with the Southeast Asian group in the middle of the pack ($16,900). Income is therefore unevenly distributed in some groups such as the Chinese group and especially the Southeast Asian group, owing to the substantial proportion of highly educated immigrants from Vietnam who have a good job, especially in the health sector.

STATUS/ PERIOD OF IMMIGRATION	TOTAL INCOME ($)		PREVALENCE OF LOW INCOME AFTER TAX IN 2005 (%)	
	Median value	Average value	Economic family members	Persons not in economic families
Total	**25,161**	**34,196**	**11.7%**	**37.5%**
Visible minority population	16,391	22,848	-	-
Chinese	14,789	23,130	26.8%	66.5%
South Asian	15,361	22,434	33.0%	58.9%
Black	18,109	22,701	26.1%	55.4%
Filipino	19,497	23,105	12.0%	54.5%
Latin American	17,144	21,168	27.3%	59.3%
Southeast Asian	16,857	26,017	21.3%	52.1%
Arab	14,669	22,590	36.5%	64.5%
West Asian	12,949	20,225	38.5%	61.6%
Korean	12,560	10,018	32.6%	74.8%
Japanese	17,367	46,070	20.6%	47.2%
Visible minority, *n.i.e.*	18,259	22,608	-	-
Multiple visible minority	17,556	24,424	-	-
Not a visible minority	27,205	36,126	8.0%	34.7%

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census of Population
    Total Income: Catalogue number 97-563-XCB2006007
    Prevalence of low income: Catalogue number 97-564-XCB2006009

The prevalence of low income is high for those persons not living in economic families in all eight visible minority groups, varying relatively little from 52.1% for the Southeast Asian group to 66.5% for the Chinese group, versus 34.7% for the white population group. It is, however, somewhat less for economic family members, although the corresponding prevalence rate differs much more among groups, ranging from 12.0% for the Filipino group to 38.5% for the West Asian group, versus 8.0% for the white population group.

MORE ON INTERETHNIC INEQUALITIES

The interethnic economic inequalities just cited could well stem from differences in the socio-demographic composition of the groups. However, this is unlikely because those inequalities appear to be pervasive in a comparative analysis across immigration status of how two economic indicators (employment rate and labour income) closely related to those used above vary with several socio-demographic characteristics such as age, educational level and knowledge of the official languages (Zhu and Bélanger, 2010). In a nutshell, immigrants born in non-Western countries always perform worse than non-immigrants (and immigrants born in Western countries), although the gap between the two groups varies to some extent. It tends to decrease with age, it is much larger among individuals holding a university degree than among those not holding one, and finally it is wider among individuals knowing both official languages and even more among those knowing French only than among individuals knowing English only.

Also worth addressing here are the interethnic economic inequalities related to the various industries in which the employed population works. The industry distribution of this population does not vary drastically with either of the two immigrant background dimensions. Still, there are some important differences that are broadly similar for the two dimensions so that it is enough, for example, to dwell on the differences with immigration status (see Table 4). Some of those differences pertain to either gender. When compared with non-immigrants, immigrants are more often employed in *Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services* and especially in *Manufacturing*, although somewhat more in this case for females (14.9% VS 7.9%) than males (20.6% VS 16.5%). By contrast, they are less often employed in *Public administration*. But other differences are sex-specific. Thus for males, there is a comparatively higher concentration of immigrants in *Accommodation and food services* and a lower one in *Construction* for males, whereas for females there is a comparatively higher presence of immigrants in *Health care and social assistance* and a lower one in *Finance and insurance* as well as *Educational services*. Although based on 2001 data, additional insights into the differences in industry distribution by immigration status can be found in CAMO-PI (2007). As hinted earlier, similar differences can be found between employed persons who belong or not to the visible minorities, but nevertheless there are a few peculiarities. For example, the comparatively higher concentration of immigrants previously observed for males in *Accommodation and food service applies* to the visible minority population for both males and females.

INDUSTRY	MALES		FEMALES	
	Non-immigrants	Immigrants	Non-immigrants	Immigrants
All industries	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2
21 Mining and oil and gas extraction	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
22 Utilities	1.2	0.4	0.7	0.2
23 Construction	8.7	4.3	1.4	0.7
31-33 Manufacturing	16.5	20.6	7.9	14.9
41 Wholesale trade	6.9	6.6	4.1	5.1
44-45 Retail trade	11.3	10.2	13.7	11.6
48-49 Transportation and warehousing	7.2	6.8	2.7	2.2
51 Information and cultural industries	4.0	3.3	3.7	2.5
52 Finance and insurance	3.4	2.9	6.4	4.9
53 Real estate and rental and leasing	2.0	2.0	1.6	1.7
54 Professional, scientific and technical services	8.7	9.8	7.6	7.5
55 Management of companies and enterprises	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
56 Administrative and support, waste management and remediation services	4.4	6.0	3.2	5.2
61 Educational services	4.4	4.8	10.3	8.0
62 Health care and social assistance	4.5	4.2	17.4	18.9
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation	2.4	1.4	2.4	1.2
72 Accommodation and food services	4.5	9.1	6.1	7.0
81 Other services (except public administration)	4.0	4.6	5.0	5.7
91 Public administration	5.1	2.3	5.0	2.5

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In 2006, the economic inequalities for the immigration dimension in the Montreal CMA population (and thus the Quebec population) are clear: immigrants are not as well off as non-immigrants. But this was not always the case. As recently as 1981 (Cousineau and Boudarbat, 2009) and even 1986 (Labelle *et al.*, 2007), the situation was totally the opposite with immigrants faring better than non-immigrants. It so happened that, in the wake of the 1970s shift in the origin of the immigrants from Europe to the rest of the world, that those immigrants born in several groups of countries more or less associated with the various visible minority groups began to experience economic difficulties, which are well documented as early as 1986 (Labelle *et al.*, 2007) and especially 1991 (CCCI, 1993). This resulted in a deterioration of the economic situation of immigrants vis-à-vis non-immigrants which, besides leading to the reversal already mentioned, has continued unabated to this day. Reasons for this deterioration are numerous and thus cannot be easily summarized here. Nevertheless, globalization is probably the main culprit, because it led to a substantial reduction in the need for unqualified workers (traditionally immigrants) and, from there, to a shift in the selection of immigration. From being tied to professions in demand (which magnified an immigrant's chances of getting a job), such selection moved to emphasizing human capital, thus making it more difficult for an immigrant to land a job, owing to lacking recognition of credentials and work experience coming on top of creeping discrimination associated with being a member of the visible minorities. This difficulty, however, tends to diminish with duration of residence, although more or less rapidly according the visible minority group (Renaud *et al.*, 2003).

This being said, the longer the duration of residence of immigrants (the earlier the period of immigration), the better is their economic situation, although those immigrants who arrived in the early nineties appear to do marginally worse on some indicators (especially income indicators) than those who arrived in the late nineties. Moreover, the more recent immigrants, those who arrived between 2001 and 2006, perform substantially less than those arrived in the previous quinquennial period. Interestingly, these two underachieving cohorts are also cohorts with a comparatively higher volume so that one can hypothesize that their economic difficulties are somewhat linked to a labour supply that is too large for a labour demand which typically requires time to adjust itself to the shock introduced in the economic system.

Finally, given the economic difficulties encountered by the immigrants coming from countries associated with the various visible minority groups, the inequalities observed for the visible minority dimension are even more manifest than for the immigration dimension. Belonging to a visible minority leads to a lower economic performance with wide intergroup disparities. But, although these disparities may vary with the indicator used, the Filipino group is generally on top and the West Asian group at or near the bottom.

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ETHNICITÉ ET INÉGALITÉS ÉCONOMIQUES AU QUÉBEC: UN APERÇU

Les données existantes permettent difficilement d'analyser d'un point de vue strictement ethnique les inégalités économiques chez les personnes issues de l'immigration. Aussi cet article aborde-t-il la question en référence aux deux principales dimensions de l'origine immigrée, soit le statut (et la période) d'immigration et le statut (et le groupe) de minorité visible. À cet effet, il examine les écarts affichés entre les divers groupes associés à chacune de ces deux dimensions par plusieurs indicateurs économiques liés au marché du travail et au revenu. Cet examen fait appel aux données du recensement de 2006 relatives à la Région Métropolitaine de Recensement de Montréal (ci-après la RMR de Montréal) qui abrite la très grande majorité de la population québécoise de 15 ans et plus issue de l'immigration: neuf personnes sur dix, tant pour les immigrants que les personnes appartenant à une minorité visible.

Statut/période d'immigration

Dans la RMR de Montréal, près d'une personne sur quatre (24 %) est un immigrant, c'est-à-dire une personne ayant obtenu des autorités compétentes le droit de s'établir au Canada de manière permanente. Mais, alors que plus de la moitié des immigrants (55 %) sont arrivés au Canada avant 1991, moins de la moitié sont arrivés après cette date, surtout lors de la dernière période quinquennale (2001-2006) qui a vu l'entrée de près d'un immigrant sur cinq. Si l'on s'en tient à la population des 25-54 ans (afin de réduire l'influence de la structure par âge), il appert que les immigrants participent moins souvent au marché du travail et sont plus souvent en chômage que les non-immigrants et ce, bien plus chez les femmes que chez les hommes. De

plus, le taux de participation des immigrants augmente tandis que leur taux de chômage diminue avec la durée d'établissement. Cependant, les immigrants masculins arrivés dans la première moitié des années quatre-vingt-dix ont un taux de participation moins élevé que ceux arrivés dans la seconde moitié de la même décennie. De tels écarts intergroupes s'observent également face au revenu des 15 ans et plus, qu'il s'agisse du revenu total des individus ou de la prévalence du faible revenu chez les familles économiques (et les personnes qui y vivent) et chez les personnes vivant hors famille économique. Selon Statistique Canada, les familles économiques (et les personnes qui y vivent) et les personnes vivant hors famille économique, différenciées suivant la taille de la famille et le lieu de résidence, sont considérées comme ayant un faible revenu si elles consacrent à la nourriture, le logement et l'habillement une proportion de leur revenu après impôt 20 % plus élevée que la moyenne. Une famille économique est un groupe de deux personnes ou plus liées par le sang, le mariage, l'union libre ou l'adoption qui résident dans un même logement. En effet, les immigrants performent moins bien que les non-immigrants. De plus, leur performance tend à s'améliorer avec la durée d'établissement, quoiqu'elle s'inverse entre les deux moitiés des années quatre-vingt-dix. Par ailleurs, la comparaison directe des valeurs moyenne et médiane du revenu total suggère que cet indicateur est plus inégalement réparti chez les immigrants que chez les non-immigrants, en particulier chez les immigrants arrivés avant 1991.

Ainsi, les inégalités selon le statut d'immigration sont claires: les immigrants réussissent moins bien que les non-immigrants. Mais cela ne fut pas toujours le cas. Aussi récemment que 1981 et même 1986, la situation inverse s'observait. Cependant dans la foulée du déplacement de l'origine géographique des immigrants, de l'Europe vers le reste du monde, survenu dans les

années soixante-dix, le recensement de 1986 et surtout celui de 1991 ont mis en évidence que les immigrants en provenance des pays le plus souvent identifiés avec les pays de provenance des minorités visibles étaient confrontés à des difficultés économiques. Depuis, ces difficultés se sont amplifiées au point d'entraîner l'inversion notée ci-dessus et ont continué de s'aggraver par la suite.

Statut/groupe de minorité visible

Dans la RMR de Montréal, un peu moins d'une personne sur sept âgée de 15 ans et plus (15 %) appartiennent aux minorités visibles, c'est-à-dire est une personne autre qu'un autochtone qui n'est pas de race caucasienne ou n'a pas la peau blanche. Cependant, la population des minorités visibles est inégalement répartie entre les huit groupes à la présence significative. Ainsi le groupe noir (28 %) arrive en tête devant quatre groupes d'importance plus ou moins similaire – arabe (16 %), latino-américain (13 %), chinois (13 %) et sud-asiatique (12 %) – loin devant les groupes sud-asiatique (8 %), philippin (4 %) et asiatique occidental (3 %).

Tout d'abord, chez les 25-54 ans, les personnes appartenant aux minorités visibles performent moins bien sur le marché du travail que celles n'y appartenant pas, les écarts de participation et de chômage entre les deux groupes s'apparentent à ceux précédemment observés entre les immigrants et les non-immigrants. Plus intéressante est l'observation des mêmes écarts entre les principaux groupes de minorité visible. Généralement, plus le taux de participation est élevé, plus le taux de chômage est faible. Cette affirmation vaut presque toujours chez les femmes où l'on retrouve à un extrême le groupe philippin, plus performant, et à l'autre extrême les groupes arabe, asiatique occidental et sud-asiatique, moins performants. En revanche, elle se vérifie moins chez les hommes pour lesquels la participation au marché du travail varie assez peu avec le groupe de minorité visible. Ainsi, participation et chômage sont moins élevés pour le groupe chinois et à l'inverse plus élevés pour le groupe arabe. Par ailleurs, chez les 15 ans et plus, appartenir aux minorités visibles plutôt que ne pas y appartenir mène à un revenu total moins beaucoup moins élevé (16 400 $ VS 27 200 $ sur la base de la valeur médiane) et en une plus forte prévalence du faible revenu. De plus, alors qu'ils sont minimes sur la base de la valeur moyenne (quoique le groupe asiatique du sud-est présente une valeur comparativement plus élevée), les écarts de revenu total enregistrés entre les huit principaux groupes de minorité visible sont assez substantiels sur la base de la valeur médiane: le revenu total médian s'étage entre 12 900 $ pour le groupe asiatique occidental et 19 500 $ pour le groupe philippin, tandis que le groupe asiatique du sud-est, malgré sa valeur moyenne comparativement plus élevée, se situe au milieu du peloton (16 900 $).

Plus encore que les inégalités économiques observées selon le statut d'immigration, celles observées selon le statut de minorité visible sont nettement tranchées: appartenir aux minorités visibles résulte en une moindre réussite économique, avec d'importants écarts entre les groupes qui tendent à changer avec l'indicateur considéré. Néanmoins, le groupe philippin réussit généralement le mieux, tandis que le groupe asiatique occidental réussit moins bien, sinon le moins bien.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN QUEBEC AND INDIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

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REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE APPROACHES TO DISCRIMINATION

Most countries have in place laws which prohibit discrimination as well as preferential or exclusionary treatment in the work place based on different grounds. In this context, refusal to hire, promote or dismiss an employee based on his/her gender, race, ethnicity, religious background, etc. is considered as an unlawful employment practice (Dobbin, 2009). Individuals who believe that they are victims of discrimination can file a complaint with a human rights commission or an equivalent body, which will investigate the case. At the conclusion of the investigation, the individual is entitled to reparations if the employer is found guilty of discrimination. This process is traditionally described as a reactive approach to discrimination (Chicha, 2001).

Proactive policies were adopted due to the challenges of processing discrimination-related complaints; the difficulty of proving that discrimination actually took place; unreasonable delays in the investigation process; and the related costs. Because members of discriminated groups often have precarious positions in the labour market and have limited knowledge of their rights, it is also expected that many will refrain from complaining because of the risks associated with losing their job, or being perceived as "trouble-makers."

Moreover, even if an employer is found guilty of discrimination, the reparations awarded to the employee will probably fail to initiate significant changes in the attitudes and behaviours of other employers; therefore it will have a limited impact on combating discrimination (Garon and Bosset, 2003). In order for socio-economic changes to occur, one could argue that the State needs to recognize the issue of durable inequality between social groups as one of the fruits of discrimination (Tilly, 1998). The proactive approach to discrimination encompasses a broad perspective and could assist in alleviating inequalities and might make the labour market more welcoming for members of target groups. The majority of proactive measures found throughout the world today have been inspired by the various affirmative action policies implemented in the United States in the late 1960s. Numerous studies have shown that these programs had a very positive impact on the representation of discriminated groups (Holzer and Neumark, 2006).

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS IN QUEBEC

In 1985 the Quebec government officially adopted a proactive approach in order to combat employment discrimination. A new chapter dedicated to affirmative action programs was introduced in the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (L.R.Q., ch. C-12):

> *"The object of an affirmative action program is to remedy the situation of persons belonging to groups discriminated against in employment or in the sector of education or of health services and other services generally available to the public. An affirmative action program is deemed non-discriminatory if it is established in conformity with the Charter."*

The main reason that led the government to change the legal framework is the shared observation, based on a series of social and economic indicators of the labour market, that significant differences persisted between

social groups in Quebec society, including women and members of visible minorities when compared to white men.

Women in the labour market are still largely concentrated in a limited number of professions. It is also more common for them to work part-time and they are more likely to experience episodes of acute poverty (Secrétariat à la Condition féminine, 2007). In the last two decades, the gap between participation rates of women and men in Quebec has narrowed but it remains considerable (59.5% VS 70.6%; Statistics Canada, 2006a). In 2006, women working full time throughout the year were only making 73.8% of the salary of their male counterparts (Statistics Canada, 2006a).

The visible minority population is currently experiencing a period of unprecedented growth in Quebec: they now represent 8.8% of the population (Statistics Canada, 2006b). Their participation rate is somewhat similar to the rest of the population, yet their unemployment rate is twice as high: 13.1% VS 6.4% (Statistics Canada, 2006a). In terms of employment income, they earn an average of 73.3% of the incomes of those who are not visible minorities (Statistics Canada, 2006b).

Affirmative action programs are intended to achieve equality of results – or equality of outcomes – between the designated groups (women, members of visible minorities, Aboriginal people, disabled persons, and ethnic minorities) and the reference group (men who are not members of a visible minority). In any given organization, a comparable rate of success in the dotation process should be observed between members of the target groups and the reference group should their qualifications be equal. Therefore, equality of results is a much broader concept than equality of opportunities which usually involves the removal of alleged barriers in the employment system that could hamper applicants from certain groups in the competition for jobs, but without monitoring the final results (Chicha, 2001).

Affirmative action programs should be based on a structured process that follows an exact schedule and is adapted to reflect the specificities of an organization. In 1985, three types of affirmative action programs were designed:

1. Programs recommended by the Human Rights Commission or ordered by a Tribunal.
2. Programs for the public departments and agencies whose personnel is appointed in accordance with the Public Service Act (chapter F-3.1.1).
3. The Voluntary Program.

Since 1985 two additional programs have been adopted:

1. The Contractual Obligation Program. Adopted in 1987, the Contractual Obligation Program requires that private firms with 100 employees or more who wish to apply for provincial public contracts worth $100,000 or more, or who receive a subsidy of $100,000 or more, must implement an affirmative action program.
2. The Act Respecting Equal Access to Employment in Public Bodies (Loi sur l'accès à l'égalité en emploi dans des organismes publics – L.R.Q., chap. A-2.01). Adopted in 2001, this law requires that public and semi-public bodies which employ 100 persons or more provide a breakdown of target groups and put in place the appropriate measures to attain acceptable representation in their workforce.

Several employers are thus now covered by different types of affirmative action programs in Quebec and the legal framework could potentially have a noticeable impact on combating systemic discrimination. Yet because the government decided to increase the quantity and type of affirmative action programs instead of creating a unified and coherent framework, global monitoring of the programs is more difficult and confusion is often observed.

It is also important to note that with the absence of a formal and independent evaluation of these programs – mostly because the data is either confidential or extremely hard to access – a situation has been created whereby the programs remain suspect in the eyes of the public. Widespread misunderstanding of affirmative action and prejudices also contribute to the public suspicion. Many people who are oblivious of the historical roots of collective inequalities, denounce affirmative action programs as synonyms of reverse discrimination: Others think they are mostly about arbitrary quotas which, as seen above, is not the case in Quebec. Finally one hears often that affirmative action programs question the primacy of merit: while in reality preferential treatment for members of target groups applies only between candidates with similar qualities and credentials.

These prejudices have the potential to stigmatize members of the target groups, which in itself is a serious barrier for the development of affirmative action programs. Another factor that can explain the limited results of the affirmative action programs is the lack of commitment by two of the most important stakeholders, namely the government and the employers, toward the aims of these programs, combined with a denial to acknowledge the very existence of systemic discrimination in the labour market.

INDIA'S RESERVATION POLICIES

Reservation policies in India are based on quotas, targeted towards several identified minority groups which have been historically discriminated, namely the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and the Other Backward Classes (OBC). These policies existed even at the time of the British rule in India. At the time of independence in 1947, the provisions of reservation in education, employment and political representation were included in the Indian Constitution.

The caste system is estimated to be over 2,500 years old in India and has undergone many transformations. It originated from ancient times when society was divided into four classes based on their occupations: the *Brahmin* (the learned); *Kshatriya* (the warrior); *Vaishya* (merchants, traders and business); and *Sudra* (peasants, cobblers and servants). However, the rigidity of the class system over time gave way to the caste system which was determined by birth.

In spite of a raging debate on the rights of religious minority communities such as the Muslims and Christians, reservation policies target the lower caste groups (Sudras) conventionally associated with Hinduism. While caste groupings have been observed in all religions in India including Islam and Christianity, there is no reservation policy towards these groups as yet. The main idea behind reservation was to reduce the rigidity of the hierarchical caste-based structure where the lower castes continue to be socially, economically, educationally and politically backward. These backward castes are identified as Scheduled Castes (SC) and are listed in a government schedule. SCs are also commonly known as Dalits or the "oppressed."

Scheduled Tribes (ST) belong to tribal communities and are distinct from the Hindu caste system. Also known as *Adivasis* (meaning original inhabitants), the tribal population constitutes 7% of the landless people in India which is the second-largest section after the Scheduled Castes (10%) and they own only 3% of the large landholdings (Planning Commission, 2006). Even their school attendance which had risen in the late 1980s and early 1990s has gone down during the period of 1994-2000 (Rath, 2006).

The Constitution classifies SCs and STs in its articles 341 and 342 and provides for special policies in the form of affirmative action/reservations for these categories in higher education, employment in government institutions and political representation through its articles 330, 332 and 334. The list of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes of each individual state varies in India and further complicates the issue. Having constitutionally confirmed reservation for SCs and STs has ensured that it is mandatory and cannot be questioned in theory but

"its implementation is indifferent and often quotas remain incompletely fulfilled" (Deshpande, 2009, p. 66). Further, the creation of other categories like the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and the "Mahadalits" (very oppressed) have added to the quagmire of confusion. While identification in the case of SC and ST can be said to be relatively easy, the status of OBC being granted to certain groups is difficult and controversial. It is not clear that all groups claiming an OBC status are descendants of the *Sudras*. Each state has its own list of OBCs. Thus, it has taken a long time for the OBC quota to be implemented.

There is now an increasing demand for reservation for women in India. There has been a proposal to introduce reservation of 33% of seats for women in the Lower House of the parliament of India, the Lok Sabha, and in state legislative assemblies. The bill is pending and has yet to be passed. The mechanics of its overlap with the caste-based reservation need to be worked out apart from the opposition that the bill has generated from certain sections of the population (Times of India, November 9th, 2012).

The main criticisms of reservation policies centre around the fact that while SCs and STs have constitutional sanction, OBC reservation does not. The argument that caste cannot be the main indicator of backwardness and reservation should be class-based, does hold some merit as the ultimate goal of the state should be the abolition of the caste system. The fear is that the reservation system has become more of a political gimmick and vote seeker, rather than a genuine effort at uplifting the backward sections of society.

Implementation of reservation looks impressive when one looks at the caste-based quotas in the electoral sphere, but the problem becomes evident in government employment and education. In the latter two areas, quotas remain unfulfilled especially in the higher categories of jobs. While reservation in India cannot be said to be a resounding success, and does have numerous flaws in its conception and implementation, it has nevertheless led to the emergence of a new middle class among the socio-economically suppressed groups. A genuine effort by the politically and economically powerful would go a long way towards resolving the problem.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN QUEBEC AND INDIA: SAME GOAL BUT DIFFERENT CONTEXTS?

While both policies share a common goal, social conventions, the general legal framework and the nature and level of political mobilization in Quebec and India have resulted in distinct policy responses. But regardless of the details of the policies in place, it appears that three crucial dimensions should always be considered in policy design: 1) Should the policy be based on strict quotas, or on more flexible representation targets? 2) Should we focus our

efforts on a limited number of groups, or attempt to cover a larger proportion of the population? 3) Can affirmative action eliminate social inequality on its own, or should it be treated only as one dimension of a broader social policy agenda? The first question relates to the different forms of affirmative action policy and their relative strength (Bader, 1998). A stronger version, like the reservation policy in India, is based on the idea that an individual could get a job if he/she belonged to one of the target groups. In contrast, the affirmative action policy in Quebec can be considered weaker because individuals belonging to one of the target groups can be offered a job only if their qualifications are equal to those of other candidates. A moderate version exists between these two extreme positions: an individual would get the job if he/she met certain essential minimal standards of competence, even if a candidate from the majority group were better qualified. The weakest version of the policy is much easier for the general public to accept as legitimate. However, its impact on the labour market is likely to be more limited.

The second question is more political than the first, as it focuses on the choice of target groups. Such decisions could well be considered arbitrary. On what criteria should the selection of target groups be based on? How extreme does inequality have to be for the State to intervene in favour of a specific group? Political mobilization is a key variable to consider here. Over time, the inclusion of new groups is likely to lessen the impact of affirmative action policies: instead of focusing on achieving better workforce representation for a limited number of groups, organizations will have to manage a range of specific measures for different groups with varying experiences in the labour market. While both Quebec and India are experiencing pressure to include additional groups, caution should be exercised when extending the policy is being considered.

Finally, believing that affirmative action policies are sufficient in addressing social inequality is likely a mistake. These policies must be part of a broader social agenda that also includes measures to strengthen the capacities of people in disadvantaged groups. For instance, significant investments in schools located in poor neighbourhoods are required, as are active measures to fight poverty, etc. In the fight against inequality, affirmative action is just one tool among many. If significant results are to be achieved, the state needs to adopt a systemic perspective of inequality.

Affirmative action policies have always been a subject of heated debate, both for the general public and policy-makers. For this reason, transparent national mechanisms are needed to objectively monitor and evaluate whether or not a policy is achieving its goal. Fear of backlash is arguably one of the reasons why many politicians

have demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for affirmative action. Bakan and Kobayashi (2007) argue that backlash is understood as a "negative response to a progressive policy, campaign, or event [...] Typically, it can be traced to a "trigger" or a "spark" that provokes a response that is otherwise either non-existent or dormant and lacking substantial influence" (p. 147). Backlash can lead many politicians to avoid debates, make concessions that ease the obligations of subjected organizations, or even limit access to relevant policy-related information and data that are required to objectively assess a policy's impact. Certainly, opponents' potential reactions must be anticipated in the policy-making process. It is also necessary to give serious thought to the modalities of implementation of affirmative action. However, this does not mean that policy-makers should shy away from making bold political choices. The human costs of inaction and the related social risks are too high to leave the status quo unchallenged.

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L'ACTION POSITIVE AU QUEBEC ET EN INDE: UNE ÉVALUATION DES RÉSULTATS ET DES CONSÉQUENCES IMPRÉVUES

Les programmes d'accès à l'égalité du Québec et la politique des sièges réservés en Inde sont deux approches proactives pour combattre la discrimination dans le domaine de l'emploi. Malgré le fait qu'elles partagent l'objectif d'assurer une plus grande égalité pour les membres de groupes désavantagés, des différences significatives existent entre elles. La plupart des états possèdent un cadre juridique interdisant la discrimination, ainsi que les traitements préférentiels ou l'exclusion, dans les milieux de travail. Le refus d'embaucher et d'accorder une promotion, ou le licenciement en fonction d'un motif illicite de discrimination, seraient illégal. Les victimes de discrimination pourraient donc porter plainte. Suite à une enquête afin de déterminer si la plainte est fondée, la personne discriminée pourrait obtenir réparation de l'employeur. Cette approche complexe et coûteuse correspond au modèle réactif. À l'opposé, l'approche proactive n'exige pas de prouver au préalable la culpabilité d'un employeur; tous doivent mettre en œuvre les moyens nécessaires afin d'augmenter et de maintenir la représentation des groupes-cibles sous-représentés dans leurs effectifs. La plupart des modèles proactifs s'inspirent de l'exemple américain qui, à partir des années 60, a permis d'augmenter la représentation des Noirs dans les organisations assujetties. L'approche proactive a été adoptée au Québec en 1985. À l'origine, trois types de programmes étaient prévus: 1) les programmes recommandés par la Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse ou imposés par un Tribunal; 2) les programmes pour le personnel de la fonction publique; et 3) les programmes volontaires. Deux autres types ont été ajoutés: 1) les programmes de l'obligation contractuelle pour les entreprises qui obtiennent une subvention ou un contrat du gouvernement d'une valeur minimum de 100 000 $

et qui ont 100 salariés ou plus; et 2) les programmes dans les organismes publics. Des différences importantes existent entre ces programmes. Compte tenu de ces différences et des problèmes d'accessibilité des données, il est complexe d'évaluer les impacts de cette politique. Cette situation combinée à un manque de sensibilisation du public à la discrimination contribuent à entretenir la confusion au Québec et crée un terrain fertile à l'expression de préjugés, comme: 1) la discrimination à rebours: les programmes obligent à faire preuve de favoritisme; 2) l'obligation d'embauche d'un quota arbitraire de membres des groupes cibles; et 3) une remise en question du mérite. Le faible niveau d'engagement des employeurs et du gouvernement à l'endroit de l'accès à l'égalité constitue un obstacle majeur supplémentaire. La politique des sièges réservés en Inde est basée sur des quotas, relativement fixes, afin de permettre aux membres de groupes historiquement discriminés, nommément les membres des castes et tribus inférieures, ainsi que les autres classes défavorisées, un accès facilité à l'éducation, l'emploi et la représentation politique. Cette politique existait dès l'époque coloniale et, au moment de l'indépendance, elle a été inscrite dans la Constitution. Le système des castes existe depuis 2500 ans et bien qu'il ait subi de nombreuses transformations, son impact est toujours ressenti. À l'origine, la société était divisée en quatre classes: 1) *Brahmin* (les instruits); 2) *Kshatriya* (les guerriers); 3) *Vaishya* (les marchants et artisans); et 4) *Sudra* (les paysans, cordonniers et serviteurs). La rigidité des classes sociales a donné naissance au système des castes; la caste étant déterminée par la naissance. Malgré d'importants débats sur les droits des minorités religieuses, notamment les musulmans et les chrétiens, la politique actuelle ne leur réserve aucun siège. L'objectif principal de la politique est d'affaiblir la rigidité de la structure des castes puisque les membres des castes inférieures continuent d'être désavantagés aux niveaux social, économique et éducatif. Ces derniers sont désignés comme les « opprimés »

ou *Dalits*. L'État réserve aussi des sièges pour les membres des communautés tribales, les *Adivasis*, qui ne sont pas intégrés dans le système des castes, mais qui vivent une situation désavantageuse. Comme cette politique est inscrite dans la Constitution, elle est rarement remise en question ; par contre, il ne faut pas sous-estimer les difficultés de sa mise en œuvre. De plus, la création de nouveaux groupes cibles comme les « autres classes défavorisés » dont le statut est controversé, ainsi que les *Mahadalits* (les très opprimés), ajoute à la complexité. En ce moment, plusieurs souhaitent que les femmes deviennent un groupe cible ; cependant, cette proposition ne fait pas l'unanimité. Les principales critiques s'articulent autour du fait que le système des castes n'est pas le principal indicateur des désavantages, aussi la politique devrait se baser sur la classe sociale, d'autant plus que celle-ci légitimise le système de castes. D'autres critiques affirment que les individus qui profitent le plus de la politique sont les élites des groupes défavorisés qui n'auraient probablement pas besoin de cette intervention de l'État. Malgré tout, il est généralement admis que cette politique a permis l'émergence d'une classe moyenne dans les groupes historiquement défavorisés. L'importance de combattre la discrimination justifie l'intervention de l'État.

Cependant, il est nécessaire de pouvoir démontrer l'impact réel des politiques sur les groupes aidés, tout en nous assurant que le groupe majoritaire ne subit pas un préjudice déraisonnable lors de la mise en œuvre de la politique.

Bien que différentes, les politiques québécoise et indienne nous amènent à réfléchir à certaines dimensions cruciales de la construction des politiques proactives: 1) devons-nous instaurer des quotas fixes ou favoriser des objectifs plus flexibles ; 2) faut-il se concentrer sur un nombre limité de groupes dont la situation est particulièrement désavantageuse ou adopter une perspective élargie et prendre en considération les réalités de nombreux groupes qui rencontrent des difficultés plus ou moins prononcées sur le marché du travail ; et 3) est-ce que ces mesures de discriminations positives sont suffisantes pour éliminer les inégalités ou doivent-elles être considérées comme l'une des dimensions d'un agenda social plus important. Depuis son introduction, la discrimination positive a toujours été l'objet de controverses. Malgré tout, considérant l'importance de l'enjeu, il est essentiel d'agir puisque les coûts potentiels de l'inaction sont trop importants pour accepter le statu quo.

THE ROLE OF ETHNIC STATISTICS IN INDIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES

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THE PROBLEM:
DIFFERENT FACES OF DISCRIMINATION

Non-discrimination and affirmative action are complex and controversial issues. They aim to speed up the establishment of a representative and unprejudiced workforce and citizenry and assist those deprived by unfair discrimination. Any social or group identity can become a basis of discrimination. Using the debate on caste-based census to illustrate the relationship between affirmative action policy and statistics, this article focuses on an aspect of discrimination peculiar to India, the caste-based discrimination. We will begin by describing how discriminatory practices inscribed themselves within the history of power relations between castes and right after with the development of India's anti-discrimination policy through caste-based reservation and the quota system. The interface of statistics and anti-discrimination policy is analysed against this background using caste-based census as illustration. While Indian census has a long history, comprehensive caste census was undertaken for the first time in 2011 only. Being relatively new, this allows us to study the political, socio-economical and practical impacts of such a statistical exercise on social policy. The objective is to identify ways in which caste census, and by extension statistical data, support implementation of affirmative action.

Many nations are characterized by social inequalities, but in India these inequalities were institutionalized by the caste system. Affirmative action in India takes the form of positive discrimination through reservations, in opposition to non-discrimination in western democracies. However redistribution is unevenly spread and timely data are scarce. "Experience has […] shown that in spite of repeated and urgent reminders, it has not been possible for State Governments to furnish required and sufficient data in time for inclusion in the Report. Moreover, it is found that information is very sketchy and incomplete and, it being already too *late, no time is left to obtain further details*" (Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the Year 1953 (Third Report) in http://www.ambedkar.org/News/reservationinindia.pdf). Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) are two groupings of historically disadvantaged people that are given express recognition in the Constitution of India.

CASTE-BASED CENSUS:
SOLUTION OR SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY?

Positive discrimination is accomplished through a quota allocation system, depending upon the availability of correct statistics. The statistical system functions as per constitutional division of responsibility between the union and the states and different ministries. While decentralization is appropriate to meet individual requirements of ministries/states, the need of a holistic pan-Indian exercise is met by the Census. It is the largest single and most credible source on population characteristics, socio-cultural and demographic data, and primary data in the village/town/ward level.

For the first time since independence, the 2011 census incorporated caste-based data. SC/STs were recensed earlier, but OBCs, although eligible for 27% of reservation, had not been recensed in 1931. The key motivation behind the caste census was to identify which castes were backward or had improved their socio-economic status. The census data collection began in June 2011 with the headcount of people living below poverty line. Significantly, it was not just an OBC-headcount, but a comprehensive caste headcount, with every citizen asked which caste he/she belongs to.

Given its undeniable importance for Indian democracy, this issue deserves critical scrutiny. Will a caste census enable better implementation of affirmative action? Does it have other advantages and unintended policy consequences? What is the impact of such a census on the Dalit and tribal populations? What are the methodological/logistical difficulties involved? In addition to policy-rationale, the moral-philosophical justifications for and against collection of caste data are important.

The last time a census included caste data was in 1931. Caste census by the British was an anthropological exercise to learn about the colonised; the "census," "map" and "museum" being ways by which the colonialists learnt about the colonised (Anderson, 1991). The first census of 1871 categorised castes on a scale of superior, intermediate, trading or pastoral (Memorandum, Census of British India, 1871-72, pp 21), legitimising notions of superiority and inferiority.

POLITICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS

Debates surrounding the current census illustrate the politics of caste. Due to its socio-economic and political consequences, the census elicits intense discussions in the media and political parties. Major political parties affirm the need for caste census. Critics express anxiety about heightening divisiveness with vested interests making political capital of caste loyalties. It has been alleged that the mere act of labelling persons as belonging to a caste perpetuates the system. It is, however, difficult to see why this would be the case. It is just as easy to argue that it is impossible to get rid of any institution by ignoring its existence.

The socio-political and ideological criticality of the census is not to be found in academic discussions; rather it is traceable more accurately in people's reactions. During the colonial census "various ambitious castes quickly perceived chances of raising their status. They invited conferences of members, formed councils to see that their status was recorded in the way they thought was honourable" (Ghurye in Gorringe, 2012). Similarly, in the weeks leading up to the 2011 census, the responses, agitations, posters, demands and debates about how each caste should or should not respond were compelling. Some urged members to register themselves with an over-arching caste name for numerical advantage; others clung steadfastly and proudly to sub-caste identities by privileging status and identity over instrumental calculations. For example, in Tamil Nadu, organisations called on members to shed sub-caste identities in favour of more substantive groups. The Vanniyar Union urged members to register under the overarching category to emphasise numerical strength in order to obtain political and material benefits. The proposal for the distinct clans of Mudaliar, Vellalar and Mukkulathor Agamudayars to re-categorise and present a coherent block highlights such instrumental concerns. The Agamudayars' outraged response demonstrates how greatly this flouts existing caste-conventions. Stretching castes horizontally was also a prime response to the colonial-census, fundamentally altering how caste was understood and how they operated. The move from local to state-wide categories in the 1900s broadened marriage circles emphasising "blood" or lineage rather than conduct as the basis of caste-belonging. Finally, some seek to create new categories altogether. The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal called for marginalised sections to register as Dalits or "casteless" to avoid intra-Dalit debates about majorities and minorities.

Caste was as tricky then as now. "Experience at this Census has shown very clearly the difficulty of getting a correct return of caste and likewise the difficulty of interpreting it for Census purposes" (Hutton, 2010). During the Colonial census, people used it for "Sanskritization," to move up the social order. This crystallised caste and religious identities, otherwise nebulous. Ironically, in the post-Mandal era, the Gujjars fought a pitched battle to be moved from the OBC. The Government of India classifies some of its citizens based on their social and economic condition as Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Class (OBC). The OBC list is dynamic (depending on social, educational and economic factors.) Dalit is a designation for a group of people traditionally regarded as untouchable. To the ST list, acquiring special backward class status. The Meenas of Rajasthan agitated to win ST status. Critics fear that this race will initiate demands from other castes to be declared backward in order to claim reservation.

Since reservation is based on caste, political leaders often demand their caste to be recognised as backward. Thus the contours of caste politics are refashioned and renegotiated in response to the current census, just as during the British attempt. The outpouring of caste-based demands, gatherings and statements shows caste being politicised and animated by head-counting. The fact that notionally rigid categories can be renegotiated to secure political influence reminds us that caste has always been pliable to political influence. This demonstrates that, while the effect may be to crystallise, the process highlights the inherent fuzziness and malleability of social categories. The end result of the current survey remains to be seen, for it provides multiple organisations with a powerful means of mobilising support and with emotional cards to play. It animates caste-appeal and the rhetoric of community, but only when the dust has settled will we discern the shape that the newly-classified castes assume. In the meantime, the hope that the data would serve to rationalise reservations and related debates lies buried beneath claims and counter-claims. Central to these machinations is the fact that the survey is perceived as more than a collection of numbers. It remains a means of classifying and categorising the social universe into two groups: those entitled certain benefits and those who are not.

Incorporating caste as enumerative criteria is likely to have major social ramifications. The Census of 1901 revealed a fall in the "lower castes" because of the 1890s famine. "The diminution in the lower groups is due to the excessive mortality of 1897 when the administration had to face, and admittedly failed to solve, the difficult problem of forcing relief upon people who were reluctant to accept it until they had been reduced to a state of debility which

could end only in death" (Census Report). This illustrates how caste-enumeration is useful; the 1901 census identified the castes most affected by the famine.

In a country living with the reality of caste and striving to offset disadvantages based on social hierarchy, holding a caste census has wide appeal. Caste enumeration is essentially dictated by the quota decisions taken earlier. No quota can be fairly implemented in a data vacuum. "It is important that these things are evaluated to find out which sections are weaker and need to get social justice. This census will help formulate processes in this direction as information is gathered till micro level" (Dikshit, 2012). Once caste was accepted as the main parameter on which social-justice would be measured, it was only a matter of time before it was included in the census. Had there not been a resurgence of caste-based quotas, there would have been no need for enumeration. But after 2006, accurate knowledge of caste membership became critical for equitable fixation of quotas. Indeed, constitutional equality is violated if a caste quota is mandated in the absence of a uniform nationwide database. A country cannot put in place job and education quotas for underprivileged segments then ignore boundaries along which those entitlements are drawn. The new data should enable new policy criteria for recognizing intra-and inter-group socio-economic inequalities and dispensing social-justice commitments. The judicially imposed limit of 50% on the quantum of reservation can be overcome only by hard data. Significantly, caste enumeration is undertaken at the same time as the "Below Poverty Line" census, so there is simultaneous mapping of the economic, caste, and religious backgrounds. Instead of just a headcount of communities, the plan to integrate socio-economic data offers quantifiable data to justify administrative measures based on caste identity. This will determine which families are eligible for anti-poverty subsidies and low-cost food staples. Yet the census is conducted to generate information on permanent socio-economic characteristics and is not designed to assess impact of national policies which may result in systematic response bias.

The strongest point for a caste census was that it would help devise evidence-based social policy. There is a wide disparity in caste figures, particularly OBC numbers which vary from 40-52%. Implementation of social policies benefiting particular castes depends on knowing their exact numbers: "Enumerating all castes will allow us to examine whether and how caste continues to affect the distribution of privilege and non-privilege in our society. It is as important to track how caste benefits some groups as it is to monitor how it disadvantages other groups" (NLSUI, 2010). The Caste census will generate a reliable comprehensive database on interrelations between caste and socio-economic condition; and pave the way to "a genuine democratisation of India [...] the social and economic effects of this "silent revolution" are bound to multiply in the years to come" (Jaffrelot, 2003).

The census raises procedural and practical issues. The first is data availability. Here few problems are anticipated. Most people know their caste identity more clearly and unambiguously than their age. Caste is uniquely assigned, and is public information in rural settlements. Second is privacy. Among the urban elite, caste is private information which people may reveal in contexts like matrimonial advertisements but not to census enumerators. But though caste consciousness is lower in urban India, caste identity of households is publicly known, especially in places of residence. Enumerative methodology requires consideration of many issues, such as: existence of separate state and central OBC lists, difficulties of ascertaining OBC identities of sub-castes, differential caste status of converts, status of orphans and children from inter-caste marriages, and competence of the enumerators. A precise headcount of a particular caste may prove elusive, given the number of sub-castes and sects, and the scope for confusion over their inclusion or exclusion from a larger caste umbrella. The nomenclature of caste-groups varies, while there could be similarities in name between different sects. Even more scientifically challenging is integrating the headcount with the socio-economic profile and using these data to apply the status of backwardness to a caste.

It was concluded that the Census Commission of India was equipped to handle such procedural and methodological requirements, and is "the only competent agency" that can undertake the all-India data collection and tabulation exercise. Further, it was decided that the enumerator was not the competent authority to make the analysis and the verification/classification would be done later by census officials.

CONCLUSION: GOAL OF A CASTELESS SOCIETY

The stand that caste-consciousness is best obliterated over time by neglect would be tenable but for the resurgence of quota-consciousness. People are familiar with categories like scheduled, backward and general; the census will just be a more factual version of information they are already accustomed to provide. Aside from yielding a database, knowing caste shares will enable a fair operation of the reservation. When India became a republic, it was recognised that the nation needed to move towards a casteless society. Yet caste continues to be a pervasive marker of identity in Indian society. There are questions whether the caste-wise breakdown of the population would determine all opportunities or whether there would

be some space for open competition: "Our democracy is determined to show the world that whatever others can do, we can do worse. If in this process, individual initiatives are killed, standards lowered, and professional ethics compromised, there is no cause for worry. We can still sink a lot lower" (Gupta, 2012). In contrast, it was asserted: "Not counting caste has defeated the desire to transcend caste, and the noble idea of "caste blindness" should be rejected in favour of a fresh beginning [of counting caste]" (Deshpande in Sayeed, 2010). The link between caste-identity political affiliations and socio-economic standing is visible in almost all parts of the country. For now, the caste census is already a reality. It requires a vigilant watch to see its repercussions on the fabric of Indian society.

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LE ROLE DES STATISTIQUES ETHNIQUES DANS LES POLITIQUES ANTI-DISCRIMINATOIRES EN INDE

Cet article porte sur la discrimination basée sur la caste, un aspect propre à la société indienne. Nous utiliserons ici les renseignements obtenus grâce aux recensements des castes afin de souligner les liens entre l'action politique affirmative et les statistiques. Nous décrirons en premier lieu la façon dont les pratiques discriminatoires s'inscrivent dans l'histoire des relations de pouvoir entre les castes. Nous poursuivrons en explorant la chronologie du développement des politiques antidiscriminatoires en Inde, dont le système de réservation et les quotas accordés à certaines castes spécifiques. Les liens entre les statistiques et les politiques antidiscriminatoires seront analysés selon cette thématique, en utilisant les données statistiques du recensement des castes. Bien que les gouvernements coloniaux puis indiens effectuent des recensements depuis longtemps, ce n'est qu'en 2011 qu'a eu lieu le premier recensement entièrement basé sur les castes. Puisqu'il s'agit d'un exercice relativement récent, nous serons en mesure d'étudier les aspects politiques, socio-économiques et pratiques liés à un tel exercice statistique.

Plusieurs nations sont caractérisées par les inégalités sociales, mais en Inde ces inégalités sont extrêmement structurées grâce au système des castes.

Les actions affirmatives en Inde se traduisent par de la discrimination positive, imposée sous forme de places réservées dans les emplois gouvernementaux et à l'université. Cela va à l'encontre de la culture de tolérance et de non-discrimination des démocraties occidentales. Cependant, la redistribution est faite de façon inégale et rares sont les données qui sont à jour. Le but du recensement des castes est d'identifier celles ayant un retard socio-économique et ainsi de pouvoir les appuyer dans leur développement.

Les débats entourant le recensement illustrent bien la place des castes dans la politique. En effet, l'exercice a suscité des débats à la fois dans les médias et dans les milieux politiques. Les partis politiques les plus importants ont mis l'accent sur le besoin de connaître le nombre exact de membres dans chaque caste. Pour d'autres cependant, le recensement pourrait avoir comme conséquence d'accentuer les divisions dans la société indienne: certaines personnes pourraient être tentées de développer leur capital politique grâce à la loyauté liée à la caste. On ne trouve pas nécessairement ce discours critique à l'égard du recensement dans le discours académique, mais plutôt dans la réaction des gens ordinaires. On peut lier cette inquiétude aux conséquences qu'eurent les recensements à l'époque coloniale, au cours desquels plusieurs castes ambitieuses ont profité de l'occasion

pour s'élever dans l'échelle sociale. Les frontières de la politique des castes ont été redéfinies et renégociées à la suite du dernier recensement, comme ce fut jadis le cas avec les recensements britanniques. Le nombre élevé de demandes basées sur la caste démontre que les recensements politisent et animent les différentes castes. Le fait que des catégories rigides puissent être renégociées afin de s'arroger davantage de pouvoir politique nous rappelle que les castes ont toujours été sujettes à l'influence politique. Pour le moment, plusieurs organisations en profite pour mobiliser du support, et pour jouer la carte de l'émotion. Au centre de ces manipulations on trouve l'idée que, pour plusieurs, le recensement est bien plus qu'un simple ramassis de chiffres. En effet, nombreux sont ceux qui y voient une façon de classifier la société en groupes ayant droit ou non à certains avantages.

L'impact social d'un dénombrement des castes est majeur. Dans un pays qui tente de renverser les désavantages socio-économiques qu'engendrent pour certaines couches de la société cette discrimination basée sur la hiérarchie sociale, l'idée de faire un tel recensement est intéressante. Les nouvelles données statistiques permettront de mieux établir les critères afin de cerner les inégalités sociales et économiques au sein des groupes et entre ceux-ci, et de faire régner la justice sociale. Le dénombrement des castes se déroule en même temps que le recensement de la population vivant sous le seuil de la pauvreté. Il y a donc une mise

en correspondance simultanée des données portant sur le statut socio-économique, la religion et la caste. Le point fort du recensement portant sur les castes est qu'il aidera à établir des politiques sociales basées sur des faits.

Cependant, le recensement soulève des questions quant à sa pratique et à son fonctionnement. D'abord, on se questionne sur la disponibilité des données. En effet, les données quantitatives demandent une certaine approche et sur le plan scientifique, il est difficile d'intégrer les données du recensement au profil socio-économique et de déterminer l'état d'arriération d'une caste. Cependant, on a montré que la commission du recensement de l'Inde était bien équipée pour répondre aux exigences procédurales et méthodologiques.

L'idée que le système de caste disparaîtra avec le temps si on l'ignore serait défendable, si ce n'était de la résurgence de la conscience des différentes castes face aux quotas. En effet, les Indiens sont habitués aux termes de tribus répertoriées, de classes défavorisées, et de castes générales. Pour eux, le recensement n'est qu'une version objective des informations qu'ils ont l'habitude de fournir. En plus de permettre la création d'une base de données, le recensement favorisera un système de réservation plus juste que celui qu'ils connaissent. À l'heure actuelle, le système des castes est bien réel, et il faut rester vigilant pour comprendre ses répercussions sur la société indienne.

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION PROGRAMS IN INDIA: LESSONS FROM DESJARDINS

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INTRODUCTION

Social banking and financial inclusion present a significant challenge and a unique opportunity to build a broad based and stable financial system, subservient and contributing to growth and overall economic prosperity of the low income people. The banking business globally has been designed to serve businesses and individuals with capabilities to act in a market economy without much attention to the poor who cannot pay high costs for accessing financial services. This situation is often forces them to rely on informal sources for their funding needs at exorbitant rates and has severely curtailed the opportunities available to them to use the financial system to improve the quality of their lives. Social banking has emerged as the system where banking business is oriented towards developing technology leveraged models that bring down the costs of providing services and make banking affordable to the masses. By extending the reach and penetration of banks, social banking tries to make banking services available to the marginalized segments of society (Chakrabarty, 2012).

Financial Inclusion Programme is not only expansion of banking and financial activities to the unbanked and excluded population but it also envisions bringing multi-faceted developments to the marginalized section of society who are yet to become the partners in equilibrium of our advanced and developed societies. Three quarters of the world's more than one billion extremely poor people live in rural areas of developing countries. Poor people in rural areas tend to have lower levels of health and education; they are more likely to have limited access to basic services such as water and sanitation; and paradoxically, despite depending on agriculture as their main source of livelihood, they also suffer the most from hunger and food insecurity (Harza, 2009).

The absence of banking and credit facilities is seen as a major reason behind the mass poverty. It has been experienced that a family's overall standards of living improve drastically when they are given access to affordable credit facilities. "About 2.5 billion people across the globe do not have access to basic banking services. The unbanked population, which lives primarily in developing countries, comprises nearly half of the world's working-age population. Their exclusion from the formal financial system restricts their participation in the global economy and severely curtails the opportunities available to them to pull themselves out of poverty" (Chakrabarty, 2012).

FINANCIAL INCLUSION PROGRAMME IN INDIA

India is principally a rural economy as about 70% of its population lives in villages. Inaccessibility of credit and banking services to the weaker sections, particularly in rural areas and the agriculture primary sector, can be termed as a major reason behind the mass-poverty in India. The rural credit system assumes a high importance because most Indian rural families have inadequate savings to finance farming and other economic activities. Thus availability of timely credit at affordable rates of interest is a pre-requisite for improving rural livelihood and accelerating rural development (Sing, 2009).

The traditional avenues of rural financing consist of traditional moneylenders, big landlords, big farmers, traders, etc. The relationship brought about by such credit transaction is exploitative in nature and is marked by high interest rates, usurious practices, lifelong and inter-generational indebtedness, etc. Financing in rural sectors is mainly done through informal credit sources (Chakraborty, 2009). To fight this exploitation, modern institutional credit was introduced. A large number of agencies, including cooperatives, regional rural banks,

commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions, self-help groups together represent the institutional rural credit system in India. These networks, apart from working as financial intermediaries, also play a key developmental role in the rural economy.

As per the estimates of the National Sample Survey, over 50% of cultivator households, mostly marginal farmers, have virtually no access to credit (Committee of Financial Inclusion 2008). Access of financial services through the formal financial network remains difficult for the poor. "Thin penetration of banking and financial institutions in the rural areas," "cumbersome norms and procedures of financial institutions," "collateral-based financing," "systemic in-built bias against small borrowers by formal banking systems which feel burdened with small and frequent transactions," "high operating expenses," "ongoing opinion over the financial services to poor as a non-profitable highly risky venture," etc. are some of the principal reasons behind the hesitant approach of banks and financial institutions in extending their services to the masses on margin.

Early efforts to extend credit to weaker sections through institutional channels in India include the enactment of the Cooperative Societies Act, in 1904, and the nationalization of 14 commercial banks in 1969. With the aim to further intensify the efforts of providing institutional financial services in rural areas, the Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) were exclusively mooted. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was set up by the government as an apex and regulatory body in the field of rural financing. NABARD launched the SHG-Bank Linkage Programme in 1992, today the largest microfinance programme in the world. The concept of priority sector lending became mandatory where banks have to extend 40% of total advances to priority sectors and 18% to agriculture. The Eleventh Five-Year-Plan (2007-12) of India envisioned inclusive growth as a key policy objective. It envisages restructuring the policies in order to make the growth faster, broad-based and inclusive. The policies aim at increasing the income and employment opportunities and the financing of programmes capable of making the growth more inclusive, such as the development of agriculture and small scale industries.

PROBLEMS IN FINANCIAL INCLUSION

- With remarkable increase in the rural credit from institutional agencies, the recent years have also witnessed the unprecedented high rate of default cases. The growing cases of defaults have been putting an adverse impact over the financial health and sustainability of the lending institutions.

- The vision of financial inclusion incorporates financial assistance for capacity building and economic emancipation of the target groups. But it is experienced that the endeavor of financial inclusion has mostly remained confined to financial assistance and the large number of default cases in priority sector lending shows our midway diversion from the goal of capacity building of masses and it thus requires to re-approach the entire issue for the envisaged result of sustainable financial empowerment of the masses especially of women and other vulnerable groups.

- The existence of multiple agencies retailing credit in a common area of operation and dispersing credit in an uncoordinated manner resulted in multiple financing, over-financing, under-financing, financial indiscipline and diversion of scarce resources to unproductive purposes (Babu et Subash 2009).

- Absence or delay in adopting latest technology, in particular with cooperatives and RRBs, has been affecting cost and operational efficiency in extending affordable banking services to the masses.

- Efficiency and performances of small size exclusive institutions like RRBs and Cooperatives are marred by local conditions and policies. There is a strong requirement to restructure these institutions in a centralized body with uniform policy guiding to fulfill the requirements of the masses.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

- With rising rural income and agricultural exports, the next few years would witness a substantial increase in the demand for rural credit. The growing importance of animal husbandry, fishery, forestry, giving preference for high value crops, may necessitate involvement of newer financial agencies or groups such as Self-Help Groups (SHGs), non-banking financial institutional companies (Babu et Subash 2009). There has been a substantial increase in agricultural credit in the last decade. But in order to meet our target of maintaining 9% annual growth in GDP, the agriculture sector has to register an annual growth of 4% on a permanent basis. For this, larger capital infusion is required. Achieving minimum growth is a pre-requisite for inclusive growth, reduction of poverty levels, development of the rural economy and the enhancement of farm incomes (Economic survey of India, 2012).

- Agencies involved in rural credit, especially Regional Rural Banks and Co-operatives, need to be revitalized by the infusion of fresh capital and latest technology, with emphasis on greater autonomy, accountability and self-sustainability.

- About 70% of the population and over 50% of the total workforce depends on agriculture for its livelihood but its contribution in GDP has been falling steeply. With declining per capita productivity, it is a huge task for the development agencies to ensure our goal of inclusive development by rendering the agricultural activities profitable.

LESSONS FROM DESJARDINS GROUP

Canada is the country with the highest rate of per capita cooperative presence, particularly in Quebec. The main reason for such a strong cooperative environment in Canada lies behind the pious efforts of Alphonse Desjardins as the pioneer of the cooperative movement in North America. At the turn of the 20th century economic and social life in Quebec was characterized by exploitative and usurious lending practices due to the absence of a formal financial infrastructure. This led to pitiful living conditions for common French Canadians; life-long indebtedness caused them to lose their farms and means of livelihood, and the lack of capital prevented them from adopting the latest technologies in agricultural activities, which resulted in poor agricultural productivity, their principal source of livelihood. All this resulted in a high rate of migration of poor Francophones to the United States, leading to the dilution of their culture, religion and language. The current economic and social conditions of rural India cannot directly be matched with the conditions of Quebec during the early 20th century but some of the similarities and solutions adopted can be inspiring.

Alphonse Desjardins erected a cooperative institution, "the Caisse," as a solution to the different problems of poor Francophones. He first focused on the mission to inculcate the habit of saving and exercising a prudent life-style among the poor Francophones. These local and small savings became the seed capital of the Caisses which was further utilized for lending to individual members for productive purposes and for financing the local and community development activities through investment in local schools, hospitals and municipal bodies. Gradually, the Caisses became the centre of financial training for the cultural, economic and social emancipation of French Canada. It also became the medium to promote democracy and youth by designing special "Caisses scolaires" catering to the needs of children. The Desjardins group also worked to reduce alcoholism and gambling among Francophones. Desjardins' Caisses were the principal source of short term agricultural financing for the provincial government of Quebec during the first half of the 20th century. The Desjardins Group was also the selected honored partner of the provincial government of Quebec during the second half of the 20th century when Quebec embarked on the vision of industrialization and modernization. Being the pioneer and leader in online banking services in Quebec at the beginning of the sixties, Desjardins has always been on the forefront to adopt the latest technology as a tool to enhance the cost and service efficiency, all targeted to provide better and more affordable services to its members (Poulin, Goulet & Rivard 2000).

Starting as cooperative unit based on the small savings of the population, the Desjardins group is today the largest financial group in Quebec, the top cooperative financial group in Canada and the 6th largest in the world, with 5.6 million members and clients, 46,000 employees serving 400,000 businesses in Canada, and $190.1 billion in total assets as of December 31th, 2011. The same year, the highly regarded magazine *Corporate Knights* announced that it has ranked the Desjardins Group first on its list of the Best 50 Corporate Citizens in Canada. Desjardins is also active in 25 developing and emerging countries through *Développement international Desjardins* (DID).

CONCLUSION

The Rangarajan Committee of Financial Inclusion has defined Financial Inclusion as "the process of ensuring access to financial services and timely and adequate credit where needed by vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low income groups at an affordable cost." As an example, India is the largest producer of bananas in the world and it holds 23% of the market share of international banana production. Because of a lack of supporting infrastructures or resources, small farmers are unable to sell their product on the international market and India thus has almost zero shares in global banana exports. As a rapidly growing economy, India must tap into this unexplored potential to maintain the momentum of rapid growth. India needs to learn lessons from China who has proven, by harnessing the immense potential of the rural economy, that financing weaker and marginal sections is not charity work, but a significant source of future economic growth.

There has been appreciable progress in extending financial services to poor and weaker sections in India. But all the collective efforts get marred by various institutionalized problems. The specialized agencies, like RRBs and Cooperatives, working exclusively in the field of social banking and financial inclusion, have very poor financial health indicators. The sustainability and viability of these institutions have remained the cause of concern for the regulating bodies. Large number of defaults, high operational expenses, tardive technological upgrades, etc. can be cited as some of the problems being faced by these specialized bodies. The presence of multiple agencies working in the common field of operations has also been led to numerous cases of defaults because of

multi-financing and over-financing. Commercial banks, RRBs, Cooperatives, NBFCs, MFIs along with Foreign Banks complete the map of financial inclusion and social banking programmes in India and their participation in the agenda of financial inclusion has resulted in a increase of beneficiaries and a quantum of financing to weaker sections.

Understanding an institution like the Desjardins Group and the way it has managed to grow into the largest cooperative financial network of Canada, when founded on the small savings of people who were excluded from the formal financial network should inspire the agenda for policymakers in India. By concentrating first on the small savings of the poor, prudent lending policies with productive purposes and the training of borrowers toward financial emancipation, Desjardins has grown to the point that it has been able to adopt the latest technology to reduce the operational expenses to remain financially and technologically viable and, with adequate supervision, to expand its domain of operations in different fields of financial activities to allow its customers a single window access to all their financial services requirements. Desjardins has proved that, starting with people neglected by the normal financial infrastructure, a well-managed financial cooperative services network has the capacity to tap into and channel unexplored local capacities. The success of Desjardins can be an example to follow for Indian financial institutions dedicated to offering services under a social banking and financial inclusion agenda.

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LES ACTIVITÉS BANCAIRES SOCIALEMENT RESPONSABLES ET L'INCLUSION FINANCIÈRE EN INDE: LEÇONS DE L'EXPÉRIENCE DE DESJARDINS

Le comité d'inclusion financière de la Banque nationale pour l'agriculture et le développement (NABARD) a défini l'inclusion financière comme le: *procédé utilisé afin d'assurer l'accès aux services financiers ainsi qu'à des opportunités adéquates de crédit par les groupes vulnérables, par exemple les groupes plus faibles et les groupes plus pauvres, à un coût abordable.* Un système bancaire socialement responsable et l'inclusion financière sont devenus d'une grande importance afin d'amener les populations marginalisées à entrer dans la normalité.

Le système bancaire socialement responsable permet de diminuer les coûts des services, et donc de les rendre abordables et accessibles pour les plus vulnérables. 750 millions des gens les plus pauvres dans le monde vivent dans les zones rurales des pays en voie de développement. Ces gens ont un niveau d'éducation plus bas et sont moins en santé. De plus, ils ont un accès limité à des services de base tels que l'eau et les services sanitaires. Paradoxalement, bien qu'ils dépendent de l'agriculture pour survivre, ils souffrent de la faim et de l'insécurité alimentaire.

L'absence de services bancaires et de crédit accessible est considérée comme la raison première derrière cette pauvreté de masse. L'expérience démontre en effet que les conditions de vie d'une famille s'améliorent drastiquement lorsqu'elle accède à des services de crédit abordables.

Inclusion financière

Le financement traditionnel dans les zones rurales en Inde consiste en un système incluant des prêteurs, des propriétaires terriens, des fermiers bien nantis, des marchands, etc. Les fonds ainsi obtenus de sources non institutionnelles et informelles sont souvent une source d'exploitation et sont caractérisés par des taux d'intérêt élevés, des pratiques usuraires provoquant l'endettement prolongé et même intergénérationnel. Afin de contrer cette exploitation, un grand nombre d'agences, incluant des coopératives, des banques rurales régionales, des institutions financières autres que des banques, des groupes de soutien, interviennent dans le paysage bancaire rural et représentent les institutions modernes de crédit. Ces réseaux travaillent comme intermédiaires financiers en plus de jouer un rôle primordial dans l'économie rurale. Le 11e Plan de cinq ans envisageait la croissance économique inclusive comme un objectif primordial. Le plan envisage de

restructurer les politiques afin d'accélérer la croissance économique et d'assurer l'inclusion économique sur l'ensemble du territoire. Les politiques ont été mises en place afin d'accroître les opportunités d'emplois et les revenus et ont prévu l'accroissement du financement des programmes susceptibles de rendre la croissance plus inclusive.

Les défis du programme d'inclusion financière en Inde:

* L'augmentation remarquable du crédit dans les milieux ruraux grâce aux agences institution-nelles s'est aussi accompagnée d'un haut taux de défaut de paiements, ce qui a eu un impact négatif sur la santé financière et la persistance des institutions usurières.

* Les efforts autour de l'inclusion financière sont majoritairement restreints à l'assistance financière. Le nombre important de cas de défaut de paiements dans des secteurs prioritaires démontre que nous nous sommes écartés du but initial d'augmenter notre potentiel d'action et la responsabilisation financière des populations, spécialement des femmes et des autres groupes vulnérables.

* La présence de multiples agences offrant du crédit dans un même secteur d'opération et une dispersion du crédit d'une manière non coordonnée résultent dans certains cas en un surfinancement de certaines activités, ou en un sous-financement d'autres activités.

* L'absence de technologies de pointe ou le délai à les obtenir, en particulier dans les coopéra-tives et les BRRs, affectent les coûts et l'efficacité des opérations dans l'extension de services finan-ciers abordables.

* Avec l'augmentation du niveau de vie et des exportations agricoles, les prochaines années verront une augmentation de la demande pour du crédit rural.

Leçons du groupe Desjardins

Au tournant du 20e siècle, la vie sociale et économique du Québec était caractérisée par des pratiques usuraires, principalement dues à l'absence d'infrastructures financières institutionnelles acces-sibles aux moins nantis. Cet état des choses menait à des conditions de vie difficiles pour les canadiens-français qui se trouvaient ainsi surendettés et pouvaient donc perdre leur propriété agricole et donc leur gagne-pain. Les difficultés d'accès au crédit responsable limitaient aussi l'accès aux nouvelles technologies dans le secteur agricole résultant en une faible productivité du secteur. Cela résulta en un haut taux de migration des francophones les plus pauvres. Les conditions socio-économiques de l'Inde rurale actuelle ressemblent à certains égards à celles du Québec du 20e siècle.

En 1900, Alphonse Desjardins fonda la Caisse, une institution coopérative. Il se concentra d'abord sur la promotion des valeurs d'épargne et d'un mode de vie prudent parmi les francophones pauvres. Les maigres épargnes locales furent à la base du capital des Caisses et furent utilisées pour accorder du crédit aux membres individuels à des fins productives, mais aussi pour financer le développement local et celui des activités communautaires. Après des débuts très modestes, le groupe des caisses Desjardins est aujourd'hui le plus grand groupe financier au Québec, en plus d'être la plus grande coopérative financière au Canada. Elle est la sixième plus grande coopérative financière au monde, avec 190.1 milliards d'actifs et 5.6. Millions de membres-clients. Elle compte 46,000 employés, servant 400,000 entreprises au Canada.

En Inde, il y a un progrès appréciable pour faciliter l'accès des services financiers par les populations plus vulnérables, mais tous ces efforts collectifs ont été marqués par divers problèmes institutionnels. Les agences spécialisées comme les BRRs et les coopératives qui travaillent exclusivement à développer les activités bancaires socialement responsables et l'inclusion financière ont des indicateurs de santé financière qui inquiètent les agences de réglementation. Ces inquiétudes se basent particulièrement sur le nombre élevé de défauts de paiement, les dépenses opérationnelles élevées et le retard dans l'adoption des nouvelles technologies qui entravent leurs efforts de promotion de l'inclusion financière. Une institution comme Desjardins peut être une source d'inspiration pour les responsables des politiques de développement de l'inclusion financière en Inde. À travers la mobilisation de l'épargne des pauvres et des politiques prudentes de crédit à des fins productives, la formation et la supervision des emprunteurs, Desjardins a démontré que la tranche de la population négligée par les grandes institutions financières peut représenter un immense potentiel si nous arrivons à mobiliser et à organiser ses capacités inexplorées.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS AND REVIEWING APPROACHES FOR EQUITABLE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

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BACKGROUND

Building on a diversity of challenges and experiences between health researchers in India and in Canada over the past five years, the goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how a partnership across borders and viewpoints can coalesce around converging preoccupations: the identification and processes of integrating a sex and gender lens into programs and policies addressing tuberculosis (TB) prevention, detection and management in vulnerable contexts. We wish to discuss the values added of multidisciplinary, inter-sectoral collaborative, strengths-based, participatory approaches as essential ingredients for the development, implementation and evaluation of sustainable, ethical and quality interventions and training programs for TB prevention, detection and management in countries such as India.

Using examples from a diversity of case studies, our aim is to demonstrate the importance of gathering or deriving sex and gender sensitive data in order to develop and implement interventions. These are in view of enhancing the health system performance and offer a best quality of care to women, men and families.

The biological concept of "sex" needs to be distinguished from the notion of "gender." Gender is generally defined in the social realm, compared to the biological anchor of the notion of "sex" (Johnson, Greaves and Repta, 2008). The latter is generally constant, while the former is perpetually in flux, socially defined and responding to the social, cultural, economic and political dictates of a given society. Gender can broadly be as how a woman, a man, a boy, or a girl is perceived and expected to behave in the society where he or she "belongs" (Iyer, Sen and Östlin, 2008; Vissandjée and Pai, 2008). Therefore, while the terms "sex" and "gender" may be often used interchangeably, they represent distinct units of analysis.

Accounting for sex and gender in health requires that interventions, programs and policies are examined in order to unravel potential situations of inequality in the distribution of resources, as well as the differing social determinants of access to services for women and men in selected spheres of a society. Accounting for sex and gender in health requires the consideration of differential trajectories and, if and when appropriate, must, like the declaration of human rights, be reinforced by ethical values, namely highlight the level of responsibility of those who are bound to deliver quality health care services for all (Selgelid and Relchman 2011).

INROADS TO EQUITY: ACCOUNTING FOR THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH

Tuberculosis (TB), an infectious disease caused by the tuberculin bacillus Mycobacterium tuberculosis, is often associated with high mortality if left untreated; yet, despite being treatable with antibiotics, tuberculosis ranks as the second most fatal infectious disease (WHO, 2011). Because it is contagious, the prevalence of TB is high in densely populated environments where housing is poorly ventilated; such situations are typical in shantytowns of large urban cities in India. In 2011, India had one of the heaviest burdens of TB cases of any country in the world. There is also the additional burden of a form of extra resistant TB (Kamineni *et al.*, 2011). Its estimated 2.0 to 2.5 million cases represented 26% of the global burden in India (WHO, 2011).

While a great deal of progress has been made in global TB control in recent years through the large-scale implementation of DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment with Short course regimen) and the availability of effective diagnostics and antibiotic treatment, the global incidence of TB and MDR-TB (multi-drug resistant TB) remains on

the rise. The global TB targets, namely, detecting 70% of cases, successfully treating 85% of the latter and halving the prevalence and TB associated mortality by 2015 as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) could likely be met only if current sex and gender sensitive efforts are intensified and targeted to reach the most vulnerable. Efforts, in countries such as India, to provide effective and accessible TB prevention, identification and treatment are fraught with multiple, interrelated challenges such as near-global health-system transitions, challenging coordination between private and public providers, guidelines standardization with the private sector, increasing rural-urban as well as international migration leading to selected co-morbid issues such as HIV/AIDS, diabetes, malnourishment, and alcohol and tobacco use. Against such a backdrop, this paper calls for sex and gender sensitive interventions carried out with a participatory approach to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals while addressing trans-disciplinary and intersectoral challenges associated with TB identification, prevention and management (WHO, 2010).

The literature indicates that sex and gender-related inequalities play a decisive role in the spread and control of TB (Somma *et al.*, 2008). These include the risks of exposure to the bacteria, the types of requests for care, the reactions in healthcare systems, the socio-economic context, and the risk of stigmatisation. These same studies show that women and men with TB are affected by stigma differentially. Such perceptions have been found to affect women more often than men, leading to situations of withdrawal both from the family network and from the health and social-services system. In a comparative analysis of likelihood to disclose TB status in India, men were twice as likely as women to disclose to a confidant (Somma *et al.*, 2008). Although more men generally contract TB, the disease is liable to have serious, even fatal, consequences when women are infected, and it is one of the main causes of death among them (WHO, 2011). However, the cure success rate is higher for women than men, who are more prone to abandon treatment before completion (WHO, 2011).

Introducing a sex and gender lens is essential to enable an improved understanding of the influence of societal norms regarding gender roles on equitable access to health care. Societal norms often impact the social determinants of health in a way that directly disadvantages women and girls. Particularly in low to middle income countries, such as India, women and girls are found to experience lower income, reduced access to and representation within the workforce, a disproportionate care-giving burden, increased exposure to violence and higher degrees of poverty and marginalization compared to men and boys. The negative impacts of these social determinants result

in a reduced tendency of women and girls to seek out or access health care services. In addition, women and girls often have fewer services available to them and experience more physical and mental illnesses compared to men and boys (Sen and Ostlin, 2008).

Introducing sex and gender dimensions in the assessment of TB is more than ascertaining which sex has a higher prevalence rate, or a higher fatality rate. It also includes looking at other issues such as differences in risk of exposure to infection, in health-seeking behaviour and health systems response, economic consequences, and stigma associated with being known as a woman or a man with TB. Consequently, though some may contend that, given inconsistent definitions and metrics, a consideration of sex and gender is too complex a task, the reflections presented in this chapter point to the need to shift health care professionals' focus to the ethical consequences of not doing so.

In light of this complexity, negotiations within the research team centred on a number of questions: What are the complex social, political and economic forces that differentially shape the lives of women and men, especially those in difficult health situations—the very people for whom we must develop programs and strategies that take their living environment into account? Would it not be consistent to stress that an intervention geared towards the recognition of strengths should be included in programs when there is a risk of disempowerment? What about the capacity for resilience and collective action, for building on the resources of the network even as the disease heightens the risk of stigmatisation? How does a participatory approach with an equity lens contribute to alleviating vulnerability?

The partnership-based approach rests on an aspiration to tolerance, knowledge and cultural diversity, one which would be rooted in social and economic responsibility. This approach is consistent with findings that involvement in community health initiatives, with or without economic incentives, often incurs benefits in the areas of education, employability, social respect and personal empowerment, resulting in a mutually bene-ficial engagement at the individual and community level, assuming there is alignment of the context-specific expectations of community members, programme managers and policy makers (Glenton *et al.*, 2010).

With such a background, it is expected that sex and gender sensitivity allows better deciphering of the complexity of health experiences that emerge at loci of daily interactions at times at the heart of unequal relations and rights (Sen and Ostlin, 2008). To echo Sen (2009), one needs to be aware that the conditions of vulnerability associated with gender and migration experiences do potentially affect freedom and rights.

INTERDISCIPLINARY AND INTERSECTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

In terms of ethics, as partnerships are built, terms, approaches, scientific and experiential knowledge of each member need be accounted for. Agreeing on definitions (of sex, gender, migration, social vulnerability, risk, among other concepts); agreeing on results in the search for best practices; and agreeing on how to adapt and implement "best practices" in the field, we were able to create a common and innovative dynamic relation as we evolved in our partnership. Determinants of effective relationships call for "intercultural effectiveness" and stress such skills as acknowledgment of mutual strengths, interpersonal adaptability and a spirit of initiative to develop collaborative strategies makers (Vissandjee *et al.*, 2002; Glenton &. al, 2010; South, Kinsella & Meah, 2012).

The common goal of fostering social transformation and changes in practice requires respect; respect in acknowledging differences, in allowing for specific contributions and varying knowledge-sharing strategies. Our research group was built up through teamwork and cooperation; our emphasis was on sex and gender issues in TB-protection, detection and management programs to ensure they reach those who are most vulnerable.

While what was discussed in this chapter aimed to implement TB prevention and treatment best practices and sensitive processes to social context for countries such as India, the scientific and social implications extend beyond geographical specificity. Assessing international TB programs and literature related to TB prevention and management accounting for sex, gender and migration experience sensitivity is expected to also benefit programs in Canada, given the increasing diversity of migration source countries. In Montreal, Quebec, Canada, about 150 cases per year occurred from 2000 to 2006, 80% of which affected women and men born outside of Canada. In many parts of Canada, India has remained the second most important source country for new immigrants since 1997 (in 2006, 12.2% of new permanent residents in Canada were born in India).

INROADS TO EQUITY: PARTNERSHIP IN ACTION, THE CASE OF *SAVE A MOTHER* (SAM)

Save A Mother (SAM), a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2008, works to design health care solutions for rural communities in India, with a focus on maternal and child health and TB. SAM has had astounding success with a behavior change communication program for maternal health in partnership with low-income women in Uttar Pradesh in India. SAM has achieved a 90% reduction in the maternal mortality ratio over three years, using simple, low-cost, social marketing tools delivered by local health promoters with frequent repetition of key messages (SAM, 2011). This approach is now being implemented along with women and men towards more sensitive TB management strategies in rural UP.

Intersectoral and international partnerships have been integral to the success of SAM's programs. In Uttar Pradesh, SAM partners with Rajiv Gandhi Mahila Vikas Pariyojana (RGMVP) based in Lucknow. RGMVP has helped collectivize over 400,000 women across 200 blocks of UP and are in the midst of scaling up to over one million members. While their primary focus is microcredit and finance, SAM provides the technical expertise for healthcare and leverages RGMVP's platform to reach women and families through organized groups. This partnership has allowed the maternal health program to scale to over 50,000 villages in UP through further partnerships with UNICEF and The Gates Foundation. Likewise, in Karnataka, SAM partners with local organizations in order to amplify the reach of programs.

There is a high burden of TB in the areas where SAM works, almost seven fold higher than previously reported. In addition, there appears to be a gender bias in terms of TB detection and management. In such a scenario, partnership of local NGO's with the government run RNTCP program and DOTS centres is instrumental for TB management programs. Currently, less than 35% of households in rural Uttar Pradesh are aware of the free national public health program for diagnosis and treatment of TB (District Level Household and Facility Survey, 2007-2008). In addition, data from a pilot study of 25 villages in UP indicate that women are less likely than men to get tested for TB; while 60% of men with TB symptoms underwent sputum testing, only 40% of women with symptoms identified through community meetings went for diagnostic tests. Consequently, SAM is working with local and government partners to strengthen sex, gender and migration experience sensitive TB management, prevention and detection in partnership with local women and men in selected target areas.

The qualitative impacts of these programs were demonstrated to transcend health care. Empowering women through health knowledge has increased demand for public health services leading to an improvement in public health delivery as well as other in realms such as attitude towards education of the girl-child. Such results reinforce the importance of integrating a sex and gender approach with the goal of enhanced equity in health service access and reflexive ethical integrity in overall health programs in addition to the ones aimed at TB prevention, detection and management.

AVENUES FOR FURTHER REFLECTION

Global partnerships, incorporating participatory research approaches are needed to address socially relevant responses and practices to global health issues (Vissandjee & Pai, 2007). Community-oriented, gender-sensitive partnerships cannot be overlooked to address both socio-cultural barriers to care as well as resources of those providing treatment. TB programs and services need and should be designed to provide outreach and home-visits for women and men who cannot leave their homes, flexible opening hours at accessible and secure clinic locations as well as health workers trained to identify and respond to challenges associated with social processes and stigma as they affect TB management and control.

We have argued that in order to better understand the significant variations that may enhance women and men's capacities for resilience or conversely expose them to situations of risk, programs such as the ones for TB prevention, detection and management must be adjusted to better deal with and, indeed, highlight the intersecting nature of the social determinants of health. Education and training strategies among a diversity of health care workers – from lay to specialists – must allow for simultaneity in the analysis of the relationship between disease, health care delivery systems, sex and gender and socio-cultural patterns as they are built in the living conditions of women and men going through selected health experiences. Interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral partnerships must reinforce this need for the integration of such an empowerment driven and equity based approach to ethical interventions in public health.

Initiatives to redress persistent gender inequities need to address both the lack of resources and barriers (basic needs approach) as well as the opportunity to attain personal (including health) outcomes (capabilities approach); both are integral components of effective health programs from prevention to treatment taking into account the involvement of communities (Vissandjee *et al.*, 2012). Mainstreaming gender and equity needs to be acknowledged as a critical aspect in the prevention and control of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis.

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LA CRÉATION DE PARTENARIATS
ET L'ÉTUDE DES APPROCHES POUR
UN ACCÈS ÉQUITABLE AUX SOINS DE SANTÉ

L'intégration des notions de sexe et genre dans l'évaluation de la tuberculose requiert d'aller au-delà de l'identification de qui, homme ou femme, a un taux élevé de prévalence ou de mortalité. Cette appréciation des différences entre les sexes exige de se pencher sur d'autres questions telles que les différences de risque d'exposition à l'infection, aux comportements de santé, aux réponses établies par le système de santé, les conséquences économiques et sociales, incluant une perception de stigmatisation.

Si certains peuvent prétendre que, compte tenu de définitions imprécises, parfois incohérentes, d'outils de mesure limités sinon inexistants de ces déterminants de la santé que sont le sexe, le genre et l'expérience migratoire, l'effort d'inclure ces considérations fait partie des arguments présentés dans ce chapitre. Il est important que les professionnels de la santé se penchent et soient formés pour le faire sur l'éthique inhérente de leur pratique qui se doit d'être sensible à ces trajectoires diversifiées des femmes, des hommes, des filles et des garçons requérant des soins de santé.

C'est dans le cadre d'une telle complexité que le présent chapitre vise à illustrer les diverses négociations que les partenaires (chercheurs et intervenants terrain) ont construites au sein de l'équipe de recherche, en se basant, pour ce faire, sur certaines questions: De quelle façon doit-on, peut-on tenir compte des forces sociales, politiques et économiques qui façonnent la vie différemment des femmes et des hommes, en particulier dans le domaine de la santé, alors que des programmes sont censés être élaborés justement pour les rejoindre? De quelle façon doit-on doser la nature des implications, de la participation dans les stratégies visant l'*empowerment* afin de ne pas se déresponsabiliser en tant qu'intervenant ou de mettre inutilement des personnes dans des situations à risque? Qu'en est-il de la capacité de résilience et des ressources dans les actions collectives à considérer alors que c'est souvent le réseau de soutien lui-même qui est à l'origine de certaines perceptions de stigmatisation? Comment une approche participative avec une perspective d'équité contribue-t-elle à atténuer la vulnérabilité?

Nous soutenons que dans le but de mieux comprendre les variations importantes qui peuvent améliorer les capacités des femmes et des hommes pour la résilience ou au contraire les exposer à des situations de risque, des programmes tels que ceux de prévention de la tuberculose, de la détection et de la gestion doivent être ajustés afin de mieux traiter et, en effet, souligner le caractère intersectionnel des déterminants sociaux de la santé. Les stratégies d'éducation et de formation à mettre en place auprès d'une diversité de professionnels de la santé doivent ainsi permettre la simultanéité dans l'analyse de la relation entre les systèmes de santé et les défis d'une prestation de soins de qualité dans une perspective éthique et de justice sociale. Des partenariats interdisciplinaires et intersectoriels construits dans le respect et l'éthique devraient permettre de renforcer cette nécessité de l'intégration des déterminants sociaux de la santé vers une responsabilisation basée sur l'équité et l'éthique dans le domaine de la santé.

**The Research Pole on India and South Asia (PRIAS)
is a research network composed of India specialists
from Canada, France, and India.**

Its main objective is to develop interdisciplinary expertise in order to better understand the dynamics shaping the region and its people by facilitating dialogues between academics from around the world. PRIAS encourages the development of exchanges among government agencies, local and international institutions, as well as students and concerned citizens. The core axes of research initiatives developed by PRIAS are Cultural diversity in South Asia and Contemporary challenges of pluralism in the region.

http://www.cerium.ca/PRIAS

Canadian Studies Programme (CSP) of the Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies, School of International Studies (SIS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi is a full-fledged Area Studies programme on Canada in an Indian university. First of its kind, the CSP is a taught-cum-research programme at the Master's and doctoral level on contemporary Canada. After its establishment in 2001-02, the programme has produced many doctoral and research monographs on Canada, a substantial number of which have a focus on Quebec.

The scope and objective of the CSP are as follows:

- to develop and expand inter-disciplinary studies on Canada including facilitating research and education about Canada;

- to provide outreach programming to the wider community including scholarly conferences/ workshops, field trips and developing curricula for under- and post-graduate studies on Canada in order to raise awareness about Canadian realities in India; and

- to foster productive exchanges between Indian and Canadian scholarship on themes of mutual interest with a view to improve India-Canada bilateral relations.

Ceetum

Centre d'études ethniques
des universités montréalaises

Le Centre d'études ethniques des universités montréalaises (CEETUM) est un regroupement stratégique soutenu par le Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture (FRQ-SC). Il s'agit d'un centre de recherche interuniversitaire et pluridisciplinaire qui regroupe des chercheurs provenant de sept institutions universitaires, spécialisés dans l'étude des relations ethniques au Québec, au Canada et ailleurs dans le monde par la participation à des projets ou réseaux internationaux.

Le CEETUM intègre aussi des membres provenant d'autres organismes gouvernementaux ou des milieux de pratique. Le regroupement comprend quatre universités partenaires: l'Université de Montréal, qui assure la gestion du centre, l'Université du Québec à Montréal, l'Université de Sherbrooke et l'Institut national de la recherche scientifique-Centre Urbanisation Culture Société.

La perspective théorique qui définit le programme de recherche du CEETUM permet d'aborder la persistance de l'ethnicité, sous ses divers marqueurs, comme facteur explicatif des inégalités ou comme ressort de mobilisation qui génèrent des débats importants sur les modèles de citoyenneté à privilégier. Les quatre axes de sa programmation sont:

- Intégration des personnes issues de l'immigration: spatialité, économie et cohabitation
- Éducation et rapports ethniques
- Langues, identités, relations intergroupes
- Pluralité religieuse: enjeux sociaux, politiques et juridiques

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The Centre d'études ethniques des universités montréalaises (CEETUM) supported by the Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture (FRQ-SC) of the Quebec government. is an inter-university and multidisciplinary research centre that brings together researchers from seven university institutions, specializing in the study of ethnic relations in Quebec and Canada as well as elsewhere in the world through participation in international projects and networks.

The CEETUM also includes members from government and community organisations. The group includes Université de Montréal, which manages the Centre, Université du Québec à Montréal, Université de Sherbrooke and Institut national de la recherche scientifique-Centre Urbanisation Culture Société.

The theoretical perspective defining CEETUM's research program addresses the persistence of ethnicity under its different markers as a factor contributing to inequalities or as a launching point for important debates on the desirable citizenship models. The four main components of the program are:

- Integration of Immigrants: Spatial Factors, Economy and Cohabitation
- Education and Ethnic Relations
- Languages, Identities and Intergroup Relations
- Religious Plurality: Social, Policy and Legal Issues

http://www.ceetum.umontreal.ca